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To Nani, Marta, Pinuccia and Tarcisio 
"How did Warsaw become Warsaw? First they built one house, then another, 
and gradually a city emerged. Everything grows. Even stones grow. " 
I. B. Singer (1962), Storiesfor Children. 
Meytl, meytl, ch'vel bay dir fregn: Maiden, maiden I would like to ask you: 
vos ken vaksn, vaksn on regn? ( ... ) what can grow without rain? Narisher bokher, vos darfstu fregn? Silly lad, why do you ask? 
A shteyn ken vaksn, vaksn on regn A stone can grow without rain 
Tum balalayka, (popular Yiddish song) (English translation by Klezmer Conservatory Band) 
Unless the Lord builds the house, its builders labor in vain. 
Psalm 127 
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Summary 
The location of productive activities and the emergence of clustering dynamics has been 
an important research topic since the early works of Weber (1929) and Marshall (1920 
and 1921). This thesis aims at relating the processes of firms' location decision and the 
development of high-tech clusters within an encompassing theoretical and empirical 
framework. 
The thesis shows the empirical relevance of the clustering of high-tech sectors and 
highlights the importance of the issue through the construction and use of an original 
database on the location of high-tech establishments and employment (at two different 
geographical levels) in four major industrialised countries. It also contains a critical 
review of a number of different streams of theoretical and empirical literature which are 
directly connected, or which have been explicitly put in connection by the author, with 
the topic of study. In the thesis we develop a composite modelling framework for 
analysing firms' location decisions and the growth of high-tech clusters, and we 
empirically test a number of crucial hypotheses in order to draw some guidelines for 
economic policy. 
The models presented in the theoretical chapter derive from two different streams of 
literature. The first derives from the analysis of population ecology, the second from the 
theory of innovation diffusion. These modelling frameworks have stressed the existence 
of a critical mass and a maximum dimension of the cluster and their effects on the early 
and late phases of development within the "life cycle" of a cluster. They also highlighted 
the role of rank, stock, order and epidemics effects in the location decision of an 
individual firm which has to decide whether to locate into a developing cluster. 
The empirical evidence presented in the thesis has focused on the crucial elements of the 
location process by verifying the empirical relevance of different locational factors, has 
stressed the relative importance of agglomeration versus scale economies in determining 
the industrial specialisation of an area, and has measured the competitive effects which 
arise between the development of different clusters and the synergistic effects which are 
generated within the cluster. Finally the thesis presents empirical evidence which shows 
that local competition and industrial specialisation are the key elements for the success 
of an industrial cluster. 
A final chapter extracts some crucial policy conclusions on the role of entry versus 
growth policies, on the different development path that an industrial cluster may follow 
depending on the excludability condition, presents an original taxonomy of specific 
policies, applies some of these findings to a brief survey of the phenomenon of science 
parks and finally produces a series of guidelines for policy makers. 
The conclusion surnmarises the results obtained in the thesis and present a brief agenda 
for future research. 
xi 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Across a line drawn from New York to Los Angeles, the level 
of economic activity is hardly uniform. In principle, the 
regional economist ought to be able to predict the 
agglomeration of activity at certain points ( ... ). 
R. E. Hall (1991), Booms and Recessions in a Noisy Economy. 
This thesis aims to study the location process of high-technology firms and to analyse 
the emergence of spatial clustering in such innovative sectors. 
The relevance of the issue at study is witnessed by its current centrality in the theoretical 
and empirical literature, and in the policy debate. From a theoretical viewpoint, the 
analysis of spatial problems (of "geography and trade") has recently been re-admitted to 
the realm of economic theory after long years of exile. From an empirical perspective, 
the analysis of spatial knowledge spillovers, together with inter-industrial ones is getting 
much attention from the scholars. From a policy-oriented standpoint, the current world- 
wide globalisation process, together with continental processes of integration, has 
gradually but crucially shifted the focus far from the national level toward the two 
extremes: the regions and the world. 
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. 
The second chapter is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the problem. In the first 
sections of the chapter the empirical relevance of the issue is firstly discussed. Then a 
series of statistical and economic indicators, identifying and measuring spatial industrial 
clustering, are illustrated and applied to an original data-base, which has been built for 
the thesis, concerning four major industrialised countries (US, UK, France and Italy). 
The third chapter is devoted to a particular kind of literature survey. Different streams 
and also different disciplines have been reviewed in order to highlight the theoretical 
underpinnings of firm's location decisions and the dynamics of industrial clustering. In 
particular the first section is dedicated to the contributions put forward by the founding 
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fathers of location theory and to the analysis of three main approaches proposed by the 
so-called classical school: namely "least cost", "demand side" and "land utilisation" 
approaches. Subsequently the general equilibrium representation of the location problem 
has been examined, with specific reference to non-price interactions and monopolistic 
competition models. Strictly connected to the previous section, a further section is 
devoted to the literature originating from the contributions of Krugman, which are based 
on the introduction of increasing returns and imperfect competition into the neo- 
classical framework of general equilibrium. Another section deals with the "industrial 
geography" approach, which sees the economic regions as the product of the striving 
forces of industrial capitalism. This approach is followed by a survey of the 
"technological infrastructure approach", which stresses the relevance of scientific and 
technological agglomeration economies in determining the innovative performance of a 
region and its industrial specialisation. Two sections are respectively devoted to a brief 
survey of Porter's and Jacobs' contributes. These two authors, who belongs to the 
neighbouring scientific communities of strategic management theorists and economic 
historians, have acutely highlighted some interesting features of the process of 
development of industrial clusters. Another section deals with Arthur's contribution to 
the theory of industrial location and shows some interesting similarities and differences 
between this approach and the analysis of informational cascades. The final section of 
the literature survey looks at a peculiar approach to locational issue: the biological and 
ecological models, which deal with the locational process in a systemic framework. The 
chapter is concluded by a table which summarises the advantages and drawbacks of 
each approach when dealing with the topic of study. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the theoretical definition of a modelling framework 
able to explain the stylised fact of firm's location process and high-tech clustering. In 
particular the section 4.2 concentrates - from a macro-economic perspective - on the 
development path of industries and regions in order to explain two major questions: why 
do industrial clusters not grow infinitely and why do some cluster grow and others stay 
small and, sometimes, disappear. Section 4.3 introduces the role of firm expectations 
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into the ecological modelling framework in an attempt to build some explicit micro- 
foundation for this class of models. A first appendix (section 4.4) analyses the effects of 
changes in the macro-economic conditions at the national and international level on the 
development of the cluster and discusses the desirability of different local industrial 
policies. A second appendix (section 4.5) focuses - from a micro-economic perspective - 
on the application of models derived from diffusion theory to the location process in 
order to answer the following questions: Why is location a lengthy process? Why is 
development generally S-shaped? Why does it display significant variance across 
industries, regions and countries? 
The fifth chapter contains a brief review of the empirical literature on the geographical 
and agglomeration factors which explain the existence, the location and the growth of 
high-tech clusters. A section devoted to a discussion of the main methodological 
techniques (empirical surveys, statistical studies, econometric analyses and simulations) 
available to investigate the structure and the dynamics of innovative industrial clustering 
concludes the chapter. 
The sixth chapter contains the empirical analysis of the thesis and makes extensive use 
of the original data-set. In particular, after an introduction, the second section is devoted 
to the identification of the most relevant locational factors in explaining the location 
decision of US high-tech firms over the last decade. The third section analyses the 
relative importance of scale versus agglomeration economies in explaining the industrial 
specialisation of four major countries. In the same section the role of industrial and 
geographical spillovers is also explicitly examined. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 show the 
empirical potentialities and drawbacks of ecologically derived models in the analysis of 
the processes of firms location and of the development of industrial clusters. The sixth 
section builds a framework of analysis for testing the empirical relevance of three 
possible interpretations on how technological externalities and knowledge spillovers 
cause the growth of high-tech clusters. A final section surnmarises the empirical 
findings and tries to bring together the different and sometimes contrasting empirical 
results within an encompassing framework. 
3 
The seventh chapter presents the policy implications which derive from the analysis 
performed in the thesis. These are especially relevant for two main reasons. The first 
refers to the growing regional inequalities across regions. The second is the recent trends 
in EU economic policy and structural intervention programmes, which have shifted their 
focus from a sectoral to a territorial one. In particular, after an introduction, sections 7.2, 
7.3 and 7.4 analyse, from a policy perspective, the trade-off which exists between a 
development programme focused on geographical as opposed to agglomeration benefits. 
The fifth section underlines the issue of entry versus growth supporting policies, while 
section 7.6. shifts back into theory and addresses the fundamental question of the nature 
of an high-tech cluster. The seventh section applies the above analysis to a policy 
instrument which in the recent years has been diffusely used, misused and abused: the 
science park. A final section, with a bit of immodesty, tries to state a series of guidelines 
for public authorities which already deal and will deal, even more in the future, with the 
dynamics of industrial innovative clusters. 
A final chapter summarises the results of the thesis, and set the future research agenda. 
4 
Chapter 2 
What do we know about the clustering of high-tech 
firms? 
Regional or "spatial" economics can be summed up in the 
question: "What is where and why ( ... )? " Where refers to location in relation to other economic activity; it involves 
questions of proximity, concentration, dispersion, and similarity 
or disparity of spatial patterns ( ... ). Until fairly recently, 
traditional economists ignored the where question altogether, 
finding plenty of problems to occupy them without giving any 
spatial dimensions to their analysis. Traditional geographers, 
though directly concerned with what is where, lacked any real 
technique of explanation in terms of human behaviour and 
institutions to supply the why and resorted to mere description 
and mapping. 
E. M. Hoover (197 1), An Introduction to Regional Economics. 
Do firms cluster? 
From a theoretical viewpoint, when observing the spatial distribution of a phenomenon 
(say the location of firms) in a given territory (say a nation or a region), three main 
structures can emerge: clustering (i. e. most firms tend to concentrate in a single or in a 
few locations), avoidance (i. e. all firins tend to be uniformly scattered, in order to 
maximise inter-firm distances) and independence (i. e. no clear spatial pattern is visible, 
locations are as if determined by a random process). A specific branch of statisticsl is 
devoted to the identification of specific patterns of distributions of events over a plane 
which can be tested against the null hypothesis of "complete spatial randomness". Such 
an hypothesis implies (i) that the intensity of events (in our case firms' locations) does 
not vary over the plane and (ii) that there are no interactions among events2. It is easy to 
see that the location of firms does violate both hypotheses since (i) there are 
considerable variations in the spatial distribution of finTis and (ii) the previous location 
of firms at a given site is likely to influence (in various ways, both positively and 
negatively) the location of other firms in the same and in neighbouring areas. 
1 Namely the statistical analysis of spatial point patterns. 
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From an empirical point of view, firms generally do cluster, and they often cluster 
according to industry. In every country there is plenty of evidence of the phenomenon of 
local concentration of specific types of firms due to a plurality of different causes 
(historical events, knowledge spillovers, availability of raw materials etc. ). 
Moreover there is a conventional wisdom3 in the economic literature that high-tech 
firms are even more likely to cluster than other types of firms because of the relevance 
that agglomeration economies and knowledge spillovers play in these industries. Finally 
this process, which is often spontaneous, may be fostered by specific industrial and 
territorial policy interventions, e. g. the creation of science parks, in order to achieve 
traditional economic policy targets such as the reductions of unemployment, the 
promotion of economic and social cohesion, the improvement of the international 
competitiveness of the national economic system. 
This chapter aims at showing the empirical relevance of the issue discussed in the thesis. 
In order to accomplish this task we firstly analyse a series of graphical tools and 
statistical indexes which are used in order to detect and measure the existence and the 
size of clustering phenomena. The existing empirical evidence is briefly reviewed and 
then new empirical evidence relating to four developed countries is presented. 
2.2. How can clustering be detected? 
The phenomenon of industrial clustering4 can be roughly illustrated by a simple 
geographical re-aggregation5 of a general industrial data set - such as: the US County 
business patterns, the British Census of production, the French Enqu9te annuelle 
d'entreprise regionalis6e and the Italian Censimento generale dell'industria, 
2 The independence assumption would be violated if the existence of an event at a given point either 
encouraged or inhibited the occurrence of other events in the neighbourhood of that point. 
3 Although recently disputed by Krugman (1991a and 1991b). 
4 Although in the literature clustering and agglomeration are often used as synonyrnies, in the thesis the 
first will be used to define a static phenomenon of a higher than average spatial concentration of a given 
type of firms, while the second will be used in conjunction with the concepts of economies and 
diseconomies to define a dynamic phenomenon which can cause the existence of industrial clusters. 
5 However it is not so simple to obtain a geographical description of the productive structure of a 
Country. For the UK, for example, few data are published (in official ONS publications such as: Regional 
Trends, Local Authority District Analysis of UK Businesses, and Business Monitor) and often these data 
are aggregated at a geographical or a industry level which does not fit the scope of the analysis. For some 
countries (and in particular for the UK and France) it has thus been essential to acquire unpublished data. 
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commercio, servizi e artigianato - in order to observe the spatial distribution of Xj,., 
where X is the measured variable (this being the number of establishments, the 
employment level or the sales value) in industry i, in the geographical sub-unit r. 
The use of the letter r to define the geographical unit under study derives from the 
concept of region which will be used, throughout this work, to define a generic 
administrative sub-unit of a Country6. In this chapter, however, it will be used either the 
official national denominations (such as County and Region, for the UIK; Provincia and 
Regione, for Italy), or an artificial ad-hoc classification composed by FLAs and SLAs. 
First level area (FLA) defines: Provincia (I), County (UK), State (US) and Departement 
(F); second level area (SLA) defines: Regione (1), Region (UK), Census Division (US), 
Region (F). FLAs and SLAs have been created because of the lack of a coherent 
international hierarchic definition of geographical areas7. The classification used in the 
thesis is therefore based on a simple principle. FLA is defined as the first coherent level 
of an analysis of economies and diseconornies of agglomeration and is often used by 
policy maker as the first level of economic policy. SLA allows one to consider other 
sources which can explain the structure of industrial clustering by taking into account 
some macro factors and existing geographical differences within a country in the labour 
force skills, business climate, physical and informational infrastructures (such as the 
Italian or British "North-South divide", the US "industrial belts"). 
2.2.1. Simple counts, percentages and location maps 
Simply by looking at spatially re-arrangcd data sets, one may have a feeling of whether 
or not a relevant number of firms and workers belonging to certain industries are 
concentrated in some specific geographical area. One may further compare the local 
XiR 
amount of high-tech activities with the national average N, where 
N is the 
6 While the term cluster will be used to identify the economic entity which is defined by the combination 
of an industry and a region. 
7 EU has its own threefold geographical classification (NUTS) but this does not correspond to the single 
country definitions of administrative units (i. e. NUTS2 in Italy are not regions but sets of regions) and, by 
definition, does not take into account the US. 
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number of regions in the larger geographical area of reference (usually the nation) which 
N 
is called R, and XjR E, xi,. 
r=I 
One can also calculate the local percentage (of the national industry total) through the 
following ratio: 
AXj,. = 
Xr 
(2.1) 
XiR 
in order to measure the relative distribution of an industry in different regions8. 
Alternatively, if one plots the data (on establishments, employment or sales) regarding a 
specific industry or group of industries on the map of a country, and uses some simple 
graphical techniques (as using darker shades to indicate the presence of a stronger 
phenomenon or spot of different dimensions, where the dimension of the spot is 
proportional to the size of the variable under study), then the emergence of spatial 
concentration of Xj, can be made graphically evident. Figure 2.1. and 2.2 illustrate the 
use of such techniques9. 
8 This percentage is a building block of several concentration indexes which will be illustrated in section 
2.2.3. 
9 Throughout the thesis, US maps do not include Alaska and Hawaii in order to obtain a larger picture of 
"continental" USA. 
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Figure 2.1. Geographical distribution of integrated circuit manufacturing 
establishments (1982) 
New York - 
Now Arsey 
Figure 2.2. Location of US manufacturing employment (1990) 
Source: Harrington - Warf (1995) 
Source: Scott (1988a) 
However the simple geographical descriptions offered by such location maps cannot be 
taken as indisputable evidence of the existence of industrial clustering, for they can be 
criticised on a number of grounds. 
2.2. Z Relative vs. absolute effects 
The biased distribution of the percentages of establishments and employment towards 
certain locations can be simply due to the fact that some areas are larger and/or more 
densely populated than others. In order to achieve a more precise description of the 
clustering phenomenon one should thus utilise some slightly more sophisticated 
indexes. 
The easiest and most popular "trick", to solve the area size-bias problem, is to weight 
the number of firms and/or the level of regional employment in industry i by the size of 
the local population P,.. In this way, clustering in larger and densely populated areas is 
no longer overestimated. One then looks at PX, . where 
x 
jr PX ir = Pl. (2.2) 
However, when using this normalisation technique one must take into account that the 
spatial distribution of a population is not an entirely exogenous variable; on the contrary 
an industrially developed area is likely to have a density of population above the average 
because of the "labour market pull" phenomenon. One must also consider that, 
especially at low geographical levels, as in FLAs, such a technique does not take into 
account commuting and can therefore result in highly biased measurements. 
Alternatively, one can use as weights the local amount of manufacturing employment, 
Mjr, where I is the total of all manufacturing industries i. This last measure seems 
preferable because it takes into account the "manufacturing" size of the region and 
avoids the underestimation of particular locations (such as, for example, the Silicon 
Valley) where there is either a feeble manufacturing tradition (and a strong primary 
sector) or an extremely developed tertiary sector, and the only manufacturing activities 
in site belong to high-tech industries. Formally one then uses: 
Xir 
MXir 
M 
Ir 
(2.3) 
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A more subtle technique relates to the use of location quotient, LQi,, R, which allows one 
to compare the specialisation of an area with respect to a larger area unit (which is used 
as a reference). More formally, if one wants to measure the relative specialisation of 
region r in industry i with respect to a larger area R (say the nation) and the total of 
manufacturing industries I, by using the variable X (i. e. number of firms, size of 
employment, sales), then the location quotient can be written as follows: 
Xir 
xjr LQ, 
R X 
iR 
XIR 
(2.4) 
The location quotientlO measures the ratio between the industrial specialisation of the 
smaller area in comparison with that of the greater one; when its value is greater than 
one, then the local economy is more specialised (in that particular sector) than the larger 
economy; the opposite holds if the value is smaller than one. 
However it must be noted that location quotients - as with any other relative measure of 
specialisation - are not substitutes for absolute indexes, for the two give complementary 
information. Absolute indexes and their graphical counterparts (the so called location 
maps) show the localised consistence of a phenomenon; while relative indexes on the 
one hand may help to eliminate size related biases but, on the other, run the risk of 
overestimating specialisation in case of negligible absolute relevance. Furthermore the 
majority of micro phenomena involved in agglomeration dynamics have an intrinsically 
non linear nature, where threshold effects and critical sizes play a major role. For these 
reasons the absolute value of a localised variable can give more analytical insights than 
other more sophisticated relative indexes. 
Z2.3. Measures of spatial concentration and Inequality 
The study of industrial clustering is similar to the analysis of the degree of concentration 
of an industry. In other words the task of the researcher is similar: he/she must find a 
10 One may further note that this quotient has different names in different streams of literature. In the 
international economics literature, where the measured variable is the value of exports, it is called Balassa 
index or index of revealed comparative advantage; in the applied industrial economics literature, where 
the measured variable is the number of patents, it is called index of revealed technological advantages or 
index of comparative technological specialisation (Paci - Usai, 1997). 
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uni-dimensional measure, incorporating two relevant aspects of the structure: the 
number of units and the inequalities in size of such units 11. 
Thus the ideal index of spatial concentration SC should be a function of: the number of 
areas N where the studied phenomenon is present, and the size inequalities Q of the 
phenomenon across the areas (Waterson, 1984), such that: 
SC =f (N, Q); fN <OJQ >O 
for it is natural to assume that the smaller the number of areas where a given industry is 
present and the more unequal the distribution of the industrial location across these 
areas, the more spatially concentrated is the industry. There is an encompassing "and 
also enlightening way of thinking of concentration, namely as a weighted sum of (area) 
shares12: 
N 
sc, =I Sg(s, 
); 0: 5 g(s, 
) <I 
r=l 
where g(s,. ) is a weighting scheme" (Waterson, 1984, p. 168). 
Among all the possible indexes and measures of spatial concentration (which have been 
adapted from industrial economics handbooks) my thesis will focus on the following - 
concentration ratio, Herfindahl index, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient (in two 
different version), and Linda index - which may all be considered as different 
interpretations of the above mentioned general measure. 
The spatial concentration ratio SCR is the simplest and - ranking regions by the number 
of establishments (or level of employment) - is defined as the sum of the shares of 
industry located in the first n regions (where n is chosen as a significant threshold for 
measuring spatial concentration): 
n 
SCRi,, = 1, si, 
r=l 
< SCRj,, <I N 
(2.5) 
11 Here size refers to the local amount of the variable under study (number of establishments, 
employment level, etc. ). 
12 The share is calculated as the local amount of the measured variable divided by the national total and is 
thus equal to Axi,. defined as in (2.1). 
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SCRin is a discrete index, for it refers only to a specific point of the cumulative 
concentration curve (described below). For this reason it is possible that for different 
values of n, a given industry i may appear both more and less concentrated than another. 
Furthermore it appears rather arbitrary (if not useless) to compare SCRj,, for countries 
which have different numbers of sub-national areas N13. 
The second measure of concentration proposed is the spatial version of the Herfindahl 
index, which is defined as follows: 
N1 
SHi 1; si2r -: 5 SHi :51 (2.6) 
r=l 
N 
If an industry is equally distributed among all the areas (and therefore we deduce that 
clustering is not very prevalent), then SHj = 11? V. The more unequal is the geographical 
distribution of the industry (keeping N fixed) the closer the index is to one14. The main 
difference with the standard concentration ratio refers to the fact that in the industrial 
economics literature the maximum number of firms is an endogenous variable which 
can take very large values15. Here, on the contrary, the number of "populated areas" is 
upper bounded by the exogenous number of areas (FIAs or SLAs) in which the country 
is divided. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, we have calculated a non-nalised 
version of the index SNH, which takes into account the existing differences in N 
between various countries. Formally: 
SH, 
SNHj N 0: 5 SNHi :51 (2.7) N-1 
N 
This index has the advantage that its value varies between 0 (uniform distribution) and 1 
(locational monopoly) irrespective of the number of areas into which the country is 
divided. 
13 It is possible to normalise the value of SCRin in order to allow for international comparisons so that the 
transformed index, RSCRin, would vary between 0 and I irrespective of the value of N. RSCRin = (SCRin - 
n1N)1(J - n1N). However the value of such a transformation is at least doubtful since the direct connection 
with the percentage of the first n areas is lost. 
14 The limit being when the whole of an industry is concentrated in one single area, a situation which can 
be defined, following Arthur's (1990) terminology, as locational monopoly, where SCRi = 1. 
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The last concentration measure considered in the thesis is the Linda index, which is a 
discrete index based upon the concentration ratio allowing for inequalities between 
different largely "populated" areas which has been extensively used in EC studies of 
industrial concentration (Linda, 1986). The spatial version of Linda index for the first n 
regions (ranked as in expression 2.5) can be defined as follows: 
SL. 
1 n-r SCRr 
n(n - 1) r=l r SCR,, - 
SCR, 
(2.8) 
If all regions up to the nth are equally populated, then SL,, = I/ n. If the (n + 1)th region 
is much less populated than its predecessor, the index SL,,.,, will be much larger than 
SLn. The use of a series of Linda indexes, calculated for different values of n, helps to 
identify an "industry spatial core"16 which is defined by the number of regions for 
which a minimum value of SL,, is reached. 
Other measures used in the analysis - which cannot be properly defined as concentration 
indexes but rather as inequality measures - are the coefficient of vaiiation and the Gini 
coefficients. 
The coefficient of variation is the simplest statistical measure of inequality. It is 
calculated as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean of a distribution of a 
given variable and it is therefore independent of the variable's mean value. Formally, 
the spatial coefficient of variation can be expressed as follows: 
scv, = 
ail scv, ý: 0 (2.9) Xil. 
If an industry is evenly distributed across areas, then the value of the spatial coefficient 
of variation is equal to zero. The higher the value of SCV, the more unequal is the 
spatial distribution of the industry in a given territory. 
The Gini coefficient, which is commonly used to describe the degree of income 
inequality within a country, can be easily modified in order to measure the degree of 
15 And the average firm dimension is negligible, as in the perfect competition case. 
16 The industry spatial core - which can be seen as the spatial counterparts of Linda's original concept of 
"oligopolistic arena" - can be sensibly identified only if the selected areas (or at least a significant part of 
them) are spatially contiguous. 
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inequality in the spatial distribution of a given country. It is calculated as the ratio of 
two areas 17 described in figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3. Geometric representation of Gini coefficient 
I 
cumulative share of 
manufacturing 
Refer-ring to figure 2.3, the Gini coefficient is equal to AI(A+B); since the area of the 
triangle (A+B) is, by construction, equal to 112, it follows that 
A 
G= -= 2A = 1- 2B. A+B 
In this thesis two versions of the Gini coefficient have been used differing in the 
definition of "unifonn distribution". "Locational Gini coefficient" (LG) considers as 
uniform a spatial distribution of industry i such that each area r registers exactly 11N of 
the total of the industry; formally: 
N 
N+ 1- 21 rSir 
LGi 
N 
0: 5 LGi 51 (2.10) 
"Krugman-Gini locational coefficient"18 (KG), considers as uniform a spatial 
distribution of industry i such that each area registers exactly the same shares for 
industry i and for total manufacturing L Formally: 
17 The first being the area enclosed between the cumulative concentration curve (also called locational 
curve), and the diagonal of the diagram (a 45-degree line), the second being the area of the whole triangle 
(by construction equal to 112). 
18 This index has been known for a long time in the regional science literature as "index of localisatioW' 
(Florence, 1948; Isard, 1960). However in the thesis we call it "Krugman-Gini locational coefficient" 
since it has been re-discovered by mainstream economics after its use in Krugman (1991a). 
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cumulative share of industry i 
KG 
12 Xir 
_ 
XiR 
0: 5 KGj :51 (2.11) 2id Xlr XIR 
By referring to figure 2.3 in order to calculate KG we substituted the cumulative number 
of regions (from 1 to N) with the cumulative regional share of total manufacturing. To 
ensure a better comparability with LG, differently from Krugman (1991 a), we halved the 
value of his original index, so that in the thesis, KG varies between 0 and 1. 
A final index refers to the degree of spatial association displayed by different high-tech 
industries. This index, which is calculated as a correlation coefficient between the 
regional relative distribution of two industries, allows one to measure the degree of 
similarities existing between the spatial patterns of a couple of industrial sectors. 
IMX,, 
-MXjr .1 
SAij r 
)2(j: 
MXjr)2 
- 1: 5 SA, :51 (2.12) (I 
Mxir 
rr 
where MXir is defined as in (2.3). 
When the spatial association coefficient SAj is close to 1, the industries are highly 
spatially associated (when one industry records a high value in a region, the other 
records a high value too); when SAj is equal to - 1, there is spatial avoidance between 
the industries (when one industry is predominant in a region, the other is absent)19. By 
calculating the average across all high-tech industries within a country, one has a rough 
indication of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the locational preferences of high-tech 
industries. 
2. Z4. The definition of clusters 
0 Spatial definition 
A prime issue relates to the best geographical definition (or the size) of the area in 
which to detect clusters. In the empirical literature, different sizes have been chosen in 
order to identify finns clusters. 
19 This index is thus different from the index of geographic association (Florence, 1948) which, being 
based on the coefficient of localisation, varies between 0 (complete geographic association) and I (non 
geographic association). 
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If we limit the analysis to standard administrative entities for which data are available, 
one can study the process of firm location, in the US case, with respect to 4 Regions, 9 
Divisions, 51 States20 or 3126 Counties. In the UK one can base the analysis on 4 
Countries, 11 Regions, or 65 Counties2l. In Italy one can look at the agglomeration 
issue on the basis of 20 Regioni or 95 Province22. In France one can focus the analysis 
on 22 Rigions or 95 D9partements. 
In most cases, the level of the analysis is determined by the availability and the overall 
manageability23 of data. In general one must perform the analysis at the territorial level, 
which corresponds to what geographers would call "homogeneous or uniform region", 
(i. e. areas characterised by similar industrial structure, demographic patterns and labour 
market dynamics) and which fits best the topic at hand. However, it is very difficult to 
find such homogeneous regions in practice (Boudeville, 1966). For this reason, later in 
the chapter some descriptive analyses - aimed at showing the existence and the 
relevance of clustering of high-tech industries in different countries - have been 
performed both at the FLA (County in the UK, Departement in France, Provincia in 
Italy, State in the US) and at the SLA level (i. e. Region in the UK, Region in France, 
Regione in Italy, Census Division in the US). The use of SLAs allows one to test 
whether economies of agglomeration extend their influence over a wider space or, on 
the contrary, dynamics of locational orphaning prevail24. 
ii) Industrial sector definition 
This issue is threefold: it firstly relates to the definition of an industrial cluster per se, it 
also refers to the definition of what high-tech industries are, and finally it concerns the 
20 Since we count the District of Columbia as a State. 
21 Since we count Scottish Local Authorities as Counties. 
22 At present in Italy there are 103 Province. Since 1991 (date of the last industrial census) 8 new 
Province have been created by splitting old ones. 
23 There is a trade off between the level of geographic disaggregation (and accuracy) and the number of 
observations which can be reasonably studied. 
24 "When attractiveness varies smoothly over the landscape, then places near a location with a larger 
number of firms are similar to this location geographically; and they are not sufficiently more attractive to 
overcome the agglomeration advantage of their dominant neighbour. These places have become 
dynamically orphaned, and we can say they lie within the agglomeration shadow of their dominant 
neighbour" (Arthur, 1990, p. 240). 
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international comparability of different countries' industrial classifications, statistical 
standards and data collecting procedures. 
When one is interested in analysing industrial clustering - which is the product of 
several interacting forces such as, among others, enjoyment of agglomeration 
economies, reduction of search costs, exploitation of a localised source of skilled 
labour25 - one should carefully consider what is the most appropriate level of analysis 
(usually expressed in terms of number of digits in the official industrial classification). 
Wider definitions of industries runs the risk of mixing high-tech and not so high-tech 
activities, narrower ones may prevent the identification and the analysis of technological 
and productive interdependencies existing between different sub-sectors within the same 
industry26. 
With regards to the sectoral definition of high-technology activities, in this work we 
examine the most prominent high-tech sectors according to the OECD (1986) definition 
which is based on the percentage of sectoral R&D expenditure over total sales, which 
that should exceed the value of 3%27. The high-tech sectors analysed in the thesis are: 
Aerospace, Computers and office machinery, Electronic components, Pharmaceuticals 
and Instruments. The last industry - for all countries, except France - has been divided 
into 4 homogeneous sub-sectors: Medical instruments, Measurement instruments, 
Industrial process control instruments, and Optical and photographic equipment. 
We built a macro-sector (called total high-tech) as the sum of the previously mentioned 
industries and - in order to test the claim of Krugman (1991a) that agglomeration is not 
specific to high-tech industry but, on the contrary, it is displayed more fiercely by 
"traditional" sectors - we chose two "benchmark sectors" to represent the medium and 
the low technology industries: Motor vehicles and Textiles. In this way, industries 
25 For more on this issue, see section 5.2.4. 
26 This is a debated issue. Swann et al. (1998) use a narrower level of industrial classification, than the 
one used in the thesis, arguing that most innovative spillovers develop within (and not between) a NACE 
3-digit industry. 
27 Later, OECD (1997) has changed the threshold for high-tech sectors (from 3% to 4%). However this 
has only marginally changed the list of sectors. Furthermore the list of high-tech industries used in this 
thesis has become a conventional wisdom in the empirical literature (see, between others, Acs - Audrctsch, 
1989; Castells - Hall, 1994; Feldman, 1995; Hall - Markusen, 1985; Keeble, 1988; Luger - Goldstein, 
1991; Malecki, 1991; Oakey, 1981a; Premus, 1982). 
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belonging to all types of the Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984) are included in the 
analysiS28 
As far as international comparability of data is concerned, we used the European NACE 
industrial classification at three digit level as standard. In France data at the 
Departement level were collected according to an older classification (the NAP, Niveau 
100) and therefore a correspondence table between the different classifications had to be 
constructed (see table 2.1). A similar procedure has been followed to allow the 
comparability of US data, originally recorded according to SIC (1987 version)29. 
iii) Measured variables definitions 
At this point we need to choose the variable to measure industrial concentration. Most 
of the studies on this issue utilise data on local employment, some of them use firms (or 
local units) count, virtually none uses sales data. The first two variables could be used 
interchangeably, according to data availability. Very few studies utilise total sales 
because of the difficulty in obtaining these data at a highly disaggregated territorial 
level. 
However it is easy to understand that, although these variables are highly and positively 
correlated30, mapping industrial location through three different variables can result in 
different pictures. 
The number of business units (these being either firms or establishments) is utilised to 
obtain a description of the solidity and vitality of sectoral industrial structure and 
28 According to Pavitt (1984) Aerospace, Computers and office machinery, Electronic components, and 
Pharmaceuticals are science based industries, Instruments belongs to both science based and specialised 
supplier industries, Motor vehicles is a scale intensive industry, and Textiles is a supplier dominated 
industry. 
29 For more on this issue see section 2.3.2 
30 While it is easy to see why employment and sales are correlated (this is a direct consequence of a 
reasonable assumption of similar productivity of firms in the same sector), it seems more difficult to 
explain the correlation existing between the number of establishments and other size-related indicators 
(employment and sales) which may logically appear to be inversely related (on a particular location one 
can find either one large establishment or several small ones). However it must be noted that, generally. 
large establishments are surrounded by lots of small local suppliers and sub-contractors, and this is 
especially true for high-tech firms which need a stable local network of highly specialised suppliers in 
order to establish an efficient web of producer-user interactions (von Hippel, 1988). Thus the existence of 
one large establishment in a particular site is likely to be associated with the presence of several other 
(small) ones in the same or neighbouring locations. 
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entrepreneurship3l. This variable, however, does not take into account any existing 
difference in firms' sizes. A locational map based on firm numbers can therefore 
overestimate emerging local clusters of small (often relatively young) firms at the 
expense of established locations where the average business unit size is higher32. 
Furthermore some relevant phenomena which generate agglomeration economies (such 
as producer-user relationships, knowledge spillovers, and local competitive spurs) are 
related to the number of different business units more than to the local size (in terms of 
employment or sales) of the industry. 
The level of reporting units constitutes another issue: most of the data are collected both 
at firm and establishment33 levels. We decided to use the number of establishments for 
three main reasons: first, production takes place at the establishment level and so we can 
choose the interesting units in case of market-diversified firms; second, the location 
decision is often taken at the establishment level (and this is especially true for firrns in 
high-tech industry, where the typical organisational structure is flat and non- 
hierarchical); third, we wanted to avoid the overestimation of metropolitan areas (and 
especially capital cities) where most finns locate their headquarters34. 
Industrial employment is the size-related variable most widely used in location studies. 
Through employment data one can better assess both the absolute and the relative size 
of specific industries at the local and national level. However, when using this variable, 
one runs the risk of identifying as industrial clusters, the locations of large isolated 
firms. Furthermore it must be stressed that, as labour is an input to the production 
process, every measurement built on it does not take into account the existence of 
31 A well established stream of industrial economic literature - devoted to the analysis of firms birth and 
death processes (see, among others, Keeble - Wever, 1986; Storey 1982; Vivarelli, 1994 and 1995; 
Audretsch - Vivarelli 1996; and the special issue of Regional Studies, 1994) - is based on the analysis of 
these data. 
32 It must be noted, however, that for a significant number of US high-tech industries (Computer and 
office machinery, Electronic components, Aerospace, and Computer services) the average establishment 
size has steadily decreased in the last forty years. 
33 Which is sometimes defined also as plant, local unit or reporting unit. 
34 This has been the reason why we were compelled to use the old NAP 100 classification for France. The 
data classified according to NACE are recorded in terms of firms (and due to the peculiar geographical 
corporate structure of French industry, more than 80% of all high-tech firms are located in the 
Dýpartement of Paris). 
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differences in productivity. In this way one can overstate the importance of specific 
locations where technology is particularly labour-intensive35 
Total sales (or turnover) registered by firms located in the area is probably the best 
candidate for an "objective" survey of industrial location. Sales are, by definition, an 
output measure and, although indirectly, they allow one to measure the "industrial 
competitiveness" of an area. If 80% of the total sales of a specific sector comes from a 
particular region, then this region (irrespective of firm numbers and employment) must 
surely be the place where industrial clustering pays. Unfortunately, the difficulty in 
obtaining such data (which are usually not recorded by the Census) hinders such 
analysis. 
iv) Time framework 
The final issue relates to the time framework of the analysis. In this thesis we perforna 
different empirical exercises, each exercise requiring different types of data. The 
descriptive statistic analysis contained in this chapter utilises the most recent data for 
every country of our sample. In chapter 6, the dynamic analysis requires the longest 
possible time series, while other econometric exercises requires panel data. For these 
reasons we end up using, for the static analysis, 1991 data for Italy (1991 being the last 
census year), 1995 unpublished data for both France36 and the UK37, and 1994 for the 
US. The dynamic and the panel data analyses have involved mostly the use of US 
County Business Patterns38 - which gives yearly data on number of establishments and 
employees from as early as 1948 at various industrial and geographical disaggregations - 
together with other sources of data (described in section 2.4). 
35 This limitation appears less severe if one considers that, especially within the high-tech sectors, the 
variance in the production function of different firms is reasonably small. 
36 Data for France were obtained by INSEE within a joint research project - between the Italian and the 
French Research Councils - carried out by the author with Christian Longhi (Latapses-CNRS). 
37 Data for the UK are published by ONS exclusively at Standard Statistical Region Level. For this 
analysis we expressly acquired data on "count and employment" at County level. 
38 From 1948 to 1975, County business data are available, only in print, in some US public libraries (thus 
we accessed the Library of the Congress in Washington D. C. ). from 1976 to 1986 data are recorded on 
("old fashioned" 9-track 6250 bpi) magnetic computer tapes, from 1986 onwards data are available on 
CDs. 
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2.3. Where do high-tech firms cluster? 
2.3.1. Existing empirical evidence 
In many countries, the spatial concentration of innovative firms favours already 
established regions, fostering regional economic growth in these advantaged areas, and 
increasing spatial development gaps. In Italy the innovative activity39 of two main 
industrial regions (Piemonte and Lombardia) accounts for the 60% of the national total 
(Antonelli, 1988; Ciciotti, 1992; Maggioni - Miglierina, 1995). In the LJK, the South- 
East region dominates in the location of high-technology manufacturing and services 
(Howells, 1984; Begg - Cameron, 1988; Oakey, 1984). In the US, five states (California, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) account for more than 50% of 
total shipments of semiconductors and integrated circuits (Scott, 1988a; Storper - 
Walker, 1989). A slightly different list (which includes Florida and Illinois and excludes 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania) records more than 40% of total US establishments in the 
medical devices sector (Scott, 1993). In France, a large and expanding industrial region 
(called "la Cit6 Scientifique") which is formed by a loose aggregation of 87 City 
Councils belonging to four Departements in the outskirts of Paris (Yvelines, Hauts de 
Seine, Val de Marne and Essonne) accounts for more than one third of the French total 
high-tech employment. In Japan two major metropolitan areas (Tokyo and, in a minor 
way, Osaka) constitute the core of a very rigid centre-periphery territorial structure for 
high-tech industries, both for R&D and production departments (Morita - Hiraoka, 
1988). 
A conventional wisdom, which has gradually emerged in the existing empirical 
literature on the issue, states that high-tech firms cluster in large sub-urban areas close to 
and easily connected to metropolitan areas. Both production externalities and 
consumption externalities are responsible for this choice. From a production 
perspective, innovative firins (which are usually both small and newly established) look 
for an urban area close to a university (or a research centre) with a good scientific and 
technological reputation where a highly skilled labour force is easily available, and 
connected to the rest of the world by modem infrastructures of transport and 
communication. From a consumption perspective these areas should also be endowed 
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with pleasant residential areas, with the presence of natural and cultural amenities and 
without congestion phenomena (such as pollution, traffic, noise, criminality) typical of 
the inner cities of a large metropolis. However it must be considered that - because of 
the existence of agglomeration economies and locally increasing returns to location - the 
exact positioning of an industrial cluster within a region may well have been initially 
determined by chance or by historical accidents to become later established because of 
the cumulative nature of firms' location processes. 
The applied empirical literature on the issue is rich in case histories which try to identify 
the reasons for success of famous high-tech cluster such as: Santa Clara County (US), 
and Route 128 (US) for the semiconductor and computer industries; Orange County 
(US), West Yorkshire (UK), and Mirandola (1)40 for bio-medical apparatus and medical 
instruments; Hertfordshire (UK) and the North Carolina "triangle', 41 (US) for the 
pharmaceutical industry; Toulouse (F) and Seattle (US) for aerospace industry. 
Some of the above mentioned experiences may be defined as "spontaneous" clusters 
since they were generated and developed by a series of autonomous location decisions. 
Others clusters are either the pure product of the will of a regional planner (in vitro 
location) or, more often, a combination of local authorities planning and individual 
firms autonomous decisions. There are many different names which have been used, in 
the literature, to define these "artificial clusters" such as: technopolis, science parks, 
innovation centres, etc. In these cases, clustering is not the sole result of autonomous 
entrepreneurial choices, but also the response to a planned structure of locational 
incentives. 
Nowadays the support to science and technology activities is in on policy agenda of any 
public decision maker (both at local and at national/super-national level). The fostering 
of innovative industrial clusters is one of the main instruments through which such 
39 Measured by the number of patents, the R&D employment and the R&D expenditure. 
40 However it must be noted that typical Italian high-tech clusters are somehow dissimilar from the ones 
existing in other countries. Italian cluster are based on a lower level of technology and they consist in a 
new variety of the "industrial district model", where medium and advanced technology are adopted and 
adapted to the needs of mature sectors. 
41 Identified by the cities of Raleigh, Chapel Hill and Durham. 
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policy may be effectively implemented. It is thus becoming more and more difficult to 
empirically distinguish between spontaneous and artificial clusterS42 
Section 2.3.2 is devoted to a detailed presentation of the results obtained by the author 
using an original database for studying the geographical localisation of high-tech 
industry in four major industrialised countries (USA, UK, France, and Italy43). The 
analysis is conducted in such a way as to identify the major high-tech clusters and to 
empirically demonstrate that high-tech firms do cluster. The aim of the entire thesis, is 
to go further and to also try to discover how and why finns cluster. 
2.3. Z New empirical evidence 
i) Data description and transformations 
This section illustrates the original data set which has been used for the descriptive 
analysis and highlights the limits to the comparability of the figures. 
For all countries data have been recorded on number of establishments and employment 
at both FLA and SLA levels. Sector identification codes are defined following the EU 
NACE classification: 244, Pharmaceuticals; 300, Computers and office machinery; 321, 
Electronic components; 331, Medical and surgical instruments; 332, Measuring and 
controlling devices, search and navigation instruments; 333, Industrial process control 
instruments; 334, Optical and photographic equipment; 353, Aerospace; 170, Textiles; 
240, Motor vehicles; D, Manufacturing. A macro-sector, denominated total high-tech, 
has also been built as the sum of all high-tech sectors. Exceptions to this scheme are the 
following: in France there is only one instrument sector; in the UK most of the figures 
for employment at county level have been removed by ONS to avoid disclosure44 and 
therefore some indexes have been calculated only on establishments data. For the UK 
42 For a theoretical discussion about this issue, see Chapter 7. 
43 Ranked in terms of relative size of total high-tech employment. 
44 A similar, but minor, problem regards US data. In that case, however, censured employment figures 
were substituted by size class flags. Differently from Krugman (1991a) we decided not to drop these units 
from the statistical analysis and we substituted the size class flag with the median of the size class (i. e. the 
"C" flag, corresponding to a size class of 100-249 employees, has been substituted by a figure of 175). By 
checking the resulting industry totals, obtained by adding the figures for all States, against the official 
figure for USA, we discovered a negligible "error" (the average size being equal to 0.64%). 
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we were also unable to get data for the medium and low technology sectors (Textiles 
and Motor vehicles). 
Table 2.1. The original database 
Industria l classificat ions 
Industries NACE 
(ITA) 
NACE 
(UK) 
NAP 
(FRA) 
sic 
(USA) 
Pharmaceuticals 244 244 19 283 
Computers and office machinery 300 300 27 357 
Electronic components 321 321 29 367 
Medical and surgical instruments 331 331 - 384 
Measurement instruments 332 332 - 381+382-3823 
Industrial process control instruments 333 333 - 3823 
Optical and photogaphic equipment 334 334 - 385+386 
Instruments 330 330 34 380 
Aerospace 353 353 33 372+376 
Total high-tech H-T H-T H-T H-T 
Textiles 170 44 22 
Motor vehicles 340 31 371 
Total manufacturing D D D 20 
ii) Absolute and relative measures of industrial location 
United States of America 
The data on the USA (which, with a total figure of 23,455 high-tech establishments and 
2,328,400 high-tech employees, represent the largest national data set in our sample) 
confirms the conventional wisdom of a rather polarised structure. The first two positions 
in the absolute rankings for high-tech sectors record only 11 different State names 
(California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington). California is the top location for all high- 
tech sector45, New York and New Jersey lead only in two relatively more "traditional" 
high-tech sectors (Pharmaceuticals and Optical and photographic equipment) while 
Textiles firms and employment are concentrated in North Carolina and the Motor 
vehicles industry is mainly concentrated in California, in terms of number of 
establishments, and in Michigan, in terins of employment. In general, the first ranked 
State records a level of plants and employment which is about ten times the national 
45 And also for total manufacturing. 
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average46. Looking at industrial percentages, California has about 20% of the national 
total of all high-tech sectors (against a corresponding value of 10% as far as total 
manufacturing is concerned), although the largest percentage of employment in one state 
refers to Optical and photographic equipment in New York (over 37%)47, followed by 
Textiles in North Carolina (3 1 %). 
The use of relative measures substantially changes the picture. When one uses total 
manufacturing employment as a weighting criterion, the number of States which get at 
least once in the three first positions rises to 20; Massachusetts takes the lead followed 
by New Jersey and New Hampshire. A similar result is obtained by dividing the 
measured variable by the State population: 17 States are ranked in the first three 
positions and New Hampshire takes the lead followed by Connecticut and New Jersey. 
The similarity of the two relative rankings becomes clearer when the analysis is 
performed at SLA level; in that case, New England becomes the leading division, 
followed by Middle Atlantic and Mountains - when total manufacturing is used - or by 
Pacific and Middle Atlantic - when population is used. These data seem to suggest that, 
because of California, the centre of the US high-tech activity has now shifted towards 
the West coast; nevertheless the East coast, in which the majority of these sectors have 
first developed, is still alive and kicking. Another interpretation refers to the fact that, 
while the West coast and Mountains States are experiencing a relatively recent "wave" 
of industrial development which influences a large number of industries, the East 
coast's industrial structure has already experienced a rationalisation process and a shift 
from the old manufacturing core towards a selected sub-set of high-tech industries and 
advanced services. A further explanation regards the long established strength and 
tradition of East coast universities and the effects of this tradition in terms of knowledge 
spillovers and the creation of a local pool of skilled workers. 
Location quotients, calculated on the number of establishments at the FLA level, show 
the high degree of specialisation in the total high-tech sector of Massachusetts, followed 
by New Hampshire and Connecticut. These data substantiate the image of an East Coast 
46 With the exception of the Californian Computers and electronic components (establishments), being 
around 15 times larger, and the Michigan Motor vehicle (employment), being 20 times larger than the 
national average. 
47 Which can be explained by the presence of Kodak. 
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which, despite the loss of the leadership in absolute terms in favour of the West Coast 
and the Mountains Region, still shows an industrial structure specialised in the most 
innovative sectors48. 
The single industry rankings and values of this index are as shown in table 2.2. The 
specialisation of Kansas in Aerospace industry is second only to the specialisation of the 
Carolinas in Textiles. 
Table 2.2. Location quotients for US at FLA level (establishments) 
Industries first ranked State LO second ranked State LQ 
244 New Jersey 2.48 Maryland 2.19 
300 Massachussets 2.28 New Hampshire 2.26 
321 New Hampshire 2.6ý Massachussets 2.22 
331 Utah 2.09 Colorado 1.86 
332 Massachussets 2.50 New Hampshire 2.42 
333 Massachussets 2.2d Connecticut 2.01 
334 Massachussets 2.02 Utah 1.84 
353 Kansas 5.09 Washington 2.97 
H-T Massachussets 2.02 New Hampshire 1.91 
170 North Carolina 6.17 South Carolina 5.101 
340 Indiana 2.81 Michigan 2.361 
Location quotient maps for both establishments and employment (see figures 2.4 and 
2.5) show the prominence of the innovative industrial structure of the South West (and 
Mountains) part of the country, which on the East cost is counterbalanced only by New 
England States and (at a lower level) by Florida. 
United Kingdom 
The LTK data (which refers to national figures of 13,790 establishments and 467,285 
employeeS49 in the high-tech sectors) describe, on the one hand, the almost 
"monopolistic" concentration of high-tech sectors (and indeed of most of the productive 
activity) into the Greater London County and in the South East Region; on the other, 
they show the relative success of the development strategies implemented in Scotland, 
through the establishment of the so called Silicon Glen. The top position in almost every 
48 This result is confirmed when the same analysis is performed at the SLA level. New England is the 
Census Division which records the highest location quotient (1.57) for total high-tech industry. 
49 Since a part of the employment figures were removed by ONS to avoid disclosure, we were able to 
allocate, to their respective counties and regions, only 375,575 employees which correspond to a share of 
approximately 80% of the "true" total high-tech employment in the UK. 
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high-tech sectors is usually occupied by Greater London5O, the exception being (when 
the measured variable is employment) Kent for Pharmaceuticals, Hertfordshire for 
Computers, Strathclyde for Electronic components and Optical and photographic 
equipment, West Midlands for Industrial process control instruments and Lancashire for 
Aerospace industry. The metropolitan areas of London, Manchester and Birmingham5l, 
being the larger cities in the country, are often in the top positions as far as the number 
of firms is concerned. This can be seen as an indirect confirmation of the metropolitan 
incubator hypothesis, which sees metropolitan areas as the ideal seedbed for new high- 
tech firms given the presence of knowledge spillovers, specialised services and efficient 
infrastructures. The county chosen as the preferred location for the various high-tech 
sectors usually records an amount of firms and employment which is approximately 6/7 
times the national average52. It is interesting to note that West Midlands and Greater 
Manchester (two major industrial counties) are the most prominent location for 
Industrial process control instruments (when measured through employment). This 
prominence is certainly due to the presence on site of a dense layer of potential and 
actual users/customers. The Aerospace sector displays a peculiar clustering pattern 
because of the role played by government decisions; the major locations are often 
determined by historical events53. The clustering of high-tech activities in the UK seems 
even stronger when measured at SLA level. The South East is always the most preferred 
region, followed at a large distance by North West and West Midlands. 
The use of relative measures (both population and total manufacturing employment) 
reduces the prominence of the Greater London area, although the leading positions are 
often taken by other South Eastern Counties; it allows the emergence of Wales (Powys 
and Clywd for Pharmaceuticals, Clywd and South Glamorgan for Medical 
instruments54, West Glamorgan for Industrial process control instruments, Powys for 
50 Usually followed by Hampshire and Hertfordshire. 
51 Which may roughly correspond to the West Midland County. 
52 Less than half the corresponding figure for the US. 
53 The development of the aerospace industry in the Northern part of the country is an historical lock-in 
from the World War II when an important location criterion for such strategic industry, together with the 
established tradition in the Metal products manufacturing and Shipbuilding, was the relatively greater 
distance from Germany. 
54 Signalling the existence of a Welsh cluster of health care related high-tech activities. 
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Optical and photographic equipment, Clywd for Aerospace) and Scotland (Borders, Fyfe 
and Lothian for Electronic components, Strathclyde for Optical and photographic 
equipment). This is also confirmed at the SLA level, where the South East regions is, in 
relative terms, overcome by Scotland, Wales, South West and East Anglia. 
The relative distribution of establishments (as in figure 2.6) identify the southern regions 
as the most specialiscd in high-tech industries (together with Clwyd, Fife and Lothian), 
while when employment is the measured variable (as in figure 2.7) Scotland show the 
success of location and re-location policies and, in the South, the specialisation pattern 
move westward. 
Location quotients, calculated on the number of establishment at the RA level, show 
that even if the Greater London County loses leadership in the high-tech industry, some 
other South East Counties (namely West Sussex and Surrey) hold the first two positions 
in the sector (see table 2.3). The highest specialisation of the industrial structure is 
shown by the Isle of Wight and Clywd for Aerospace. 
Table 2.3. Location quotients for UK at FLA level (establishments) 
Industries first ranked Countv LO second ranked Countv- LO 
244 Dumfries and Galloway 3.82 Lothian 3.84 
300 Berkshire 3.08 Wilthshire 2.32 
321 Fife 3.10 Surrev 2.52 
331 West Sussex 2.10 Kent - Oxfordshire 1.59 
332 Oxfordshire 2.14 Buckinghamshire 2.11 
333 Bedfordshire 3.02 ShroDshire 2.90 
334 Isle of Wight 3.38 East Sussex 2.53 
353 Isle of Wight 4.31. CIVwd 3.6 l 
H-T I west Sussex 1.921 Surrev 
:ý 
ý 
At the SLA level the prominence of the southern regions in the innovative sectors, as 
measured by location quotients, is confirmed. South East (1.25) and East Anglia (1.22) 
are slightly more specialised than the rest of the country. 
France 
As far as France is concerned, the absolute data (which refer to national figures of 6,561 
high-tech establishments and 528,510 high-tech employees) show the prominence of the 
Departements of and around PariS55 (Haut de Seine, Essonne, Yvelines and Val de 
Mame) the exceptions being the Dipartements near the Swiss border (Doubs, Haute 
55 Which are parts of the already quoted "CM de la Science'. 
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Savoie, Jura) for the Instruments sector56. The two traditional "benchmark" sectors 
(Textiles and Motor vehicles) are localised respectively in the Wpartements of Nord 
and Doubs. However the areas around Paris are in the top positions also in these low 
and medium technology industries. The French industrial structure is even more 
spatially polarised than the US, since the first ranked Dipartement often records values 
more than twenty times higher than the sectoral. national average, and as few as 9 
Dipartements are always in the first three positions57. At the SLA level, therefore, it is 
no surprise that he de France is always on top of list of the high-tech regions while 
Rh6ne Alpes is almost always second, with the exception of Midi Pyrdndes and 
Aquitaine (for Aerospace). 
The relative measures of localization (especially when the weighting criterion is the 
manufacturing employment) smooth away the peak performance of Ile de France and 
allows the emergence of other localised centres of high-tech activity such as Cantal, Lot 
et Garonne for Phamaceuticals; Herault and Territoire de Belfort for Computers; COte 
d'Armour for Electronic components; Indre and Hautes PYr6ndes for Aerospace. At the 
SLA level, the picture appears to be a little less unbalanced towards he de France, with 
different Rggions showing their relative specialisation (Centre for Pharmaceuticals; 
Alsace and Franche Comt6e for Computers; Rhone Alpes and Centre for Electronic 
components; Franche Comt6e for Instruments). The localisation ranking as far as 
Aerospace is concerned is unchanged by the use of relative measures. 
Figure 2.8 shows, above all, the prominence of he de France (around Paris) for the high- 
tech industry as a whole, while figure 2.9 highlights the relative importance of a number 
of southern Dipartements which form a sort of discontinuous chain from Alpes 
Maritimes to Pyr6n6es Atlantique. 
Location quotients, calculated on the number of establishment at the FLA level, show 
that, when high-tech industries are considered as a whole, Essonne is the more 
56 It must be considered, however, that French data for Instruments, being collected at a higher digit level, 
take into account the production of watches (an activity which is no longer considered as high-tech). 
These data thus are heavily influenced by the existence of a trans-national watch-making cluster, of long 
established traditions, which is situated in bordering areas between France and Switzerland. 
57 Other high-tech D9partements which excel in high-tech sectors, without reach any position higher than 
the third one, are Rhone (Pharmaceuticals and Computers) and Haute Garonne (Aerospace). 
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specialised Departement58 and that other D9partements, which belong to the "Cit6 de la 
Science", are in the first ranks in many sectors. 
Table 2.4. Location quotients for France at FLA level (establishments) 
Industries first ranked D6partement LQ second ranked Ddpartement LQ 
244 Cantal 5.37 Hauts de Seine 3.82 
300 Yvelines 2.48 Val de Marne 2.36 
321 Essonne 3.12 Hautes Alpes 2.42 
330 Doubs 7.76, Jura 7.56 
353 Indre, 5.90 Corse 5.71 
H-T Essonne 2.46 Doubs 2.34 
170 Tarn 4.83 Ardeche 4.56 
340 Nievre 2.33 Sarthe 1.96 
Surprisingly, the location quotients at the SLA level, allow Corse to appear as the more 
specialised Region in the Computer, Electronic components, Aerospace, and in total 
high-tech industries. 
Italy 
Italy (the data refer to a total of 29,627 high-tech establishments and 300,876 high-tech 
employees) displays a segmented geographical structure of the high-tech industries 
which are concentrated in the northern part of the peninsula and mainly located around 
the major northern cities and Rome. Milan is almost always the Provincia with the 
greatest number of establishments and largest employment, the exceptions being: Torino 
for Computers, Belluno for Optical and photographic equipment59, Varese and Torino 
for Aerospace. The polarisation of the high-tech industries is witnessed by the fact that 
the top ranked Provincia records figures always twenty time (and sometimes even more) 
larger than the national average and that only 11 Province out of 95 are ranked in the 
first three positions. While Textiles sector shows a peculiar location strategy; far from 
large citieS60 and mainly concentrated in the so-called "Third Italy", Motor vehicle 
industry, similarly to high-tech sectors, is located in the two major industrial cities of 
Northern Italy: Torino and Milano. At SLA level Lombardia is always the top Regione 
(the rare exceptions being Veneto for Optical and photographic equipment, and 
58 The second ranked FLA is not very relevant since in Doubs the almost totality of figure regarding the 
high-tech industry is composed by watch-making establishments. 
59 However, it must be remembered that a large percentage of this sector in Italy is constituted by the 
manufacturing of spectacles frames which cannot be considered high-tech products. 
60 The figures which in these tables are attributed to Firenze are mainly located around Prato which, since 
1995, has become a separated Provincia. 
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Campania for Aerospace employment), while the second position is alternatively 
occupied by Piemonte (Computers, Electronic components, Measurement instruments, 
Industrial process control instruments, Aerospace), Lazio (Pharmaceuticals and 
Aerospace), Emilia Romagna (Medical instruments, Industrial process control 
instruments). 
Location quotient maps for the high-tech industry as a whole illustrate the relevance of 
large metropolitan areas. Figure 2.10, where the measured variable are establishments, 
describes the existence of other areas of relative specialisation in the North East and 
even in the South; while figure 2.11, where the measured variable is employment, show 
the predominance of Roma. 
The relative measures of industrial location (the weights being local population and 
local manufacturing employment) highlight the existence of relative sPecialisation in 
minor Province such as: Latina (Pharmaceuticals), Trieste and Aosta (Computers) 
Macerata and Rieti (Electronic components), Forli, Modena, Trieste and Imperia 
(Medical and surgical instruments), Trieste (Measurement Instruments), Modena, 
Piacenza and Genova (Industrial process control instruments), Aosta and Brindisi 
(Aerospace). A similar picture, with n-dnor changes, emerges from the location quotients 
at the FLA level. Milano and Torino are rarely present in the first rankings, while cities 
located in the North-East of the country get the leadership6l. 
Table 2.5. Location quotients for Italy at FLA level (establishments) 
Industries first ranked Provincia LQ second ranked Provincia LO 
244 Latina 4.36 Roma 3.8E 
300 Trieste 5.04 Torino 3.72 
321 Ancona 3.83 Macerata 3.77 
331 Trieste 2.23 Pescara 1.98. 
332 Trieste 3.34 Milano 2.971 
333 Piacenza 4.08 Torino 2.711 
334 Belluno 52.4 Cagliari 2.34 
353 Aosta 16.14 Gorizia 10.01 
H-T Belluno 5.98 Roma 1.7 
170 Pistoia 4.9 Firenze 4.11 
340 ITorino 5.67 Asti 3.91, 
61 This result can be seen as a signal of an ongoing transformation of the industrial structure of the so 
called "Third Italy" which is progressively substituting its traditional industries with more advanced ones 
but keeping constant the organisational model of the "industrial districe' (i. e. a group of SMEs spatially 
concentrated and connected by strong productive, technological and commercial relationships) (Bramanti 
- Maggioni, 1997). 
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At the SLA level, Lazio arises as the Regione with the most spccialised industrial 
structure in high-tech sectors such as Pharmaceuticals, Computers, Medical instruments 
and total high-tech, while Lombardia emerges in two sectors connected to the long 
established manufacturing tradition (Measurement instruments and Industrial process 
control instruments). Toscana and Piemonte confirm that clustering is a common and 
old phenomena in economic history which regards all industries. Toscana, since the 
Middle Age has been the centre of the Italian textiles industry (LQ = 2.75), and 
Piemonte, despite the delocalisation strategies pursued by Fiat in the last twenty-five 
years, is still the preferred locations for Italian car (and car parts and accessories) 
manufacturing. 
In the following pages location quotients maps, for both establishments and 
employment, are displayed for each country in the sample. 
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Figure 2.4. High-tech location quotients for US at FLA level (establishments) 
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Figure 2.6. High-tech location quotients for UK at FLA level (establishments) 
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Figure 2.8. High-tech location quotients for France at FLA level (establishments) 
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Figure 2.10. High-tech location quotients for Italy at FLA level (establishments) 
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iii) Spatial concentration and inequality indexes 
By looking at different spatial concentration and concentration indexes for different 
industrial sectors, it is possible to extract some hints on the structure and causes of the 
clustering process. 
United States of America 
Table 2.6 shows the spatial concentration ratio and inequality indexes for the selected 
subset of industries studied in the US. It is easy to see that, while according to SCR4, 
Textiles are more concentrated, the normalised Her-findhal index shows that Computers 
and office machinery, and Electronic components are, by far, the most spatially 
concentrated industries in the US at FLA level. 
Table 2.6. US spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(establishments)62 
Sectors I SCR 4 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Sectors K 
170 L 0.48 300 0.05 300 2.09 170 0.73 170 0.42 
300 0.45 321 0.08 321 1.96 300 0.69 353 0.28 
321 0.44 170 0.06 170 1.79 321 0.68 300 0.26 
353 0.42 353 0.06 353 1.70 353 0.68 321 0.24 
332 0.39 tot h-t 0.06 tot h-t 1.66 333 0.67 332 0.19 
tot h-t 0.39 332 0.05 332 1.61 332 0.66 333 0.18 
333 0.38 333 0.05 333 1.53 tot h-t 0.65 tot h-t 0.16 
334 0.38 331 0.04 331 1.43 334 0.64 334 0.14 
244 0.37 334 0.04 334 1.41 331 0.62 244 0.13 
340 244 0.04, 244 1 38 244 0- 62 340 012 ' 
331 0.35 340 0.03 1 340 - - 
1 
340 -- Oý61 § 
1 
331 ll O 
1 
D 6.30 D 6.03 D - 1.14 14 D 0. 5 6 D 0.00 0 
The results suggest that Textiles is slightly more concentrated in four States than these 
high-tech industries. 
The same picture emerges from the spatial inequality indexes with Gini coefficients 
(both versions) which stresses the asymmetric distribution of Textiles while the 
coefficient of variation underlines the concentration of Computers and Electronic 
components. What is also evident, is the fact that Motor vehicles establishments are, by 
far, less concentrated than the almost all high-tech oneS63. The two electronic device 
industries are usually followed by Aerospace, Industrial process control instruments, and 
62 In tables from 2.6 to 2.17, high-tech sectors are made graphically evident through a shaded pattern 
63 While in Krugman (1991a), who bases the analysis on employment data, "automotive industry is 
slightly above the median", being ranked as 49 Ih out Of 106 manufacturing industries, and is much more 
concentrated than several high-tech industries such as: Computer and office machinery (55'h), 
Pharmaceuticals (70'h), Medical and surgical instruments (94 th) . For a direct comparison, see table 2.7. 
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Optical and photographic equipment. The health-care related industries (Medical 
instruments and Pharmaceutical) are ranked almost always in the last positions, showing 
a more diffused spatial structure. 
It is worth looking at table 2.7 where the same exercise is conducted by using 
employment figures. Table 2.7 is similar to the previous one; however the first ranks are 
here occupied by those industries in which internal economies of scale play a major role 
and the average size of establishment is larger. 
Table 2.7. US spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(employment) 
Sectors SCR4 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
170 
_0.66 
334 0.16 334 2.80 170 0.83 170 0.67 
334 0.61 170 6.13 170 2.59 334 0.80 334 0.56 
353 0.53 353 0.08 353 2.05 353 0.78 353 0.53 
340 F- 0.52 300 0.08 300 2.03 340 0.73 300 -(i-45 
300 0.47 340 0.08 340 2.02 333 0.73 340 0.41 
321 0.46 321 0.07 321 1.84 244 _ 0.73 333 0.38 
244 0.45 332 0.06 332 1.65 300 0.72 244 0.35 
333 0.44 244 0.05 244 1.65 321 0.69 321 0.34 
332 0.42 333 0.05 333 1.65 332 0.68 332 0.31 
tot h-t 0.401 tot h-t 0.05 tot -t 1.62 331 0.66 tot h-t 0.26 
331 0.35 331 0.04 331 1,47 
1 
tot h-t 0.65 331 0.23 
D 0.26 D 
1 
0.02 D 1.03 D D 000 
The concentration and the spatial inequality indexes thus underline the spatial 
concentration of Textiles, Optical and photographic equipment and Aerospace (although 
Computers and Electronic components are always in the upper half of the list). Car 
manufacturing is in the top half of the distribution, confirming the size prominence of 
the establishments located in Detroit but is generally less spatially concentrated than 
Computers and office machinery. 
When spatial concentration and inequality are looked at SLA level, the general picture 
stays almost unchanged64, the main difference being that Textiles and Motor vehicles 
rise to the top positionS65. This fact can be explained by thinking that, since it takes time 
for agglomeration economies and technological spillovers to diffuse over space, the 
attractiveness of "older" industrial sectors has been able to cover longer distance so to 
overcome state boundaries and establish Division-wide clusters. However it must be 
64 Therefore we do not report tables for spatial concentration and inequality indexes calculated at the 
SLA level. 
65 Their SCR2 (calculated on the number of establishments) are respectively 0.62 and 0.46. 
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noted that at SLA level some high-tech industries (i. e. Computers and office machinery 
and Electronic components) do show high values of spatial concentration indexes too66. 
The use of Linda indexes allows the identification of a series of industry spatial cores. 
For the Pharmaceutical industry (figure 2.12) this core lies in a North-eastem "belt" 
(which ranges from Missouri to Massachusetts, interrupted in the middle by Ohio) and 
in three isolated States (California, Texas67 and North Carolina). The Industrial process 
control instruments industry (when the measured variables is the employment level) 
shows a twofold spatial structure (figure 2.13) with a North-eastern belt (from 
Minnesota to Massachusetts) and a South-western belt (from California to Texas68). 
The Optical and photographic equipment industry (figure 2.14) is concentrated in a 
wedge-shaped core (with an East-West branch ranging from Minnesota to 
Massachusetts and a North-south branch which stretches along the entire East coast 
from Florida to Massachusetts69) and three scattered western States (California, 
Colorado, Texas). The Aerospace industry presents a very dispersed core (figure 2.15) 
with four clusters: one in the North-east (Michigan, Ohio, New York and Connecticut), 
one in the South-east (Georgia and Florida), one in the South-centre (Kansas, Oklahoma 
and Texas), one on the Pacific coast (Washington, California, Arizona). Industry spatial 
cores arise also in traditional sectors; figure 2.16 shows the endurance of the textiles- 
based "cotton belt" stretching along the East coast, while figure 2.17 illustrates the 
resilience (and perhaps revitalisation) of the rust belt", located near the Great Lakes, 
where car manufacturing and industrial process control instruments industry prevail. 
United Kingdom 
In the UK, as shown by every index in table 2.8, Pharmaceuticals is the most 
concentrated industry followed either by Optical and photographic equipment or 
Computers according to the index used. 
66 The spatial concentration ratios (SCR2) for Computers and Electronic components are, respectively, 
0.45 and 0.44; the spatial coefficients of variation for these sectors are 0.81 and 0.72. 
67 These two States are part of any identified "industry spatial core". 
68 With the exception of New Mexico. 
69 With a gap in correspondence of South Carolina. 
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Table 2.8. UK spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors SCR4 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Se ctors KG 
244 0.31 244 0.04 244 1.60 244 0.54 244 0.17 
334 0.30 334 0.03 334 1.37 300 0.53 300 6.12 
D 0.29 300 0.03 300 1.28 353 0.52 353 0.11 
- 300 0.28 D 0.02 D -1.22 333 0.51 334 6.09 
321 0.27 331 
_0.02 
331 1.17 334 0.50 321 0.08 
331 0.26 321 0.02 321 1.16 331 0.48 333 0.07 
tot h-t 0.25 tot h-t 0.02 tot h-t 1.09 321 0.48 332 0.04 
332 0.23 353 0.02 353 1.00 D 0.47 tot h-t 0.02 
353 0.23 332 0.02 332 1.00 tot h-t 0.46 331 0.02 
333 0.22, 333 0.01 
. 
333 0.97 , 332 
0.45 
,DF -0-00 
It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the UK shows a rather polarised spatial 
structure of production concentrated in the South East region, high-tech sectors are 
below the figure of all manufacturing sectors (D). The locational Gini coefficient70 
confirms this result (although the difference between total manufacturing and high-tech 
industries becomes almost negligible) and underlines the inequality of the spatial 
distribution of the Aerospace industry. The lack of employment data for many Counties 
hinders the calculation of most indexes, with the exception of SCR4 71. The analysis of 
this index strengthens the conclusion that in the UK total manufacturing is almost 
always more spatially concentrated than high-tech sectors, but also underlines the 
geographical concentration of the Computer industry which takes first position. It is 
therefore worth looking at the results at SLA level as shown in table 2.9. 
Table 2.9. UK spatial concentration and inequality indexes at SLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors SCR2 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
244 0.54 300 0.24 300 1.35 353 0.50 244 0.16 
300 0.54 321 0.24 321 1.32 300 0.49 353 6.12 
321 0.54 244 0.23 244 -1.31 333 0.48 321 0.12 
331 0.51 334 0.23 334 334 0.48 300 0.11 
332 0.53 332 0.22 332 1.26 244 0.47 334 0.10 
333 0.51 tot h-t 022 tot h-t 1.23 321 0.47 332 0.09 
334 0.53 353 0.20 353 1.14 332 0.47 tot h-t 0.09 
353 0.51 331 0.20 331 1.13 tot h-t 0.46 333 0.08 
D 333 0.19 333 1.12 331 0.44 331 _ 0.06 
tot h-t 0.52, D 017 D 0.96, D 0.41 D 0.00, 
At the regional level the situation appears a little blurred, with each indicator showing 
different rankings for the four main high-tech sectors (244,300,321, and 353). 
According to the concentration ratio, Electronic components take the lead, but both the 
70 KG is, by definition, equal to zero for total manufacturing. 
71 For this reason, for the UK, tables are presented only with respect to the number of establishments. 
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Herfindhal index and the Coefficient of variation signal Computers as the most 
concentrated sectors, while the locational Gini coefficient identifies Aerospace and 
Krugman's version signals Pharmaceuticals. However, it is more interesting that, at this 
level of analysis, high-tech sectors are more spatially concentrated than total 
manufacturing. This can be explained by the fact that high-tech industries in the UK are 
spread in different counties which all belong to the South East and the East Anglia 
regions, while total manufacturing is more evenly diffused throughout the country. 
The Linda system of indexes for the UK most of the times identifies (either a fraction or 
the total of) the counties belonging to the South East Region plus few other scattered 
counties (mainly in Scotland or around the cities of Manchester and Birmingham). Some 
peculiarities are shown by Pharmaceuticals, where there are two cores (figure 2.18) one 
in the South East of England and the other in the West of Scotland. Computers and 
office machinery (figure 2.19) shows two distinct core one in the South (from Essex to 
Wiltshire) one in the west part of Scotland and few scattered Counties in the middle 
(around Manchester and Bin-ningham) Electronic components (figure 2.20) displays the 
presence of a Southern "belt", ranging from Wiltshire to EsseX72 and a Scottish "belt" 
(composed of Strathclyde, Lothian and Fife). Industrial process control instruments 
(figure 2.21) are mainly concentrated into two distinct cores, one in the South and one in 
the central part of England. The first exhibits an inverted Y shape (centred on Greater 
London with the three branches being respectively in Bedfordshire, Hampshire and 
Kent). The second core lies in a North-South corridor along the M6 motorway from the 
West Midlands to Greater Manchester. The spatial distribution of Optical and 
photographic equipment industry (figure 2.22) confirms the prominence of the South 
East and highlights the existence of a central "belt" from Hereford and Worcester to 
Leicester, and a Northern core (Lancashire, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire). In the 
Aerospace industry (figure 2.23), the Linda's system of index is almost unable to 
identify an industry spatial core, since the selected Counties are scattered all around the 
Country, with the exception of a Northern-central cluster ranging from Lancashire to 
Derbyshire. 
72 And a number of other scattered Counties such as: Devon, Gwent, Northamptonshire, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, Tyne and Wear, and Northern Ireland. 
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France 
In France Textiles is one of the most spatially concentrated industry as can be seen in 
table 2.10. Within the high-tech industries, Pharmaceuticals and Aerospace record the 
highest values of concentration indexes, which display almost identical rankings, 
followed by Instruments and Computers and office machinery. 
Table 2.10. France spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors SCR4 Sectors I SNH Sectors I SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
170 0.4 170 L 0.05 170 1 2.17 353 0.72 330 0.48 
244 0.35 244 0.04 244 1.88 170 0.71 353 0.42 
353 0.33 353 0.03 353 1.80 244 0.68 170 0.34 
330 0.26 330 0.02 330 1.44 300 0.65 321 0.25 
300 0.25 300 0.02 300 1.44 330 0.63 244 0.24 
tot h-t 0.24 tot h-t 0.02 tot h-t _ 1.30 tot h-t 0.57 300 0.16 
321 0.23 321 -0.62 321 1.27 321 0.55 340 0.16 
D 4 0.22 D 0.01 D 340 0.47 tot h-t 0.04 
34o 0.18 340 0.01 340 0.99 D 0.46 D 0.00 
As far as inequality indexes are concerned, while spatial coefficients of variation display 
the same rankings as the concentration indexes, the locational Gini coefficient 
recognises Aerospace, while Krugman's version identifies Instruments as the most 
unequally distributed industries. A similar picture is obtained by using employment 
data, as in table 2.11., the main difference being that Textiles looses its prominence. 
Table 2.11. France spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(employment) 
Sectors SCR4 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
244 0.45 244 0.07 244 2.51 353 0.82 330 0.68 
353 0.42 170 M 170 2.32 300 0.81 244 0.56 
170 [ ýýO 353 0.05 353 2.27 244 0.77 170 0.55 
300 0.37 300 0.05 300 2.24 170 0.73 353 0.54 
321 0.34 321 0.03 321 1.78 340 0.67 321 0.42 
tot h-t 0.31 tot h-t 0.03 tot h-t 1.67 330 0.66 300 0.39 
340 0.29 340 0.03 340 
1 
1.6 321 0-. 66 tot h-t 0.38 
330 0.28 330 0.02 
- 
330 1.52 tot h-t 0.64 340 
- 
0.34 
- 
ID L 018 D F 001 D F- 0.92 D -0.45 D1 0.60 
At SLA level (displayed in tables 2.12 and 2.13) the most interesting results refer to the 
clustered structure of the Aerospace industry, which in fact has got more than half of its 
firms and employment in two single RggionS73. 
73 When the measured variable is the number of establishments, the two preferred locations are ile de 
France and Midi-Pyr6n6e; when the measured variable is employment, the two preferred locations are ile 
de France and Aquitaine. 
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Table 2.12. France spatial concentration and inequality indexes at SLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors I SCR2 Sectors SNH Sectors SCv Sectors LG Sectors KG 
244 0.51 353 0.16 353 3.51 353 0.67 330 0.33 
353 0.51 244 0.16 244 2.53 170 = 9.60 353 018 
321 0.47 321 0.12 300 2.52 244 0.60 170 _ 0.22 
total h-t 0.46 total h-t 0.11 total h-t 2.41 300 0.55 300 0.13 
300 0.45 300 0.11 330 2.41 330 0.54 244 0.13 
170 F-0.45 170 010 010 170 F-2-. 40 321 0.53 340 0.12 
330 0.43 330 0.09 -A 321 2.39 total h-t 0.52 321 0.11 
D 4 0.39 D 0.06 
L 
D F-2.35 D 0.45 total h-t 0.03 
340 0.35 340 0.05 340 2.33 340 0.40 D F 0.00 
It is also interesting to note that at SLA level the high-tech industries as a whole are 
almost always more spatially clustered than the two benchmark sectors. This 
phenomenon is more evident in table 2.13, which refers to employment data, and it 
seems to suggest that in France the optimal scale for the diffusion of productive and 
technological externalities, which are involved in the dynamics of high-tech clusters, is 
larger that the Dipartements74 
Table 2.13. France spatial concentration and inequality indexes at SLA level 
(employment) 
Sectors I SCR2 Sectors SNH Sectors i SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
244 0.58 300 0.23 1 300 2.56 353 0.74 330 0.52 
300 0.58 244 0.21 244 2.55 300 0.71 244 0.41 
353 0.54 353 0.18 353 2.51 244 0.69 170 0.39 
321 0.50 321 0.17 321 2.48 321 0.60 353 0.35 
tot h-t 0.49 tot h-t 0.15 tot h-t 2.46 tot h-t 0.59 300 0.29 
170 F 0.46 170 F- q09 9.09 170 F2-4-2 170 0.58 340 0.28 
330 0.38 330 0.07 330 2.37 330 0.57 321 0.20 
D 0.33 340 0.05 340 -2.34 340 049 tot h-t 0.12 
340 0.32 D 0.04 D 2.33 D 0.40 D 0.00 
The use of the Linda class of indexes in France for several high-tech industries mainly 
identifies Dipartements which belong to the already mentioned "Citd de la Science" or 
more generally to the R, ýgion Parisienne. Another constant presence in these clusters is 
Rh6ne or the central part of the Rh6ne-Alpes region. An exception to this patterns is the 
Computer and office machinery industry (figure 2.24), whose spatial pattern (when the 
measured variable is the number of establishments) seems to show the effects of a 
decentralisation policy, which has added to the Wgion Parisienne a number of other 
scattered Dýpartenzents - in a wheel-shape - almost everywhere in the peripheral areas of 
France (in anti clock-wise order, from Nord to Seine Maritime, from Bretagne to 
74 A complementary explanation refers to the fact that, over the recent years, Wgions have been in France 
the most active local authorities in promoting innovation-supporting economic policies. The consequence 
of such policies may well be the establishment of intra-Wgion, inter-Dýpartetnent high-tech cluster. 
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Gironde, from Garonne to Bouches du Rh6ne, from Rh6ne-Alpes to Bas-Rhin and 
Moselle). Aerospace is also scattered and it is possible to identify only a very loose and 
non contiguous core in the South West. As far as traditional sectors are concerned, the 
Motor vehicles industry (figure 2.26) is mainly clustered along the Channel coast (from 
Ille et Villaine to Nord) and along the French-Swiss and German borders (from Moselle 
to Doubs)75 
Italy 
The analysis of spatial concentration and inequality in Italy, when the measured variable 
is the number of establishment (see table 2.14), shows a blurred structure where 
Pharmaceuticals and Aerospace are, according to different indexes, the most 
concentrated industries, followed by Optical and photographic equipment, and 
Computers and office machinery. 
Table 2.14. Italy spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors I SCR4 Sectors I SNH Sectors 1 SCV Sectors i LG Sectors I KG 
244 0.53 244 0.12 244 3.35 353 0.83 353 0.65 
300 0.51 334 0.08 334 2.74 244 0.79 244 0.51 
353 0.49 300 0.08 300 2.7 0 300 0.77 300 0.49 
333 0.43 332 0.07 332 - 2.6 l 333 0.77 333 0.46 
321 0.42 353 0.07 353 -- 2.54 321 0.73 321 0.42 
332 6.42 333 0.07 333 2. _ 51 170 0.69 170 -0.39 
334 0.41 321 0.06 321 2.37 332 0.69 334 0.38 
340 0.39 340 0.06 340 2.30 340 0.68 340 
170 035 170 0.05 0 0.05 170 2.09 334 0.64 332 0.35 
tot h-t 0.27. tot h-t 0.02 tot h-t 1.49 tot h-t 0.54 tot h-t 0.1 
331 0.25 331 002 331 1.33 331 0.51 
1 
331 0.08 
D 0.20 DE --O-. )ll DF -1 . CO-9 D 0.47 D 
0.00 
The inequality indexes identify either Pharmaceuticals or Aerospace as the most 
clustered industry. In general, the two traditional sectors are less clustered than the 
individual high-tech sectors but they are more clustered than the high-tech industry 
when considered as a whole. This apparent puzzle can be explained in term of a 
scattered clustering structure of each high-tech sector in specific areaS76 so that, when 
these industries are considered all together as a macro-sector, the value of the 
concentration and inequality indexes tend to be small. 
75 Other selected Dýpartenzents are those around Paris and Rh6ne. 
76 This is another indirect evidence of the transfer of the "industrial districts" organisational model from 
the traditional to the high-tech industries. Each Provincia, or even each group of villages, becomes the 
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A similar picture emerges from the employment data (see table 2.15). Here it can be 
noted that while the Motor vehicles industry rises to the first positions, the Textiles 
industry (which in Italy is traditionally based on an enormous number of small firms) 
falls down to the last rank, being only slightly more clustered than Medical and surgical 
instruments. 
Table 2.15. Italy spatial concentration and inequality indexes at FLA level 
(employment) 
Sectors I SCR4 Sectors I SNH Sectors I SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
300 0.78 300 0.23 300 4.64 353 0.93 353 0.75 
353 0.74 340 0.19 340 4.30 300 0.92 300 0.70 
244 0.64 244 0.19 244 4.23 244 0.87 244 0.62 
340 353 0.15 353 3.79 340 0.84 334 0.61 
334 0.56 334 0.15 334 3.76 334 0.81 340 0.60 
332 0.52 332 0.12 332 3.32 332 _ 0.79 333 0.55 
321 0.47 321 0.07 333 3.21 321 0.77 321 0.44 
tot h-t 0.46 tot h-t 0.07 321 2.65 tot h-t 0.73 332 0.43 
170 170 tot h-t 2.64 170 0.73 170 0.37 
331 0.32 . 32 331 0.03 . 03 170 1.89 89 * 331 0.60 0 tot 
h-t 0.35 
D 
A 
D ý 
Aff 
331 1.73 73 
j 
D 0.54 
] 
331 0.15 
333 O 20 333 0.0 1 D - 1 38 333 0.47 D 0.00 
At SLA level, the most surprising result, as can be seen in table 2.16, concerns the 
concentration of establishments belonging to the Industrial process control instruments 
sector. The first two Regioni (Lombardia and Emilia Romagna) record almost 60% of 
the industry total. This prominence contrasts with the low ranking occupied by the same 
sector according to the employment figures (table 2.17). This fact can be explained in 
terrn of a small average size of the establishments which is a consequence (but also a 
cause) of the prevailing organisational structure of the industry: the industrial district. 
Table 2.16. Italy spatial concentration and inequality indexes at SLA level 
(establishments) 
Sectors I SCR2 Sectors I SNH I Sectors i SCV Sectors i LG Sectors KG 
244 0.58 333 0.19 333 1.94 333 0.75 333 0.38 
333 0.58 244 0.18 244 1.89 321 0.71 244 0.36 
170 0.51 321 0.15 
-- 
321 1.75 244 0.71 321 0.33 
340 0.51 332 0.15 332 1.73 170 0.68 340 0.33 
321 0.51 334 0.14 334 1.66 346 0.66 170 0.31 
332 0.49 170 0.12 1 70 1.57 332 _ 0.64 353 0.30 
334 0.49 34 _ _ 0 340 
[Eý 
1 1.56 300 0.60 334 0.25 
300 0.42 300 0.09 300 1.33 353 - 0.59 332 0.24 
353 0.40 353 0.09 353 1.33 334 0.58 300 0.21 
tot h-t 0.35 tot h-t 0.06 tot h-t __ 1.11 tot h-t 053 tot h-t 0.04 
D D 0.05 D 1 04 
1 
DL ý50 331 
1 
0.00 
331 0.31 331 0.05 331 1.01 331 0.49 D 0.00 
"leader" of a given production and acquires a monopolistic power on firms locations which extends way 
beyond the regional borders (locational shadowing). 
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It is also worth noting that, at SLA level, the concentration and inequality indexes of the 
two benchmark sectors (Textiles and Motor vehicles) are very similar and are about the 
middle of the industry list. The high-tech sector as a whole is only slightly more 
clustered that the total manufacturing activity, showing therefore, at this geographical 
level, no sensible clustering dynamics for the innovative activities. 
Table 2.17, where employment is the measured variable, emphasises the geographical 
polarisation of many high-tech industries in Italy. In particular three high-tech industries 
(Computer and office machinery, Pharmaceuticals, and Optical and photographic 
equipment) show a SCR2 greather than 60%77. 
Table 2.17. Italy spatial concentration and inequality indexes at SLA level 
(employment) 
Sectors SCR2 Sectors SNH Sectors SCV Sectors LG Sectors KG 
300 0.75 334 0.27 334 2.32 300 0.80 353 0.52 
244 ___ 0-. 68 244 -- ---- 6.26 244 2.28 244 0.77 340 L 0 L44 
340 0.65 300 0.25 300 2.25 353 0.75 334 _ 0.42 
334 0.64 340 0.23 340 2 16 340 0.74 300 0.40 
332 0.59 332 0.22 332 . 2.11 332 0.73 244 0.39 
170 r 0.52 170 0.16 333 1.78 334 0.72 333 0.30 
353 0.49 353 0.15 170 [-1.77 170 0.71 332 0.27 
321 0.48 tot h-t 0.13 353 1.75 321 0.67 170 0.24 
tot h-t 0.48 321 0.12 tot h-t 1.60 tot h-t 0.66 321 0.19 
331 0.42 331 0.08 0 321 1.58 331 0.57 tot h-t 0.17, 
D L 
ý 
D ý 0.08 
A 
331 1.28 
I 
D 0 .7 57 331 0.03 
333 0 33 333 O. 05 D - 1 2E 333 0 .0 0 0.50 D 0 nn F 
The Linda class of indexes in Italy identifies the metropolitan areas of the greater cities 
(Milano, Torino, Roma, Napoli, Firenze) as the industry spatial core of many high-tech 
sectors (as Pharmaceuticals, Computer and office machinery, Aerospace). A different 
spatial pattern is shown by Electronic components (figure 2.27) in which, apart from the 
isolated metropolitan areas of Torino, Roma, and Napoli) establishments are clustered in 
a north-west-ward wedge (with East-west branch ranging from Varese to Padova, and 
the North-south branch stretching from Milano to Firenze) with a small cluster in the 
Marche region. The Medical instruments industry (figure 2.28) shows a major 
concentration in a Northern belt, ranging from Varese to Udine, and a second central 
cluster composed of Bologna, Forl! and Firenze (and other scattered "metropolitan 
provinces" such as Torino, Genova, Roma, Napoli, and Bari) The Optical and 
photographic equipment industry (figure 2.29) is characterised by the prominence of a 
North-eastem cluster which includes almost all Province of the following regions: 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (together with Torino, Varese, 
Milano, Mantova, Firenze, Roma, and Salemo). The Aerospace industry (figure 2.30), 
as already stressed above, is centred in the metropolitan areas of the largest cities. 
77 Furthermore, Lombardia is within the first 2 Regioni (in term of employment) in 6 out of 8 high-tech 
industries. 
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Figure 2.12. US Pharmaceuticals spatial core (employment) 
Figure 2.13. US Industrial process control instruments spatial core (employment) 
Figure 2.14. US Optical and photo. equipment spatial core (employment) 
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Figure 2.15. US Aerospace spatial core (establishments) 
Figure 2.16. US Textiles spatial core (employment) 
Figure 2.17. US Motor vehicles spatial core (employment) 
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Figure 2.18. UK Pharmaceuticals spatial core (establishments) 
4 
I 
Figure 2.19. UK Computers and office machinery spatial core (establishments) 
. 4. 
I 
50 
Figure 2.20. UK Electronic components spatial core (employment) 
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Figure 2.21. UK Industrial process control instrum. spatial core (establishments) 
4. 
I 
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Figure 2.22. UK Optical and photo. equipment spatial core (establishments) 
-4. 
I 
.6 
Figure 2.23. UK Aerospace spatial core (employment) 
4 
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Figure 2.24. France Computers and office machin. spatial core (establishments) 
0 
Figure 2.25. France Aerospace spatial core (employment) 
0 
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Figure 2.26. France Motor Vehicles spatial core (employment) 
0 
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Figure 2.27. Italy Electronic components spatial core (establishments) 
Figure 2.28. Italy Medical and surgical Instruments spatial core (establishments) 
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Figure 2.29. Italy Optical and photo. equipment spatial core (employment) 
Figure 2.30. Italy Aerospace spatial core (establishments) 
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iv) International comparison 
The first element to be compared across countries - apart from the absolute size of the 
national high-tech industries, which have been already presented - is the relative 
specialisation of each nation with respect to high-tech activities as shown in table 2.18. 
Table 2.18. High-tech specialisation (total high-tech/total manufacturing) 
USA UK France Italy 
establishments 6.06% 8.91% 10.42% 5.00% 
employment 12.87% 10.73% 15.33% 5.76% 
Contrary to the common wisdom of the US being the most specialised country in high- 
tech sectors, France appears to have the highest ratios of high-tech establishments and 
employment78. The US follows shortly behind France when employment is considered, 
but the UK gets into the second position as far as the number of establishments is 
concerned. Italy is far behind, with a percentage between one third and one half of the 
leading country. 
Another interesting comparison concerns the average size of high-tech establishment in 
different countries as shown by table 2.19. 
Table 2.19. Average size of high-tech establishments (empJestab. ) 
I USA I UK I France I Italy laverage 
size 1 99.271 33.891 80.551 10.161 
The data show that while larger plants prevail in the US and in France, smaller 
establishments are most common in the UK and in Italy. Furthermore the average US 
high-tech establishment is ten time larger than the average Italian one. 
When data on the spatial concentration of high-tech establishments at FIA level are 
compared, then the US display the highest concentration ratio followed by France, UK 
and Italy. However it is worth noting that, when this kind of analysis is performed at the 
single sector level, the most concentrated industry (according to the normalised 
78 However one must bear in mind that this result may be influenced by the definition of Instruments for 
France which is wider than those used in the other 3 countries. 
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Herfindhal index) are the Italian Phan-naceuticals79, followed by US Computers, US 
electronic components and Italian Optical and photographic equipment. 
A similar picture emerges when employment data are analysed: Italian Computers and 
Aerospace take the lead, followed by US Optical and photographic equipment. However 
one must bear in mind that an SCR4 of 0.47 for the US Computers industry means more 
than 106,000 employees, while the Italian SCR4 of 0.78 refers to less than 20,000 
employees. This observation shows clearly that all relative measurements run the risk of 
overestimating single national and sectoral situations irrespective of their absolute and 
objective relevance. 
It is more interesting to note that, while in Italy and in the US high-tech sectors are far 
more concentrated at the FLA level, in the UK it is exactly the opposite: all indexes 
register higher values at the region level than at the county level8O. For France the 
situation is a little blurred, since while concentration indexes and the coefficient of 
variation are higher at the SLA level, Gini coefficients give the opposite results. 
Total manufacturing is almost always (at all levels and in all countries) in the bottom 
part of the concentration lists; however in the UK, at the FLA level, total manufacturing 
appears to be more concentrated than its high-tech subset. 
As far as "traditional" industries (Textiles and Motor vehicles) are concerned, they seem 
to show the highest concentrated structure in the US and Italy at the SLA level, while in 
France, at the FLA level, car manufacturing establishments seem to be scattered almost 
everywhere. 
A further international analysis can be performed by comparing the spatial correlation 
coefficients of different high-tech industries (as in table 2.20). 
79 Where two metropolitan Province (Milano and Roma) record more than 45% of the industry total. 
80 This result has been interpreted in the following way: it does not really matter in which County an 
high-tech firm does locate as far as it locates in the South East. 
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Table 2.20. Spatial association between high-tech industries in four OECD 
Countries at FLA level (establishments) 
USA 
- - 
A verage 
Industries 244 300 321 331 332 333 334 353 
244 0.33 0.20 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.37 -0.01 0.48 
300 0.86 0.81 0.82 0.61 0.67 0.25 
321 0.67 0.80 0.65 0.58 0.29 
331 0.70, 0.65. 0.65, 0.21 , 
332 ). 691 0.57 0.20 
333 55 0.18 
334 0.15 
353 
UK Average 
Industries 300 321 331 332 333 334 353 
244 0.24 0.12 . 0.09, -0.02 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.27 300 o 0.42 0.64 , 0.38 0.23 0.23 
321 0.27 0.47 1 0.18 0.28 0.30 
331 
j 
0.43 1 0.24 0.31 0.37 , 
332 ). 23 0.31 0.35 1 
333 0.01 0.25 
334 0.31 
353, 
France A vera e 
Industries 244 300, 321 331 332 333 334 353 
244 -0.16 -0.24 -0.31 -0.20 -0.09 -0.13 -0.37 0.12 
300 0.24 0.29 -0.02 , 0.11 0.15 0.44 
321 0.60, 0.14 -0.02 0.28 0.67 
331 0.09 -0.09 0.32 0.82 
332 0.08 -0.06 0.55 
333 -0.01 
334 0.37 
353 
Italy A vera e 
Industries 244 300 321 331. 332 333 334 353 
244 0, 0.15 0.38 0.50 0.27 -0.06 0.11 0.20 
300 T32 0.58 0.47 0.14 -0.08 0.34 
321 0.16 0.36 , 0.44, 0.07 0.06 
331 0.45 1 0.211 -0.09 0.12 
332 ). 48 1 0.07 -0.02 
3233 -0.04 
334 
353 
The table shows significant similarities and dissimilarities across Countries in the 
spatial distribution of high-tech industries. In the US, Computers and Electronic 
components display the highest spatial association coefficient, witnessing the existence 
of an established structure of forward and backward linkages in the information 
technology sector8l. In the UK the most spatially associated industries are Computers 
and Measurement instruments. In France, Aerospace acts as a peculiar industrial 
attractor, recording high spatial association coefficients with Electronic components 
and, above all, Medical instruments. In Italy, Computers and Medical instruments are 
81 The strength of this correlation is further reinforced by noting that the value of the spatial correlation 
coefficient is the highest in the whole sample. 
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the most significant spatially associated industries. The centrality of the Computer 
industry in the US is shown by the three highest spatial association coefficients. A 
similar role, but with a major difference, is played, in the UK, by the Measurement 
instruments industry. This sector records the two highest coefficients and the lowest one 
(with Pharmaceuticals). The same happens with Aerospace in France, which records the 
two highest coefficients and the lowest one (with Pharmaceuticals). Italy shows its weak 
innovative structure with the lack of any innovative industrial pole. Table 2.19 confirms 
also the heterogeneity of the Optical and photographic equipment industry within the 
high-tech sectors in Italy and in France (many spatial association coefficients are 
negative). The values of the average coefficients show that the US have the most similar 
geographical distribution for all high-tech industries, followed by UK, Italy82 and, far 
below, France83. 
Z3.3. Final remarks and observations 
Chapter 2 has been devoted to a geographical analysis of the location of high-tech firms 
and employment based on an original database - concerning the spatial distribution of 10 
high-tech industries within four major OECD countries (US, UK, France, Italy) at two 
distinct geographical levels (FLAs and SLAs) - which has been expressly built for the 
thesis. Section 2.3.2. has thoroughly discussed the problems which had to be solved in 
order to make these data comparable. Here, it is worth stressing the contributions that 
the new empirical evidence presented in this thesis has brought to the existing 
knowledge on the clustering of high-tech firms. 
Methodology: 
i) Absolute and relative measures of clustering give different and complementary 
infon-nation on the spatial distribution of industrial activities, because of the 
existence of scale economies and threshold effects. 
ii) Within the toolbox of the economic geographer and of the regional scientist there is 
a plethora of concentration and inequality indexes which are almost unknown in 
mainstream economics. 
82 Where metropolitan areas act as strong attractors for all high-tech industries. 
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iii) Empirical results are crucially dependent on the selected geographical level of 
analysis, the measured variable, the adopted industrial classification, the chosen 
concentration and inequality index. 
Contents: 
i) High-tech activity (measured both in terms of number of establishments and level 
of employment) shows a significant degree of spatial concentration. Even though 
clustering is not an exclusive feature of innovative industries, these industrial 
sectors are, in general, more clustered than total manufacturing and the 
"benchmark" sectors (Textiles and Motor vehicles). 
ii) US high-tech industry, at the FLA level, displays the highest degree of spatial 
concentration, followed by French, British and Italian ones. 
iii) High-tech activities are clustered in the West coast and Mountains States in the US, 
in the South East Region in the UK, around Paris in France and in the metropolitan 
areas of the major cities in Italy. 
iv) In almost all countries, the exception being France, Computer and office machinery 
displays the highest spatial association coefficients, confirming the relevance of 
geographical spillovers and the extent of local forward and backward linkages of 
such industry. In France, Aerospace acts as the most powerful industrial attractor. 
Chapter 2 aimed at showing the relevance of firms clustering. The use of several 
statistical indexes, applied to a number of high-tech sectors in four industrially 
developed countries, has sufficiently proved that firms do really cluster and that there is 
plenty of empirical evidence on the agglomeration and clustering of firms (and 
especially of high-tech ones). This evidence has attracted different streams of theoretical 
literature which have examined firms' locational choices trying to explain the clustering 
dynamics and to highlight the role played by different factors. Chapter 3 therefore will 
review the major theoretical findings in relation to the specific object of this thesis, i. e. 
the location of high-tech firms and the emergence of spatially defined industrial cluster. 
83 This results may be due to the decentralisation policy implemented by the French government in the 
Eighties. 
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2.4. Appendix: data sources 
This appendix is devoted to the presentation of all data sources used in the thesis, while 
the definition of variables can be found in the appropriate chapters. 
Chapter 2 
Data on the number of establishments and the employment level for 12 sectors84 in 4 
OECD countries (US, UK, France and Italy) at both FLA and SLA level have been 
collected from, or have expressly been produced by, national official sources. 
United States: County Business Patterns, 1994, US Department of Commerce, US 
Census Bureau, Washington. 
* United Kingdom: unpublished 1995 data, expressly produced for the thesis by ONS. 
* France: unpublished 1995 data, expressly produced for the thesis by INSEE. 
o Italy: Censimento generale dell'industria, commercio, servizi e artigianato 1991, 
ISTAT, Roma. 
Chapter 6 
Section 6.2. 
Data for 51 US States85 in two different years: 1986 and 1993. 
e APAY: Average annual pay (in US dollars), source: Employment and Wages Annual 
Averages, various years, US Bureau of Labour Statistics, Washington. 
* ECOL: number of students enrolled in institutions of higher education, source: Fall 
Enrolment in Higher Education, various years, US Department of Education, 
Washington. 
e EMP: Number of mid-march high-tech employees, source: County Business Patterns, 
various years, US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, Washington. 
84 For the US and Italy, 10 for the UK and 9 for France. 
85 50 States and the District of Columbia. 
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EMPOP: Number of mid-march high-tech employees divided by State resident 
population, both variables defined as in this paragraph. 
ESTA: Number of high-tech establishments, source: US Department of Commerce, 
Couniy Business Patterns, various years, US Census Bureau, Washington. 
ESTAPOP: Number of high-tech establishments divided by State resident 
population, both variables defined as in this paragraph. 
EXPORT: State export related shipments as percentage of total shipments, source: 
Exports from Manufacturing Establishments, various years, US Census Bureau, 
Washington. 
FAIL: Number of business failure by State (in thousand), source: Business Failure 
Records, various years, Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Wilton. 
HWAY: State highway mileage, source: Highway Statistics, various years, US 
Federal Highway Administration, Washington. 
INCO: Annual personal income per capita, by State (in US dollars) source: Survey of 
Current Business, various years, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington. 
9 LAND: State Areas, source: Census of Population, 1980, US Census Bureau, 
Washington. 
9 MALEPT: Ratio of civilian labour force on active population, Labour Statistics, 
various years, US Bureau of Labour Statistics, Washington. 
METRO: Resident population in metropolitan areas as percentage of State 
population, source: Census of Population, various years, US Census Bureau, 
Washington. 
PAT: Number of patent granted to resident of the United States, source: Patenting 
Trends in the US, States and Counties Report, various years, US Patent and 
Trademark Office, Washington. 
POP: State resident population, source: Current Population Reports, various yeas, 
US Census Bureau, Washington. 
TAX: State marginal corporate income tax rate, source: US Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations Report, various years, ACIR, Washington. 
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9 TRD: Total of funds for research and development activities (in millions of US 
dollars), source: National Patterns of R&D Resources, various years, National 
Science Foundation, Washington. 
9 UNEMP: Total unemployment as percentage of civilian labour force, source: 
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various years, US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics, Washington. 
9 UNION: Union membership as percentage of the number of State employees, source: 
Manufacturing Climate Study, various years, Grant/Thorton, Chicago. 
Section 6.3. 
Data on the number of establishments and the employment level for 5 sectors in 4 
OECD countries (US, UK, France and Italy) at both FIA and SLA level have been 
collected from, or have expressly been produced by, national official sources. 
e United States: County Business Patterns, 1994, US Department of Commerce, US 
Census Bureau, Washington. 
9 United Kingdom: unpublished 1995 data, expressly produced for the thesis by ONS. 
9 France: unpublished 1995 data, expressly produced for the thesis by INSEE. 
e Italy: Censimento generale dell'industria, commercio, servizi e artigianato 1991, 
ISTAT, Roma. 
Section 6.5. 
The original database contains data on the evolution of 55 high-tech clusterS86 from as 
early as 194887 until 1994. However for expositional reasons, the empirical analysis has 
been performed on 28 clusters. Clusters are identified by the name of the State followed 
by the original SIC code (see table 2.1 for details). 
86 For each high-tech sector, we chose 8 States which recorded the highest number of establishments 
either at the initial or at the final date. 
87 County Business Patterns started to record data for different high-tech industries in different years: 
Instruments and related products were recorded since 1948; Drugs, Computers and office equipment and 
Aircraft and parts since 1956; Electronic components and accessories since 1959; Guided missiles, space 
vehicles and parts, and Computer and data processing services since 1974. 
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ESTABLISHMENTS: Number of establishments, source: US Department of 
Commerce, County Business Patterns, various years, US Census Bureau, 
Washington. 
Section 6.6. 
Data on the growth rate of different variables in the period 1975-1995 regarding 112 
clusters (state-industries). 
EMPLOYMENT: Number of mid-march employees, source: County Business 
Patterns, various years, US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, 
Washington. 
WAGE: Annual payroll (in US dollars) divided by the number of mid-march 
employees, source: County Business Pattems, various years, US Department of 
Commerce, US Census Bureau, Washington. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical literature review 
On ne fait point de l'industrie entre ciel et terre; il faut se poser 
quelque part sur le sol. 
L. Walras (1874), Elements d'economie politique pure. 
( ... ) who can deny the spatial aspects of economic development: 
that all economic processes exist in space as well as in time? 
Realistically both time and space must be vital considerations 
in any theory of economy. Unfortunately, ( ... ) the architects of 
our finest theoretical structures ( ... ) continue to abstract from 
the element of space and in doing so they are approaching a 
position of great imbalance (... ) and actually confine themselves 
to a wonderland of no dimension. 
W. Isard (1949), The General Theory of Location and Space 
Economy. 
Introduction 
The two contrasting quotations which open this chapter seem to suggest that the analysis 
of industrial location (and, more generally, the economic analysis of spatial issues) has 
been for years a fundamental but, surprisingly, almost neglected topic in mainstream 
economic theoryl. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to survey different streams of literature and highlight 
the most significant contributions to the study of the location decision of firms in order 
to identify the key issues to be first theoretically developed within an original modelling 
framework and then empirically tested on the already described data set, in the 
following chapters. 
Among the several questions that have been investigated in the literature, three are 
central: (i) why are there agglomeration (and dispersion) forces; (ii) why are there 
agglomerations formed by different types of economic agents; (iii) why do clusters 
specialise in different activities? 
1 The situation has notably changed in the early 1990s since the diffusion of Paul Krugman's works which 
have generated a new wave of theoretical and empirical contributions (which is currently known as "new 
economic geography"). 
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For this reason the following pages, devoted to a survey of the theoretical literature, are 
not intended as an exhaustive review of location theory. On the contrary the aim of this 
chapter is to draw from different streams of literature (and even from different 
disciplines such as economics, regional science, operational research, corporate 
geography, business studies) the relevant building blocks for a theoretical approach to 
explain the emergence of industrial innovative clusters building upon high-tech firms 
location decisions. 
The reader particularly interested in location theory can easily refer to Isard (1956), 
Hoover (1948), and Beckmann (1968) for a taste of the founding fathers' contributions; 
to Gabszewicz - Thisse (1992) for a game-theoretical approach; to Stahl (1987) for a 
detailed survey on urban business locations; to Beckmann - Thisse (1986) for a compact 
and rigorous summary; to Greenhut - Norman (1995) for an exhaustive and all- 
comprehensive set of readings; to Ponsard (1983) for further historical details. 
The reader more interested in firms' entry and formation processes can see Geroski 
(1991 and 1993), Acs - Audretsch (1989 and 1992), Storey (1982 and 1985), and the 
whole issue of Regional Studies (1994). 
Finally the reader interested in spatial externalities, industrial spillovers and their 
relations to the process of regional development can see Jaffe (1989), Jaffe et al. (1993), 
Malecki (1983,1986 and 1991), Malecki and Varaiya (1986), Henderson (1994). 
3.2. "Classical" location theory 
3.2.1. Least cost approach 
The seminal contribution to the theory of industrial location is identified by most 
scholars in Alfred Weber's book - published in 1909 in German and translated into 
English twenty years later (Weber, 1929) - 77teory of the Location of Industries2. Weber 
is the founder of the so called "least cost approach" to industrial location. Ifis model 
explains the location of (manufacturing) firms as arising from the interaction of three 
factors (three "orientations" in Weber's words): transportation costs, labour costs and 
agglomeration forces. The first two factors constitute what he called regional (i. e. 
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geographically determined) components whilst the third represents what he defined as 
non-regional factors (i. e. deten-nined by the interaction of firms' location decisions). 
Weber's theory is based upon three main assumptions. First, the geographical basis of 
material inputs is given; second, the situation and size of places of consumption are 
given (so to imply conditions of perfect competition for all producers); third, there are 
several fixed labour locations with labour immobile and in unlimited supply at fixed 
wage rates3. 
On these bases Weber constructs a location decision model as follows: firstly firms 
choose a location (the point of minimum transport costs) which would allow the 
minimisation of transport costs between the sources of material inputs and the market 
for output (through the construction of a locational figure4), then they take into account 
two distorting forces which can shift the firms' location from the previously calculated 
optimum site: the location of cheap labour and the effect of agglomerative (and 
deglomerative) forces. 
Weber takes into account the existence of points of lower labour costs which can make 
the firm deviate - in any direction - from the point of minimum transport costs. By 
drawing a series of lines (isodipanes) centred around the point of minimum transport 
costs, it is thus possible to identify all locations for which additional transportation costs 
are equal to a given series of values. A "critical" isodipane is then built as the locus of 
2 Even though some authors underlines that other scholars (namely von ThOnen and Launhardt) had by the 
time already put the very first building blocks of the discipline some fifty years before. 
3 Wages, and more importantly, total labour costs - which take into account differences in "subjective 
efficiency" (a function of a particular geographic distribution of the population) - can be different at 
different locations and, given the hypothesis of immobility and unlimited supply of labour force, stay 
different forever. No labour migration is in fact allowed in the model. 
4 In the most famous example a firm is producing a good by using two inputs, available at two different 
locations, and sells its output on a market, situated in a third location. The location figure - used to 
calculate the point of minimum transport costs - is therefore a triangle (known as "location triangle"). The 
actual location point is then determined by the force (a function of the "ton per miles" coefficient that can 
be saved by approaching the corresponding corner) with which each comer attracts the firm. The ratio 
between the weight of localised raw materials and the weight of finished product (which Weber calls 
"material index") determines the first approximation of the firm's location. If the index is greater than one, 
the firm will locate towards the source of raw material; if it is smaller than the unity, the firm will locate 
towards the market place. On the basis of these intuitions the empirical literature has tried to build an 
exhaustive taxonomy of industries with respect to their locational decisions: materials oriented are those 
industries (as Chemicals and Metal products) which are primarily determined by the location of inputs, 
market oriented are those industries (as Food and beverage ) heavily influenced by the spatial distribution 
of consumers, and footloose industries (sometimes identified with high-tech ones) are those industries 
whose location dynamics are scarcely influenced by the spatial distribution of both inputs and consumers. 
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points for which the saving in labour costs is equal to the extra cost of increased 
transportation to the new location (per ton of product). The location of the firms will 
therefore deviate towards the point of lower labour costs if, and only if, this point is 
located inside the area delimited by the critical isodipane5. 
The third set of factors influencing the firm's location decisions are the economies (both 
positive and negative) arising from the spatial clustering of firms6. Agglomeration will 
arise if the isodipanes of a sufficient number of firms intersect and if the total output of 
these firms is greater than or equal to the quantity required to benefit from the 
economies of agglomeration. Actual firms clustering will emerge in the intersection area 
of several firms critical isodipanes. The actual ordering of three criteria (first transport, 
then labour, finally agglomeration) 'is more a logical than an historical one. In theory, 
firms firstly take into account the spatial distribution of relevant inputs and output 
(remember labour is an ubiquitous resource), then search locally for cheaper labour; 
finally they consider (although not in a strategic way) the effects of other firms location. 
Other authors such as Palander (1935), Hoover (1937 and 1948) and Isard (1949 and 
1956) further contributed to the development of this approach to industrial location by 
enlarging its scope and enforcing its predictive power. 
Palander's thesis was published in 1935. In this early work he addresses two 
fundamental questions. First - given the location of materials and the position of 
79 Second - given the location of firms, products market - where will location take place . 
competitive conditions, production and transportation costs - how does price affect the 
extent of the area in which the firm can sell its output? The contribution of Palander 
(1935), thus allows the least cost approach to deal with the issues of spatially distributed 
5 Similarly to material index, a "coefficient of laboue'- calculated as the ratio between the index of labour 
and the "locational weight" - measures the force of attraction of labour. High coefficients of labour will 
lead to concentration of firms around the cheap labour source; low coefficients, to their dispersion. 
6 In particular Weber assumes the agglomeration force to be a parabolic (quadratic, concave) function of 
the number of firms and the "deglomeration" force to be linear. Once again an index of saving in unit 
costs, dependent on agglomeration, is defined as the reduction of production and marketing costs resulting 
from firms clustering. 
7 This first question was very much in the tradition of Weber, even though Palander blamed Weber's 
analysis of agglomeration economies because of the lack of strategic considerations and of a dynamic 
perspective. 
69 
consumers and market areas8, to clearly distinguish in the analysis of total costs between 
production and transportation costs, to analyse the effects on isodipanes arising from 
non-linear freight rates, and to integrate the locational problem into more general 
production theory. 
Later contributions in the same stream pursued the connection between location and 
production theory in several ways: Hoover (1937 and 1948) investigates the effects of 
diminishing returns in production on market area boundaries; Isard (1951 and 1956) and 
Moses (1958) show that location decisions can be analysed within the traditional 
framework of the substitution principle between factors9. In Moses (1958) the optimal 
location can therefore be calculated by identifying the tangency point between the higher 
isoquant (Isard's "transformation line") and the iso-outlay line (Isard's "equal outlay 
line"), where the ratio of the marginal productivity of spatially located production 
factors is equal to the ratio of their delivered price. Moses extends the analysis even 
further by highlighting the fact that, if the production function is not homogeneous of 
the first degree, then there is no single optimum location, for the optimum location 
varies with the level of outputIO. 
The above mentioned authors made a very substantial point in highlighting that the 
concept of perfectly competitive general equilibrium (PCGE) -A la Walras, Cassel, 
Pareto - cannot be meaningfully applied to spatial econornics1l. A spatial PCGE 
8 Even if this is done in a very specific way: costs are still the only relevant variable and demand is held 
constant. 
9 The aim of the substitution approach to location theory is efficaciously summarised by Greenhut and 
Moses. "The theory of plant location is one segment of economic theory. It, too, rests on the principle of 
substitution. The extent to which labour can be substituted for capital or land and vice versa is basically 
the same problem as the selection of a plant site from among alternative locations. Both decisions attempt 
to maximize the ends. The objective is accomplished when the scarce means are allocated among 
competing ends in the optimum manner. " (Greenhut, 1956, p. 4). "My objective is to place the theory of 
location within the main body of economic literature. I wish to make the theory of location an integral part 
of the theory of production and to investigate the implication of factor substitution for the locational 
equilibrium of the firms. My main conclusion is that profit maximization requires a proper adjustment of 
output-input combination, location and price. Moreover, the optimizing values of these three variables can 
be determined with analytical tools derived directly from traditional economic theory. There is no need for 
much of the esoteric paraphernalia sometimes employed by location specialists. " (Moses, 1958, p. 259). 
10 By introducing the possibility of a plurality of possible equilibria, Moses directly calls for the 
introduction of "demand considerations" to identify the actual equilibrium. However this procedure is not 
explicitly and analytically dealt in his analysis. 
11 The same point has been recently recognised by Krugman (199 1a and 1995) as the main cause for the 
exclusion of spatial issues from the realm of economic theory. 
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framework would necessarily imply the following highly unrealistic assumptions: 
transport costs equal to zero; capital and labour ubiquitous or perfectly mobile; 
production technology uniform throughout the space. 
These authors concentrated therefore on partial equilibrium analysis, focusing on the 
supply side of the economy; the driving force of location decisions being the 
minimisation of costs, allowing little, if any, room for demand variation and strategic 
interaction between firms12 (Beckmann, 1990). 
Although at a first glance these contributions may seem rather primitive and very distant 
from the topic at study - transport costs being almost negligible for high-tech products13 
(whose typical weight to value ratio is very low) - it must be stressed that they can 
handle very effectively some peculiar features of innovative sectors. 
The first feature lies in the understatement of the demand side of the locational issue, 
related to the geographical dispersion of consumers, and in the consequent neglect of 
market areas. Innovative firms in real economic life either produce very specific 
consumer products whose relevant market extend to the "whole world" (therefore there 
are no locational advantages connected to any specific site to serve such a market) or 
they produce some inten-nediate goods used as input by other firms, which are usually 
larger and spatially concentrated. 
The second feature concerns price determination. Weber's hypothesis of perfect 
competition does not sound so unrealistic in the specific sectoral framework. In some 
high-tech industries, firms seems to have very little power in fixing prices: on the one 
hand, the world market is so large - compared with the output potential of a single firm - 
that it seems rather sensible to model the situation as an almost perfect competitive 
environment where firrns are price takers; on the other hand, when firms are 
12 The existence and the exploitation of agglomeration economies for an individual firm in Weber's 
model depends strongly on the behaviour of other firms, even though these behaviours are assumed as 
given. It must be noted, however, that this remark does not apply to some more recent contributors of the 
least cost approach. From the late Sixties, in fact, Isard (Isard, 1966; Isard - Smith, 1967) has repeatedly 
stressed the importance of game theory as an useful tool to model locational problems and to understand 
locational patterns subject to agglomeration dynamics. 
13 It must be stressed, however, that a re-interpretation of transport costs as distance-related opportunity 
costs, would radically change the picture. Closeness to intermediate input producers is very important for 
high-tech firms because of the relevance of producer-user interactions in the innovative activity (von 
Hippel, 1988). 
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subcontractors or suppliers of larger ones, then the situation resembles an oligopsony 
where few buyers fix the price and sellers are price taker. 
The third feature regards the relevance of (cheap) labour force location. High-tech firms 
do require skilled workers and it is rather simple to show that - if one considers the 
hedonic (or quality-adjusted) price of labour, by computing both education and training 
expenses as part of the labour costs - the search for particular locations which are 
endowed with a richer pool of (already trained) workers does correspond to the original 
orientation towards cheap labour locations in the least cost approach. It must be also 
considered that these pools of skilled labour are often produced by already existing 
clusters of similar firms. It is thus rather difficult to distinguish labour orientation from 
the willingness to experience agglomeration economies. In this case the new entrant 
firm can free-ride (at least in the short run) on the local labour pool and "poach" skilled 
workers (by offering marginally higher wages) who have been already trained by other 
firms in the area14. 
The fourth feature deals with agglomeration economies. Especially in high-tech sectors, 
phenomena such as: information spillovers, transaction costs reductions, existence of a 
pool of specialised service firms and spin-offs have a crucial influence in determining 
the location of industry (as extensively documented in the second chapter). Therefore 
such an approach, stressing the relevance of agglomeration forces and processes in 
determining the location of economic activities, can be useful in interpreting the 
empirical sectoral evidence. 
The fifth feature refers to the existence of multiple locational equilibria arising from the 
substitutability of inputs and on the condition for the production function to exhibit 
increasing returns to scale. This original result, due to Moses (1958), solves a possible 
conflict between reality and the Weberian location doctrine (stating that there is only 
one single best location for each type of activity) and sheds light on the fact that reality 
presents numerous examples in which firms in a given industry have different 
orientation. A key element of high-tech clusters is in fact the plurality of these 
experiences in the same country. 
14 For an interesting analysis of the relationships between training costs, labour market dynamics, and 
innovative activity, see Acemoglu (1992). 
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3.2. Z "Demand side" approach 
A complementary perspective on locational dynamics arises from the consideration of 
the demand side. If buyers are not concentrated in few market locations - which can be 
served (in spite of differences in profits) by all producers - but are dispersed in a wide 
area, and costs are assumed constant; then producers will seek the location granting 
them the greatest sales volume. In this way, by attempting to supply the largest possible 
market area, they will maximise their revenues and consequently (by the previous 
assumption of constant costs) they will maximise profits too. 
In a sense, models belonging to this group can be considered as a sort of dual of the 
"least cost" approach, presented in the previous section. There, demand is given and the 
firm's optimisation problem is reduced to the minimisation of costs; here costs are given 
and the problem to be solved concerns the maximisation of revenues, subject to the 
constraint imposed by the decisions and actions of competitors. 
The theories belonging to the demand side approach have been alternatively labelled as 
"market area" or "locational interdependence", according to the relative weights 
attributed either (i) to the identification of the exact shape and extension of the influence 
zone of different markets and producers (Fetter, 1924); or (ii) to the strategic location 
decisions that a firm has to take in order to achieve a greater monopolistic (or quasi- 
monopolistic) power over a number of consumers dispersed within a given area 
(Hotelling, 1929). 
An enormous stream of literature15 has originated from these contributions (and 
especially from the latter) spelling out all the different hypotheses which determines 
different patterns of spatial location. However, for the problem at hand, it is not 
necessary to go into many details, which can be better dealt with in section 3.4, devoted 
to game theory. 
Perhaps it is worth recalling here the contribution of Lbsch (originally published in 
German in 1940 and subsequently translated into English in 1954) because it represents 
a sort of bridge between the "least cost" and the "demand side" approach and it is an 
anticipation of the general equilibrium analysis of location. 
15 Summarised in Dean - McKee (1970), analytically reformulated in Gabszewicz - Thisse (1986), and 
extensively well documented in Greenhut - Norman (1995). 
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Spatial equilibrium in this model is detennined by two fundamental tendencies: the 
maximisation of individual advantages (firm's profits) and the maximisation of the 
number of independent economic units (firms). The equilibrium solution(s) must satisfy 
five crucial conditions: (i) the location of each firm must be as advantageous as 
possible; (ii) firms' locations must be numerous enough to cover the entire space; (iii) 
regions and/or situation of abnormal profits must disappear; (iv) production and supply 
areas must be as small as possible; (v) borderlines between two market areas must be 
iso-price lines for consumers. 
Even though Usch does not explicitly calculate the analytical solution of the location 
model, he states that, in general, the optimal location for industrial production (and 
consumption) is clustered, while optimal locations for agricultural production are 
uniformly distributed. Furthermore Usch explicitly states that locational 
interdependence approach - when confronted with equilibrium requirements - is doomed 
to produce analytical solutions cursed by mathematical impossibility and that the 
individual firm, endowed with a limited rationality, will often end up in sub-optimal 
locations16. 
The main limitation of the demand side approach lies in the partiality of the 
representation of inter-firm relationships, which are conceived only as competitive, 
leaving aside any other possible interaction (such as technical complementarities, 
market synergies, R&D co-operation etc. ). 
It must however be emphasised that this approach has firstly shown that spatial 
clustering of firms can be caused by factors other than agglomeration economies (as in 
the principle of minimum differentiation presented in Hotelling, 1929). 
Subsequent contributions, such as Eaton and Lipsey (1976) and many others, have then 
added further theoretical explanations for dcmand-driven firms' clustering, such as 
"comparative shopping" and indivisibility of the buyer. Although originally designed to 
describe household behaviour, these two reasons can be fruitfully applied to analyse the 
16 "If we wish to be precise and to consider the influence of the selection of a particular location on all 
other locations ( ... ) (then) we are faced with the interdependence of all locations. Equilibrium of the location system can therefore no longer be charted, but can be represented only by a system of equations 
that are insoluble in practice. ( ... ) There is no scientific and unequivocal solution for the 
location of the 
individual firm; but only a practical one: the test of trial and error. " (Lbsch, 1954, p. 8 and p. 29). 
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location process of high-tech firms. It seems reasonable to assume (following the 
"comparative shopping" line of reasoning) that an industrial customer - which has to 
buy intermediate inputs from a number of small high-tech firms - would prefer to do 
business with firms located in clusters (where there are several firms producing similar 
or at least comparable products) rather than with geographically dispersed firms. By a 
similar reasoning, the principle of indivisibility of the buyer can also explain why 
clusters of firms specialising in related or complementary intermediate products are 
more attractive to industrial buyers. 
IZI "Land utillsation" approach 
This approach underlines that space plays an absolutely unique role in economic theory. 
On the one hand (as widely illustrated by the previous approaches) space is something 
which causes disutility, by imposing transportation and communication costs to bridge 
distances; on the other hand, it is a truly economic good - which classical economists 
called "land" - which provides utility as a necessary and generally scarce production 
input and which has its own price: rent. 
The merit of originating this approach belongs to von ThUnen who, in 1875, developed a 
model in which the location patterns of productive activities (around a city centre) are 
dependent on different land costs. More profitable activities achieve better (i. e. more 
central) locations by being able to pay higher rents; less profitable ones are relegated to 
the outskirts of the city where rents are lower. 
It must be stressed, however, that some of these conclusions depend heavily on land 
market imperfections. In the presence of a perfectly clearing market for land, all 
locational benefits (included those arising from agglomeration economies) would be 
capitalised in land values. If this is the case, then the entire geographic space, in 
equilibrium, should display a perfect locational indifference; for each economic agent, 
wherever located, the algebraic sum of locational advantages and disadvantages 
(inclusive of rent paid to the land owner) should be the same17. In this situation, all 
17 To be precise, this reasoning will hold only in a "least costs" modelling framework. In the demand side 
approach, the value of an industrial site depends critically on how many neighbouring sites are already in 
use as inputs in the same industry, and on customers' location. 
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locations are - from the economist's point of view - identical and the choice of location 
would be of no interest, having no effect on firms' perfon-nance and profitability. 
Despite the fact that this model (that in certain respects could have been grouped in the 
least cost approach18) was originally designed to describe the locational pattern of 
different agricultural productions, its validity also holds for more advanced sectors and 
production. Real life high-tech clusters often find crucial barriers to their expansion in 
increased land prices both for industrial and residential use, and better positions in these 
clusters are always occupied by firms belonging to higher value added sub-sectors (as an 
example, one can compare the location patterns of software houses and "chip" 
manufacturers within the Silicon Valley). 
3.3. General location equilibrium models and urban 
economic theory 
Since the very beginning of locational analysis, several authors have tried, from 
different perspectives, to move from a partial equilibrium approach to a general 
equilibrium representation of the location decision. The ambitious goal was to 
determine the simultaneous location equilibrium of all agents in a given economy. 
However this has proved to be a difficult task. For a model to be realistic and 
interesting, it must display some sort of indivisibilities; but the very presence of 
indivisibilities may cause the non existence of a locational equilibrium19. The solution 
has thus been found, in most cases, by assuming that all production activities are 
perfectly divisible20. 
18 Being the rent level dependent on the distance from the market and not, as in Ricardo, from the 
difference in fertility of the land. 
19 "If all sites are homogenous and all plants are indivisible, and if the operation of plants requires them 
to exchange their outputs with each other, then no feasible location assignment can be sustained by a 
competitive price system". (Fujita, 1990, p. 185). This derives from a more general result known as the 
'spatial impossibility theorenf' (Starret, 1978), which assumes an economy with no relocation costs, 
homogeneous space (i. e. evenly distribution of immobile resources) and perfect markets for all gods at all 
locations. Even in such a situation, there is no competitive equilibrium where total transport cost are 
positive (i. e. the only feasible competitive equilibrium is complete autarky: a situation where no good or 
person is transported, production and consumption must necessarily coincide). 
20 To avoid the triviality of a uniform spatial allocation of plants it is also generally required all the sites 
to be not self-sufficient. 
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According to Fujita (1990) we can usefully divide this class of models into four main 
groups: comparative advantage, non-price interactions, monopolistic competition and 
oligopolistic interaction. In particular, this section will mainly deal with the two central 
classes which seem to fit better the case of high-tech firms2l. In both classes (non price 
interactions and monopolistic competition) firms' interactions endogenously generate 
agglomeration forces. This happens because some agents use spatial distribution signals 
(i. e. information about the spatial distribution of agents) in determining their optimal 
choice. 
3.3.1. Non-price interactions models 
Non-price interaction models describe competitive spatial equilibria allowing two 
different sources of interactions among firms and/or households: a generic locational 
choice (spatial externality) and a specific activity (communication). In both cases the 
value of the output produced by a firm is a function of the amount of inputs employed 
by the firm, but also depends on the interaction with other firms (i. e. there are external 
economies of scale). 
However, the former type (Fujita, 1985; Henderson, 1977; Kanemoto, 1980) uses the 
concept of "accessibility measure" to implicitly represent the effects of non price 
interactions and assumes that firms in the same area receive the same amount of external 
economies regardless of their positioning and active behaviours. The latter approach 
(extensively illustrated in this section) requires firms to engage in a communication 
activity and explicitly models agglomeration economies as arising from flows of 
communications among firms exchanging information22. 
In these contributions, information is modelled as an imperfect public good. The use of 
a piece of information by a firm does not reduce the content (even though it may reduce 
the value) of that information for any other firms. Hence the exchange of information, 
21 We are therefore explicitly ornitting to consider competitive advantage models, since the uneven 
distribution of immobile resources has been already dealt in the least cost approach and it does not seem 
to be relevant for high-tech industries. We also do not focus on oligopolistic interaction models with 
discrete agents, because the case of large firms interacting oligopolistically (i. e. taking into account their 
perceived market power) through land and labour markets with possible exchanges of intermediate goods 
does not seem to describe the typical inter-firms relationships established within high-tech clusters. 
22 It must be noted, however, that "these two forms of non price interactions models are mathematically 
equivalent' ' (Fuj ita, 1990, p. 190). 
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through communication activities, generates externality-like benefits to each firm. These 
benefits increase geometrically as the number of firms increases linearl 3 and they are 
greater if firms locate close to each others, because communication involves distance 
sensitive costs. The final results of this process is thus the clustering of firms in order to 
ease the flow of communication (Fujita - Smith, 1990). 
Different authors describe in detail different forms and contents of inter-firm 
relationships. Tauchen - Witte (1983) explicitly consider face-to-face interactions 
between similar firms subject to transportation and facility costs. Even though this 
model was originally formulated to describe the location decisions of offices within 
central business districts, in my opinion it may also be used to describe the spatial 
clustering of high-tech firms due to the enormous relevance that knowledge interactions 
and information spillovers have in advanced industries. In the model, agglomeration 
economies (which derive from a greater accessibility to contact at more central 
locations) are balanced by higher land rent and by the intrinsic concavity of the contacts 
benefits function24. 
Goldstein - Gronberg (1984) model the interactions between complementary firms in a 
(metropolitan) area as a way - alternative to integration (both vertical and horizontal) - 
to enjoy economies of scope25. They are able to demonstrate, among other things, that 
"there are economies of agglomeration if firms can make use of a "sharable factor" at a 
specific location" (Goldstein - Gronberg, 1984, p. 102). This approach seems thus to 
perfectly fit the typical inter-firm relationship existing in structured groups of firms such 
as the Italian industrial districts and the US high-tech clusters, where technological and 
marketing complementarities and externalities allow for vertical and horizontal 
disintegration. 
23 The number of directed communication channels in a n-agents set is in fact equal to n (n-1) 
24 "The net revenue (revenue after payment of all costs other than contacts costs and rent) of a firm 
depends on the number of contacts it has with other firms in the central business districts. ( ... ) The 
function is non negative and increasing; it may be eventually decreasing and even negative. This means 
that there are positive benefits to some level of contact with any other firm, but that the value of additional 
contacts with any one firm eventually diminishes. The function is (thus) strictly concave throughout" 
(Tauchen -Witte, 1983, p. 1313). 
25 "Economies of scope with respect to space is our concept of agglornerative economies. Agglomerative 
economies exist when it is less costly to combine two or more product lines in one (urban) area (but not 
necessarily one firm) than to produce them in different (urban) areas" (Goldstein - Gronberg, 1984, p. 97). 
78 
Pascall and McCall (1980) - by underlining the conditions of uncertainty and imperfect 
information inherent to locational decisions - analyse the relationship between already 
located finns and outsider firrns which are still deciding what location to choose. "It 
seems clear that (in presence of imperfect information) firms' decision to enter a 
particular industry should be based on the observed behaviour of the firms in that 
industry. If location is important then this should be reflected in the locational choices of 
finns already in the industry. ( ... ) Indeed the number of successful firms in this industry 
that are located at a particular site indicates the productivity of the site" (Pascal - 
McCall, 1980, p. 384). This paper thus gives a theoretical foundation to the empirical 
evidence, provided by surveys and case studies, which indicate that previous locations 
of similar firms (i. e. belonging to the same industry and dimensional class) act as a 
strong signal of the profitability of doing business in the area and therefore positively 
influences locational choices. 
All these models - which stress the relevance of inter-firms relationships (such as 
knowledge spillovers and informational exchanges) in determining the successful 
development of an industrial cluster and highlight the signalling function of previous 
locations - indirectly provide a micro-economic foundation for the modelling framework 
put forward in chapter four of this thesis. 
3AZ Monopolistic competition models 
Monopolistic competition models assume that price interactions (i. e. exchanges of 
goods and services through the mediation of prices) are the fundamental causes of 
spatial agglomeration of economic activities. These models26 are thus confirming the 
empirical evidence, frequently quoted in the surveys, that "one of the major causes of 
industrial agglomeration is the availability of specialised local producer services" 
(Fujita, 1990, p. 198). 
Rivera-Batiz (1988) specifically focuses on the service sector. In particular, he shows 
that the local availability of specialised business services (i. e. transport, maintenance, 
financial, legal, fiscal, marketing and technological consultancy etc. ) can generate 
26 It must be stressed that, even though his models - because of their qualitative and quantitative 
relevance - have been surveyed under a specific heading, most of the contribution recently produced by 
Krugman on "geographical" issues may well be ordered under this section. 
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agglomeration economies through the following causal chain. "The agglomeration of 
producers in a particular industry will result in gains if the extent of the market allows 
producer services to proliferate and to become more specialised, raising the productivity 
of the industry that use them" (Rivera-Batiz, 1988, p. 126). 
Fujita (1990) models a similar situation in which a cluster (in his words, a city) is 
characterised by two industries: an export-good industry (e-industry) and a service-good 
industry (s-industry) and explicitly states that the e-industry "can be interpreted as the 
headquarters of high-technology firms (e. g. Silicon Valley)" (Fujita, 1990, p. 199). In 
this model "given the spatial distribution of e-firms, each s-firm chooses its optimal 
location and f. o. b. price of its s-good. ( ... ) In turn, given the spatial distribution of s- 
firms, each e-firm chooses its optimal location and consumption level of each s-good. 
Since s-firms prefer to locate near e-firms and vice versa, we can expect that in 
equilibrium all firms will form a cluster. Notice also that as the number of s-goods 
(provided in the city) increases, each e-firm can enjoy a higher productivity. Therefore, 
this model can also explain the formation of a specialised city due to the availability of 
specialised local producer services" (Fujita, 1990, p. 199). 
Kanemoto (1990) demonstrates that market transactions of intermediate inputs (one of 
which can be information) can create firm clustering if they are coupled with 
indivisibility (or, more generally, scale economy) in production27. This result thus 
provides a theoretical foundation for those agglomeration economies arising from 
technological and productive interactions which have been often reported by empirical 
studies of high-tech clusters (such as Saxenian, 1994). 
Other contributions explicitly model interactions between firms' and households' 
location decisionS28 to explain the existence of (mainly urban) agglomeration 
economies. Papageorgiou (1979) establishes an analogy between vertical, horizontal 
27 "In this paper, therefore, interactions between firms are market transactions and do not by themselves 
represent externalities. Combining the market exchange of intermediate inputs with indivisibility, 
however, creates externalities in locational decisions. For example suppose that two firms interact with 
each other and they equally share the interaction costs. If one firm moves closer to the other firm, the 
interaction costs for both firms decrease. The firm which moves, therefore, gives external benefits to the 
other firm7 (Kanemoto, 1990, p. 47). 
28 "In our model firms prefer to locate near households and vice versa. Other things being equal, the 
centre of the distribution of households is the best location for each firm; the centre of the distribution of 
firms is the best location for each household" (Fujita, 1988). 
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integration and urban agglomeration. Agglomeration advantages refer to production and 
consumption while disadvantages refer to transportation costs. The city is thus 
conceived as a centre of production, a public good and a service centre. Especially the 
third function of the city provides fuel for agglomeration economies even when there are 
no output externalities. 
Papageorgiou - Thisse (1985), by using a linear city model, stress the interaction 
between firms and households29 in the search for an optimum urban dimension. 
"Households are attracted to places where the density of firms is high because 
opportunities are more numerous; and they are repulsed by places where the density of 
households is high because they dislike congestion. Firms are attracted to places where 
the density of consumers is high because the expected volume of business is large and 
they are repulsed by places where the density of sellers is higher because of the stronger 
competition prevailing there" (Papageorgiou - Thisse, 1985, p. 20). In this model, the 
clustering of households and firms requires the existence of boundaries and spatial 
interaction; firms further require the existence of positive profits, i. e., some kind of 
imperfect competition. These results can therefore be interpreted - although in a very 
broad sense - as a theoretical explanation for the positioning of high-tech clusters 
(especially in the US) close, but not too close, to large cities, due to the interaction of 
the requirements of high-tech firms and highly skilled employees. 
Fujita (1988) models a situation where there is a continuum of firms, each producing a 
single and distinct commodity, and a continuum of homogeneous households. Firms are 
assumed to prefer locations near to households and vice versa. Therefore the centre of 
the distribution of households is the best location for each firm and vice versa. When the 
number of households is larger than that of firms, we can expect that, in equilibrium, the 
firms will form a cluster in the centre of the distribution of households. This model thus 
explicitly explains the formation of downtown or commercial areas; however, "with 
appropriate modification ( ... ) it will be also possible to explain various type of spatial 
agglomeration such as business firm agglomeration and high-tech firm agglomeration" 
(Fujita, 1988, p. 89). 
29 "Our model rest upon the idea of a complete spatial interdependence between firms and households. 
The optimal behaviour of a firm depends on what households and other firms do, while the optimal 
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Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 thus have shown that economists have thoroughly analysed the 
concept of agglomeration economies and have been able to identify a number of 
different theoretical reasons which can even explain the clustering of footloose activities 
such as high-tech industry. 
3.4. Game theory 
The relevance of firms' strategic behaviour in the choice of locations has been raised in 
the location analysis literature since the works of Hotelling (1929) and Palander (1935) 
and further emphasised by Isard (1966). However, only since the 80s, has this issue 
become the central focus of analysis of a series of contributions, mainly derived from 
Hotelling (1929), aimed at analysing the strategic side of location choice. "Space, by its 
very nature, is a source of market power. ( ... ) Because market activities are performed at 
dispersed points in space, each firm finds only a few rivals in its immediate 
neighbourhood. ( ... ) Competition in space occurs 'among the few', thus leading to an 
analysis of the problem as a game of strategy" (Gabszewicz - Thisse, 1992, p. 282). 
According to Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992), who have extensively reviewed and 
acutely organised the literature on the strategic approach to location analysis, the 
locational problem is modelled as a typical noncooperative game in which firms are the 
players, prices and/or location are the strategies, and profit functions are the payoffs. 
Location, for game theory, is essentially a matter of spatial competition. Therefore, 
within this theoretical framework, different models have been proposed in order to deal 
with different forms of competition, such as location under mill price competition, 
location under discriminatory pricing, location under non-price competition. 
It is very difficult to summarise such a literature which, by its very nature, underlines the 
weakness of any general theory and would oblige one to deal with a plethora of specific 
hypotheses. For the purposes of the thesis, however, it seems more relevant to briefly 
describe advantages and drawbacks of this theoretical approach when dealing with the 
location of high-tech firms. 
Undoubtedly, game theory allows a more precise analysis of spatial competition by 
underlining the role played by few, sometimes hidden, hypotheses which are crucial for 
behaviour of a household depends on what firms and other household do: space here binds everyone 
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the solution of most locational games (is location sequential or simultaneous? Is there 
any co-ordination device or not? ). In a sense, one may state that the best contribution of 
this class of models has been achieved in showing the inconsistency, or the severe 
limitations, of previously considered general principles and laws. 
However this approach suffers from some drawbacks by having confined its attention to 
competitive interactions between firms, leaving aside the role played by technological 
and informational synergies and externalities in determining actual firms' locations. 
Further, these competitive interactions are almost always modelled as non co-operative 
games, avoiding the analysis of the behaviour of groups and coalitions of agents (which 
could be of extreme interest for the analysis of birth and development of high-tech 
clusters and science parks). Finally, these models often underestimate the role played by 
transport infrastructures in influencing firms location decisions. However, some steps 
aimed at overcome these limitations are presented in the following papers, which study 
alternative formulations of the original model of Hotelling. 
Scotchmer and Thisse (1992) highlight the relevance of spatial issues in the realm of 
public economics, and show that, once space is introduced, the line between private and 
public goods is blurred. Furthermore they illustrate that the original result of minimum 
spatial differentiation (or clustering), obtained by Hotelling and confuted by 
d'Aspremont et al. (1979), holds as far as the preferences of consumers are sufficiently 
dispersed30. Finally they show that models derived from Hotelling (1929) ignore an 
important consequence of space, namely capitalisation3l. Bester et al. (1991) 
demonstrate that Hotelling's model, with quadratic consumer transport costs possesses 
an infinity of equilibria which are normally ruled out by imposing a co-ordination 
device, concerning the ranking of the firms' locations along the market segment and 
restricting the firms' strategy spaces. Knoblauch (1991) reformulates the same location 
game of two firms on different finite graphs, obtaining surprising results such as the 
absence or presence of pure Nash equilibria depending on the topological quality of the 
together" (Papageorgiou - Thisse, 1985, p. 29). 
30 This result is further generalised by Fujita and Thisse (1996) who show that the spatial location pattern 
of firms is the result of a "trade-off where price competition pushes firms away from each other while 
competition for market areas tend to pull them together" (ibid, p. 25). 
31 "Capitalisaton means that the price of land reflects the public services, local taxes and transport costs 
incurred by the occupant" (Scotchmer - Thisse, 1992, p. 28 1). 
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graph. This last result is particularly interesting when one wants to assess the empirical 
relevance of theoretical models in real life situation, where space is not an 
undifferentiated plain and transport infrastructures are present and extremely relevant 
for firms location. 
3.5. Krugman and the new economic geography 
Under this heading lies the contribution to regional economics initially put forward by 
Paul Krugman in some recent works (1991a, b, c; 1992; 1993a, b, c; 1994; 1995; 1998) 
and further developed by other authours such as Baldwin, Martin, Ottaviano, Puga, and 
VenableS32. In the above mentioned papers, Krugman applies the original framework he 
developed for international trade theory (Krugman, 1990) to two main problems of 
spatial economiCS33: the existence of agglomeration economies and the determinants of 
firms' location. He firstly explains the existence of clustering phenomena (which he 
calls "geographic concentration") in terms of the interactions of increasing returns, 
transportation costs and factor mobility. 
In a first model34, he describes an economy divided into two sectors (agriculture and 
industry) and two locations (East and West). There are two sector-specific inputs 
(farmers and workers) and only workers are free to move wherever they enjoy an higher 
real income; farmers are immobile. Agriculture displays constant returns to scale and no 
transportation costs, while industry exhibits increasing returns to scale, transportation 
cost for its products and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition with free entry as 
market structure35. 
The model is based on the relationship between three forces: two of them are centripetal 
(firms want to locate close to the largest possible market, and workers want to have 
access to the larger number of goods) and one is centrifugal (firms want to serve the 
peripheral agricultural market). The existence (and the persistence) of phenomena such 
32 We mainly refer to the following works: Baldwin (1997a and 1997b), Baldwin et al. (1997), Venables 
(1995 and 1996), Puga - Venables (1996 and 1998), Ottaviano - Puga (1997). 
33 For further details on the relationship between international trade theory and location theory, see 
Krugman (1993c). 
34 Sketched in Krugman (1991a) and analytically discussed in Krugman (1991b). 
35 This model heavily relies on the monopolistic competition model of Dixit - Stiglitz (1977). 
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as the "geographic concentration" of industrial activity therefore depends crucially on 
the interaction of three parameters describing: the share of manufactured goods in total 
expenditure, the level of transportation costs, and the extent of scale economies36. 
The location decision of firms is explained through the interaction of two elements: an 
initial historical accident and a cumulative process which is built by translating some of 
the concepts originally highlighted by Marshall (1921) into a dynamic analytical 
framework37. Krugman explicitly focuses on the advantages of labour market pooling 
and of local supply of specialised inputs to cover a wider range of industries; however 
he does also cover in the analysis the case of high-tech firms, by considering pure 
technological externalities and informational spillovers as agglomerating factors38. 
The specific issue of the relationships between innovations, high-tech industries and 
regional/urban economics is specifically examined in another work (Brezis - Krugman, 
1993). In this article, which is explicitly entitled "Technology and the Life Cycle of 
Cities" - but whose conclusions, we think, can easily be extended to other geographical 
entities such as high-tech clusters -, they explain the overtaking of leading cities by 
upstart metropolitan areas, which often occurs during time of major technological 
change, in terms of localised leaming by doing. 
"When a new technology for which the accumulated experience is irrelevant is 
introduced, older centers prefer to stay with a technology in which they are more 
efficient. New centers, however, turn to new technology, and are competitive despite the 
raw state of that technology because of their lower land rents and wages. Over time, as 
36 If transport costs are high alo the share of expenditure in manufactured good is low, or scale economies 
are weak, no clustering will take place. However when scale economies are high enough firms will cluster 
and, because of transport costs, they will cluster where the demand is larger. 
37 A dynamic model approach to the process of industrial agglomeration - originally outlined by Marshall 
(1921) in Industry and Trade - had been already proposed by Paul David. The Marshallian Dynamics of 
Industrial Localization: Chicago, 1850 - 1890 is the title of a paper he presented in 1984 and Marshallian 
Factors, Market Externalities and the Dynan-tics of Industrial Localisation is the title of a 1988 working 
paper by David and Rosenbloom, published in 1990. 
38 However it must be remembered that Krugman is rather sceptical on the effective role played by 
knowledge spillovcrs in determining the formation of cluster. "(I) have chosen to put pure technological 
externalities last, not first, for several reason. First, it is an empirical fact that many of the industries which 
are highly localised within the United States ( ... ) are nothing like high-technology sectors. ( ... ) Second, as 
a matter of principle I think we should focus first on the kinds of external economies that can be modelled 
other than by assumption. ( ... ) Knowledge flows ( ... ) are invisible; they leave no paper trail by which they 
may be measured and tracked, and there is nothing to prevent the theorist from assuming anything about 
them that she likes" (Krugman, 199 1 a, p. 53). 
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the new technology matures, the established cities are overtaken" (Brezis - Krugman, 
1993, p. 1). This paper gives theoretical support to the empirical evidence which shows 
similar life cycles of technologies and territories. When a major technological 
innovation spreads out, new high-tech clusters appear and - if the innovation is 
commercially successful - they develop and consolidate often at the expenses of older 
historical sites. The names of the area and of the products become therefore inseparable: 
Detroit and the standardised car in the early 1900s, Palo Alto (Silicon Valley) and the 
semiconductors in the mid-1950s, Boston Route 128 and the minicomputer in the early 
1980s. 
Other contributors to the new economic geography approach have stressed further 
interesting features such as the possibility of obtaining industrial clustering through 
capital mobility and investment dynamics, even when the labour force is immobile 
(Baldwin, 1997b); the role played by industry spillovers, through a series of 
industrialisation waves, in the diffusion of manufacturing activities from one region to 
neighbouring ones (Puga - Venables 1996); the influence of forward and backward 
linkages (Venables, 1996). 
An undeniable merit of Krugman's work mainly lies in the recognition that the analysis 
of locational choice and actions of agents is part of the core of economic theory (and not 
just a very peculiar curiosity). Furthermore his approach has contributed to the 
recognition of phenomena such as multiple equilibria, path dependency, self-fulfilling 
expectations and historical accidents within the main stream neo-classical economics. 
His work seems also to suggest that very traditional and common economic reasons 
(related to economies of scales, labour force location and mobility, and transport costs) 
may help in explaining the locational pattern of high-tech firms better than peculiar 
industry specific oneS39 
However it must be noted that, in his effort to put himself aside from the community of 
regional scientists and urban economistS40, he has not explicitly included in the analysis 
39 "So while I am sure that true technological spillovers play an important role in the localisation of some 
industries, one should not assume that this is the typical reason - even in the high-technology industries 
themselves" (Krugman, 199 1 a, p. 54). 
40 This point is clearly expressed in two distinct quotations which can be found in a later contribution: 
"Instead of a deep body of theoretical work, what Isard ended up creating was an ecclectic field: regional 
science. Regional science is not an unified subject. It is best described as a collection of tools, some crude, 
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some crucial features that characterise spatial economics as such. The first and most 
relevant of these features being congestion and agglomeration diseconomies which, 
sometimes, can put a halt to the development of the most promising industrial 
clusters4l. 
3.6. Industrial geography 
This approach, put forward in the early Eighties by a group of scholarS42 (mainly 
geographers and planners based in California), aims at stressing the causal relationship 
which exists between the internal (both technological and economic) dynamics of a 
capitalistic economy and the territorial pattern of industrialisation43. 
According to this approach, industrial location patterns are created through "the process 
of growth rather than through a process of efficient allocation of plants across a static 
economic landscape" (Storper - Walker, 1989, p. 70). In contrast to Weberian location 
theory, industries are therefore assumed capable of "generating their own conditions of 
growth in place, by making factors of production come to them or causing factors 
supplies to come into being where they did not exist before" (ibid., p. 71). In other 
words, according to the geographical industrialisation approach, industries produce 
regions and are capable of creating their own geography (Scott, 1993; Scott - Storper 
1992; Salais - Storper 1992 and 1993, Storper, 1997). 
some fairly sophisticated, which can help someone who needs an answer to practical problems involving 
spatial issues that will not wait until we have a good theory. ( ... ) Over the last few years I have been 
gradually constructing a model of a spatial economy that relies on the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to 
monopolistic competition to 'sterilize' the problem of imperfect competition. I do not clam that this 
approach is the only way to do spatial economics, or even that is a wholly satisfactory model. What I do 
claim is that the model demonstrates the feasibility of telling the kind of stories that are needed to do 
meaningful economic geography in a way that mainstream economists can live with" (Krugman, 1995, pp. 
57-60). 
41 As explicitly and honestly recognised by Krugman: "But all not factors are mobile, and the presence of 
immobile factors provides the centrifugal force that works against agglomeration. In principle, one should 
include urban land rents as part of the story; in the models I have worked out so far, however, this force is 
disregarded. Instead, the only force working against agglomeration is the incentive to set up new facilities 
to serve a dispersed agricultural hinterland" (Krugman, 1995, p. 9 1). 
42 Bennet Harrison, Allen J. Scott, Michael Storper, and Richard Walker. 
43 'The basic patterns of industry location and regional growth can be produced by processes endogenous 
to capitalistic industrial isation, rather than by the exogenous placement of resources and consumers" 
(Storper - Walker, 1989, p. 70). 
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This line of reasoning - which explicitly contrasts with the established literature44 and 
rejects precise analytic modelling - assumes that the spatial dynamic of industry growth 
follows a regular pattern divided into four main phases: localisation (a new fast growing 
industry creates its own location conditions, thanks to its factor-creating and factor- 
attracting power); clustering (dynamic economies of productions, both internal and 
external to firms, lead to spatial concentration); dispersal (as the industry grows new 
plants are located further away from established industry centres, both as a response to 
increasing congestion and as a growth strategy through "expansive periphery"); and 
shifting centre (periodic convulsions lead to the crisis of established sites and, in the 
long-run, to shifts in the centres of industrial activity). 
Time plays an important part in this approach. In the early stages of a new industry, 
firms can settle on any of a wide variety of locations and avoid existing industrial 
agglomerations "because they profit from dynamic economies of production, accelerated 
investment flows and labour influx that are not necessarily dependent on the activities of 
firms in other (older) sectors" (Storper - Walker, 1989, p. 75). These moments of 
enhanced locational freedom are called windows of locational opportunity. 
It may be also emphasised that the industrial geography approach shares several features 
with a wider stream of theoretical and applied contributionS45 which, since they trade 
off analytical rigour against detailed descriptions of clustering phenomena, have been 
used in this thesis as background reference for the applied analysis of chapter 6 and the 
study of policy implication described in chapter 7. 
For the purpose of the current analysis, this approach has the merit of attempting to 
unify industrial location and regional development in a single explanatory framework. 
Furthermore it focuses explicitly on the locational dynamics of innovative industries and 
44 "We proposed to thoroughly rewrite location theory from the standpoint of political economy ( ... ). Our 
primary aim is to move towards a synthesis to replace the neo-classical one locked into position by Isard 
( ... ). Neo-classical economic models need to be replaced at the foundation" (Storper - Walker, 1989, p. 3) 
45 Which ranges from the French "regulation7' school (Benko - Lipietz 1992; Boyer - Saillard, 1995) to 
the Italian tradition of industrial districts analysis and local systems of productions (Bagnasco, 1977, 
Becattini, 1987; Garofoli, 1991; Bramanti - Maggioni, 1997). from the GREMI approach (Aydalot - 
Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1991; Ratti et al., 1997) to the Scandinavian group for industrial network analysis 
(Hakansson, 1987 and 1989; Maskell, 1997; Maskell et al., 1998), from the new sprouts of "traditional" 
economic geography (Taylor - Conti, 1997; Conti et al.. 1995) to the political economy of cities and 
regions (Crouch - Streeck, 1996; Keating - Loughlin, 1997). 
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firms and accounts for some of the main features of regional development: uneven 
territorial distribution, mixture of inertia and instability, relevance of local and global 
interdependencies. 
Its main limitations rest in the absence of any fort-nal modelling and in the consequent 
impossibility of serious empirical testing. However if this literature is used as the 
theoretical framework underpinning the modelling techniques and the empirical analysis 
put forward by the "population ecology" approach (described in section 3.12), these 
drawbacks can be easily overcome. 
3.7. Technological infrastructure approach 
This very pragmatic approach aims to explain the spatial distribution of innovations in 
terms of the availability of well developed technological infrastructure, empirically 
defined in terms of the agglomerations of four indicators: i) networks of firms in related 
industries; ii) university R&D; iii) industrial R&D; iv) business-service firms (Feldman, 
1994). This recent approach, which stems from the applied research school of Acs and 
Audretsch and it is mainly associated with the works of Feldman (Acs - Audretsch - 
Feldman, 1994; Feldman, 1994; Feldman - Florida, 1994), focuses on the empirical 
testing of the relevance of externalities and agglomerative forces in determining the 
location of high-tech firms measured, indirectly, through the size of R&D outlays and 
the number of innovations produced and/or patents awarded46. 
Although their explicit theoretical underpinnings are on the evolutionary side of the 
analysis of technological change (several references are to works by David, Dosi 
Freeman and Rosenberg), it seems more sensible to classify such work as a sort of 
indirect test of the orthodox models illustrated in section 3.3.1. stressing the role of 
generic spatial externalities (or urbanisation/regionalisation economies)47 in causing the 
clustering of innovative activities. 
46 For its mainly empirical character, this approach will be also briefly reviewed in chapter 5. 
47 Although the denomination of a dependent variable (networks of firms) would suggest an attempt at 
measuring the direct interactions or communication sources of agglomeration, this is not actually the case. 
The indicator chosen to quantify this variable is in fact the mere value added of related industries in the 
region. 
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It must be noted that the main interest of Feldman's research is the "geography of 
innovation"; therefore the location of innovative firms is considered only as a mere 
dependent variable able to partially explain the spatial distribution of product 
innovation. However the interest for the problem at study lies in the recognition of the 
importance of spatial aspects in the innovative process48 and in the exposition of an 
exhaustive series of data, variables, proxies and empirical test to validate the hypothesis. 
3.8. Porter's competitive advantages 
Even though the initial focus of Porter's analysis (Porter, 1980 and 1985) was on firms 
and firm's strategy, since 1989 he has become interested in the analysis of two main 
environments where firms must decide and act, these being the industrial sector and the 
nation. In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, he argues that the competitive 
advantage of a national industry crucially depends on four main determinants: "(i) factor 
conditions (e. g. the nation's position in the factors of production, such as skilled labour 
or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry; (ii) demand conditions (e. g. 
the nature of home demand for the industry's product or service; (iii) related and 
supporting industries (e. g. the presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries 
and related industries that are internationally competitive); (iv) fin-n strategy, structure 
and rivalry (e. g. the conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, 
organised, and managed, and the nature of domestic rivalry" (Porter, 1990, p. 71). 
When the analysis focuses on a series of industry-specific case-studies from ten different 
countries, the territorial level of analysis sometimes shifts from nations down to local 
industrial clusters49. In successive works, Porter adapts the "diamond" of national 
competitive advantages to the local framework by stating that "Regional clusters grow 
because of several factors: concentration of highly specialized knowledge, inputs and 
institutions; the motivational benefits of local competition; and often the presence of 
sophisticated local demand for a product or a service". (Porter, 1996, p. 87). 
48 "Innovation is no longer the province of the inventor, the risk-taking entrepreneur, the insightful 
venture capitalist or the large resource-rich corporation. Innovation instead has its sources in a broader 
social and economic institutions welded into a technological infrastructure for innovation. It is in this 
fundamental sense that geography organises the innovation process and helps sustain the spatially uneven 
growth and progress of advanced technological economies" (Feldman - Florida, 1994). 
49 This dynamics is particularly evident in the Italian and in the German case studies in Porter (1990). 
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I-Es contribution has been summarised by Glaeser et al. (1992) as follows: local 
competition and industrial specialisation are the main engines of clusters growth50; and 
tested in an empirical analysis on 170 large US cities. A similar analysis, relative to 
high-tech industries, is performed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
3.9. Jacobs and the economic history of cities 
The reasons for including Jacobs contribution in this survey of the literature are twofold. 
On the one hand, her name is used by Glaeser et al. (1992), to represent an alternative 
explanation of why cities grow in the above mentioned empirical exercise. On the other 
hand, her contributions (Jacobs, 1964,1969, and 1984) show that some remarkable 
results can be obtained by mixing, in the right proportion, an extensive use of historical 
cases and anecdotes and a sharp economic intuition. 
One of the main ideas of Jacobs is that variety and diversity of geographically proximate 
industries promote growth rather than geographical specialisation. This is expressed 
with vividness in Jacobs (1969, p. 48): "Our remote ancestors did not expand their 
economies much by simply doing more of what they had already been doing ( ... ). They 
expand their economies by adding new kind of work. So do we. Innovating economies 
expand and develop. Economies that do not add new kinds of goods and services, but 
continue only to repeat old work, do not expand much nor do they, by definition, 
develop". Jacobs is well aware that industrial specialisation brings short run efficiency 
(through localisation economies); however she contrasts such efficiency with the long 
run resilience which derives from a diversified industrial structure5l. In a sense, Jacobs 
is assuming that urbanisation economies are better than localisation economies for 
ensuring a long run growth path. 
Another keen intuition of Jacobs is that small average firm size (and indirectly 
competition) foster the process of growth and development. "Offhand one may suppose 
50 "Knowledge spillovers in specialized, geographically concentrated industries stimulate growth. 
(Porter) insists, however, that local competition, as opposed to local monopoly, fosters the pursuit and 
rapid adoption of innovation" (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1127-8). 
51 This point is illustrated through the example of two English manufacturing cities in the middle of the 
19'h century: Manchester and Birmingham. "Manchester ( ... ) was indeed efficient and Birmingham was 
not. Manchester had acquired the efficiency of a company town. Birmingham had retained something 
different: a high rate of development work. ( ... ) Today, only two cities in all Britain remain economically 
vigorous and prosperous. One is London. The second is Birmingham" (Jacobs, 1969, p. 87-88). 
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that large organizations with their many divisions of labour would be much more 
prolific at adding new work to old than would small organizations. But this is not so. In 
a large organization nearly all the divisions of labour, no matter how many there are, 
must necessarily be sterile in this respect" (Jacobs, 1969, p. 71). 
Thus, according to Jacobs, a competitive environment with a large number of small 
firms - belonging to different industrial sectors - is the engine of growth and, above all, 
long run development. As a consequence, high-tech clusters - characterised by a 
differentiated industrial structure and by a low average size of establishments - must 
perform better than specialised clusters where large firms are predominant. Such an 
assumption will be empirically tested in chapter 6. 
3.10. Diffusion theory 
A large part of the literature dealing with the economics of technological change 
concerns the study of the diffusion process of innovation. However the process of 
diffusion is a crucial feature in other scientific fields, from medicine (the spread of a 
virus), to ecology (the spread of a new species), to sociology (the spread of rumours). In 
general the main issues at study in diffusion theory is to explain why, once a new 
phenomenon (technological innovation, virus, biological species, rumour) has appeared, 
it takes time, for such a phenomenon, to reach the entire population and/or completely 
fill the environment. It seemed therefore natural to the author to think about the location 
process of a certain type of firms (and about the birth and development of an high-tech 
cluster) as a diffusion process where the main question to be answered is: why, once a 
new location has appeared and has proven to be superior, it is not "invaded" by all 
potential entrants? While section 4.5 deals explicitly with this very question, this section 
presents a very brief survey of the main ideas developed in the economic literature on 
the diffusion of technological innovation. 
The epidemic model (Grilliches, 1957; Bass, 1969) emphasise the role played by 
information spreading in the diffusion process of an innovation. If one assumes that 
information diffuses through contacts, and that these contacts are random, then at any 
moment of time the rate of diffusion of an innovation is proportional both to the fraction 
of actual users and to the fraction of potential users. The diffusion pattern follows a 
logistic curve (i. e. a particular type of S-shaped curve in which the rate of diffusion first 
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increases until an inflection point52 is reached and then decreases as the curve 
approaches the equilibrium level where the all agents are actual adopters). The main 
limitation of such an approach - as pointed out by Davies (1979), Stoneman (1983 and 
1986), Coombs et al. (1987), Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) - lies in the fact that all 
adopters are assumed to be homogenous, that both the population of potential adopters 
and the features of the innovation are assumed to be the same throughout the entire 
diffusion process, and that only the demand side of the diffusion process is taken into 
account, while the role played by the suppliers of the innovation is overlooked. 
Mansfield (1968), re-interpreting the epidemic model, argues that the diffusion process 
is determined by the uncertainty on the performance characteristics of the innovation 
and hypothesises the speed of diffusion to be positively related to the profitability of the 
innovation and negatively related to the size of the investment required. Other authors 
(such as Chow, 1967; Glaister, 1972) have proposed various modifications to the basic 
framework to accommodate a number of limitations. However all these models assume 
the existence of an equilibrium level (when all potential adopters become actual ones), 
underline the information constraint in any moment of time, and describe the "diffusion 
path (as) a disequilibrium approach to that end point" (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995, 
p. 273). 
Alternative interpretations of the diffusion process (equilibrium models) assume that, at 
any moment in time, there is perfect information in the economy on the existence and 
nature of new technologies. However each firm, before deciding whether or not to 
adopt, must compare the benefits and the costs of adoption. "As time goes on the cost of 
adoption (or the benefits from adoption) change and, as they do so, usage of the 
technology extends" (ibid, p. 274). In the "rank effects" models (David, 1969; Ireland - 
Stoneman, 1986) it is assumed that the heterogeneity of potential entrants causes 
different returns from adoptions and, indirectly, different dates of adoption. In the "stock 
effects" models (Reinganum, 1981; Quirmbach, 1986) the benefits from acquisition to 
the marginal adopters are assumed to decrease as the number of previous adopters 
increases. In the "order effects" models it is argued that adoption benefits to a firm 
depends on its position on the order of adoption (on the basis of a "first come, better 
served" criterion). Karshenas - Stoneman (1993) put these three approaches in one 
52 Corresponding to half the population of potential adopters. 
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encompassing model and are able to empirically estimate the relative influence of each 
factor in determining the diffusion process of computer numerically controlled machine 
tools in the UK. A modified version of such a model, able to describe the dynamics of 
the location process, will be presented in section 4.5. 
3.11. Path dependence, lock-in and informational cascades 
This approach derives from the application of original lock-in models - first proposed by 
Arthur (1983,1989) to describe a context where agents must choose between different 
technologies competing for adoption - by Arthur to the field of industrial location 
(Arthur 1988,1989,1990). 
In the most simple spatial framework, the basic mechanism at work is as follows: 
benefits arising to firms from location can be split into two parts: geographical benefits 
(depending only on the specific location's characteristics) and agglomeration benefits 
(depending on the number of previous locations). Firms are assumed to have different 
geographical preferences (or tastes)53 over a finite number of regions. The function 
representing agglomeration benefits is either monotonously increasing (assuming 
unbounded economies of agglomeration) or concave, i. e. firstly increasing then 
decreasing (allowing for the existence of a threshold size after which diseconomies of 
agglomeration prevail). The model is then completed by a randomly chosen series of 
outsider firms, which originates a sequence of locations54. 
When agglomeration benefits are set to zero, and firms locational preferences are 
independent55, then a definite pattern of industrial settlement56 will emerge which will 
53 1. e. different types of firms, in absence of agglomeration benefits, would choose different regions for 
their location. 
54 A forerunner of this approach may well be considered Schelling (1978) with his works concentrating 
on the aggregate effects of individual actions as the title of his most famous book Micromotives and 
Macrobehaviours vividly suggest. 
55 In the modelling framework proposed by Arthur the independence of location derives from the absence 
of agglomeration benefits; on the contrary in the "informational cascades" literature, location decisions of 
firms are shown to be dependent even when agglomeration benefits are absent because of their 
informational contents. 
56 Where the locational share of each region is equal to the proportion of firms with that given locational 
preference. 
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not be effected by any different sequence of historical events in the formation of the 
industry57. 
When agglomeration economies exist and are unbounded, as the industry enlarges, one 
location will emerge as "spatial monopolist" and get the entire set of subsequent 
locational choices. Which location would be chosen cannot be predicted in advance and 
depends on the level of geographical benefits and on the order of entry of firm types 
(where a key role is played by early locators' locational tastes). "Attractiveness, 
interacting with historical accidents of choice-order, determines the outcome" (Arthur, 
1990, p. 243). 
Much more interesting is the case where both agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies are modelled. In this case several results are possible depending on the 
values of key parameters describing the heterogeneity of firms' locational tastes, the 
sequence of locations, and the force of agglomeration economies. In particular it may 
happen that, when locational tastes are very relevant and/or location heterogeneity is 
infinite, "all locations (will) share the industry, with probability one, in the proportions 
that would have occurred if agglomeration economies were absent" (ibid. p. 246). 
Alternatively, when locational preference are tightly clustered (i. e. there is almost no 
locational. heterogeneity) and/or agglomeration effects at the outset are strong, then "one 
location takes all the industry with probability one" (ibid. p. 246). 
A further interesting (and somehow counterintuitive) result deals with agglomeration 
economies being responsible for spatial separation and firms spreading over a territory. 
This fact can be easily explained when it is assumed that contiguous locations grant 
similar geographical benefits to resident firms. If this is the case, and we allow for 
agglomeration economies, then locations with large numbers of firms will be preferred 
to geographically similar neighbouring locations with fewer firms. "Locations with large 
numbers of firms therefore cast an 'agglomeration shadow' in which little or no 
settlement takes place. This cause the separation of the industry" (ibid. p. 247). 
57 In Arthur (1988) an alternative location dynamics is presented in which each region is initially 
inhabited by one firm and the industry develops through new firms spinning-off from parent firms one at a 
time. If this is the case, geographical benefits are set to zero and "firms are added incrementally to the 
region with probabilities exactly equal to the proportion of firms in each region at that time" (Arthur, 
1988, p. 88). This locational process will be completely dominated by chance, or historical events, and 
any consistent locational pattern (i. e. where all regional shares sum to 1) is likely as any other. 
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These results are further re-enforced by adding those deriving from a distinct, but 
converging, stream of literature dealing with "informational cascades" and "herd 
behaviour" (Baneýee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Mrshleifer, 1993; Hirshleifer - 
Welch, 1994). In these papers, lock-in processes arise even in absence of pay-off 
interactions (i. e. when one agent's action does not directly increase the benefits to other 
agents doing the same thing) because of limited private information and of a tendency of 
extracting further information from other agents actions. In such a situation, it may well 
be optimal for an agent, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the 
behaviour of the preceding agent without regard to his own information. This causes a 
multiplicity of outcomes, volatility of the equilibrium pattern of choices across several 
plays of the same game, and the possibility for the system to be locked-in to inefficient 
equilibria. 
Although these latter works do not make explicit reference to locational issues, we think 
that this approach may be very relevant for the topic at study. According to this 
modelling framework, the number of previous locations in a given area is seen by 
outsider firms as a signal of profitability58, and thus influences the subsequent location 
choices even when agglomeration economies are absent or, even more convincingly, 
when they are unknown to outsiders. For this reason, some insights arising from this 
section have been incorporated in the ecological models used in chapter 4. 
3.12. Biological and ecological models 
Under this heading we look at two different streams of literature which, in various ways, 
use biological and ecological analytical frameworks to analyse the growth process of 
social and economic collective agents (these being: cities, regions, industries, firms, 
unions). In particular we will briefly review the dynamic models of self-organising 
urban growth (Allen - Sanglier, 1978,1981a and 1981b; Allen, 1980), and the 
mathematical ecology of cities (Dendrinos - Mullally, 1985; Dendrinos - Sonis, 1986; 
Sonis, 1986; Dendrinos - Rosser, 1992; Dendrinos, 1996; Reggiani, 1997), regions 
(Maggioni, 1993; Nijkamp - Reggiani, 1992 and 1998; Folloni - Maggioni, 1994; Staber 
58 The number of located firms is indeed the more evident and less costly signal of the profitability of a 
given location; however firms do also take into account that the ratio signal to noise, for such an issue, can 
sometimes be very small. 
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1997; Gambarotto - Maggioni, 1998), industries (Brittain - Wholey, 1988; Maggioni, 
1993; Staber, 1997), technologies (Andersen, 1994) and organisations (Carroll, 1988; 
Hannan - Freeman, 1989; Hannan - Carroll, 1992). 
Dynamic models of self-organising urban systems developed at the end of the 70s 
within the multi-disciplinary school of Prigogine. In particular, Allen and Sanglier were 
the first to model the birth and the development of an integrated (and hierarchically 
ordered) system of cities according to the self-organisation paradigm. The main 
assumptions of this paradigm are: i) any system is subject to external flows of energy or 
matter that more than compensate the internal entropy production; ii) relationships 
between the elements of the system are non linear. 
These models of urban dynamics (Allen, 1976 and 1980; Allen - Sanglier, 1978,1981a 
and 1981b) are based on two variables (number of residents and number of jobs 
available in each location), two types of agents (employers and employees), a series of 
different economic activities (or functions as in the original model of Christaller, 1933) 
that are initially introduced at random in different cities, a basic mechanism (workers 
migrate searching for employment, employers set labour demand according to the size 
of the market they serve), and two non linear interactions (first, the "urban multiplier", 
linking positively the installation of an exporting activity, the level of local population 
and local potential employment capacity; second, the external economies cycle, which 
links in a loop: concentration of employment, provision of common infrastructures, 
further concentration of economic activities). 
The results, obtained by simulating the model with different values for key parameters, 
recall those of Christaller: the system gradually evolves from an undifferentiated set of 
equal cities to an hierarchic distribution of cities ordered by population size and 
economic function provided. However the spatial symmetry is lost and several different 
outcomes may arise depending on historical accidents and on parameters describing the 
non linear relationships. These simulations- which represents a fruitful interaction 
between classical location theory and the theory of non linear dynamics - enlarge the set 
of possible equilibria of established locational models (thus reducing the generality of 
their results) and highlight the possible emergence of chaotic dynamics. 
The stream of literature devoted to the analysis of ecological models gradually evolved, 
at the beginning of the Eighties, from a conviction that urban and regional problems 
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have an intrinsically dynamic, complex, and relational nature. For this reason it seemed 
possible to draw a methodological analogy between the development of a spatial 
systems (a city or a region), dependent on the external environment (national and 
international economic conditions) and on the behaviours of other similar entities (i. e. 
other cities) operating in the same environment, and the development of a species of 
animals, dependent on the conditions of the natural environment and on the behaviour 
of other species. This approach can be considered as complementary to the paradigm of 
evolutionary economics (Freeman, 1982; Dosi et al., 1988; Metcalfe, 1994). While 
evolutionary models underline the role of variety-creation mechanism (e. g. the 
innovation), ecological models stress the role played by the selective mechanism: the 
environment (which in turn is made of external conditions and inter and intra specific 
interactions). Usually these models initially describe the laws of development of a city, 
region or industry in isolation (intra-specific ecology); then they analyse the possible 
forms of interactions exhibited by systems of cities, regions or industries (inter-specific 
ecology); and finally they deal with more general questions about the relationships 
between complexity and stability of urban, regional or industrial systems. A very similar 
approach will be used in chapter 4, when describing the evolution of a high-tech firm 
cluster, firstly by modelling its genesis and development in isolation, then allowing for 
the interactions with other clusters, finally introducing the influence of external 
exogenous macroeconomic shocks. 
The mathematical framework of these models is rather simple, based on differential and 
difference equations - and has been sketched in its core elements by Lotka and Volterra 
in the late 1§20s, early 1930s - but due to the features of dynamics and complexity it 
shows a worrying tendency towards analytical difficulty and impossibility, thus the need 
for numerical simulations. The number of different models that can be derived from this 
very basic theoretical skeleton is amazingly large and include the possibility of 
describing and analysing competitive as well as co-operative interactions. 
3.13. Concluding remarks 
The survey of the theoretical literature, presented in this chapter, has shown that 
different approaches highlight different aspects of the issue of firms' location and 
agglomeration. This section and the following table aims at summarising the chapter's 
main findings by describing, for each theoretical approach, the main advantages and 
drawbacks in explaining high-tech clusters birth, development and evolution. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of theoretical approaches 
Theoretical Advantages Drawbacks How clustering is 
approaches explained 
Least cost and supply side orientation; overlooking of resources location; 
land utilisation distance related variables; demand side; labour force pool; 
multiple equilibria perfect competition agglomeration economies_ 
Demand side role of strategic _ non cooperative comparative shopping; 
and behaviour; multiple firms' interactions; maximisation of market 
game theory equilibria; explicitation technological power 
of hypotheses synergies 
General non price interactions; lack of a unifying demand-supply 
location monopolistic competition framework interactions among firms 
equilibrium and between firms and 
households 
New economic monopolistic inexistence of labour market pooling; 
geography competition; congestion local supply of inputs; 
relation between the life dynamics preference for variety 
cycles of technologies 
and cities 
Industrial existence of windows of no explicit formal dynamic economies of 
geography locational opportunity; modelling production; horizontal 
industries produce integration 
regions 
Technological serious empirical weak relation to a localisation economies; 
infrastructure exercises specific theory industrial and university 
R&D; 
business service firms 
Porter's use of case- studies; must be reduced in localisation economies; 
competititve heuristic and pragmatic order to be beneficial effects of local 
advantages approach empirically tested competition; local 
concentration of demand 
Jacobs and the mix of hystorical. cases must be reduced in urbanisation economies 
economic and economic intuition order to be and local competition 
history of cities empirically tested 
Diffusion explains why location is a equilibrium analy- information diffusion; 
theory lengthy process. Allows ses needs firm network externalities 
for both equilibrium and level data for 
disequilibrium analyses testing 
Lock-in and existence of path-depen- results are mainly informational cascades; 
informational dency, lock-in and sub- obtained through agglomeration economies; 
cascades - 
optimality of equilibria simulation. locational preference 
Biology and self organisation; non absence of inter-specific synergetic 
population linear and complex dyna- strategic relationships 
ecology mics; multiple equilibria behaviour; need for 
1 , simulations 
Within the classical location theory, the "least cost" approach underlines the supply side 
factors in determining location and clustering. Its distinctive emphasis on transport 
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costs59, labour location, and agglomeration economies provides the guideposts for our 
analysis. The main drawbacks - being the lack of analysis of the demand side and of 
producers' strategic behaviours - are partially compensated for by the contribution 
belonging to the "market area" and "locational interdependence" approaches which 
show that clustering is possible even in absence of agglomeration economies through 
strategic locational behaviour aimed at maximising market power60. The "land 
utilisation" approach underlines the role played by rent in determining real life industrial 
locations. 
The general equilibrium approach, especially in its sub-divisions dealing with non price 
interactions and monopolistic competition raises some interesting points. Firstly: 
agglomeration occurs because firms profit from face-to face interaction, clustering thus 
becomes a valid alternative to vertical and horizontal integration. Secondly, the 
observation of the emergence of industrial clustering (e. g. spatial concentration of 
similar firm) reduces the uncertainty which is inherent to any locational choice. Thirdly, 
agglomeration economies are either produced by concentration of specialised business 
service firms, derive from market exchange of inten-nediate goods, or may arise from the 
interactions of firms and households. 
Game theory re-visited location theory, limiting the generality of results and adding new 
insights on the strategic side of price and non price spatial competition. Some interesting 
results for the issue at study could be obtained by focusing on co-operative games 
(stressing the role played by coalitions) or by considering the interactions between 
different local authorities trying to sustain the industrial development of their area each 
one at the expense of the others. 
Krugman's new economic geography stresses the role of labour force pools and 
localised sources of specialised suppliers (in conjunction with increasing returns to 
scale) in determining agglomeration economies and consequently clustering. More 
59 Which, as suggested in section 3.2.1, can be re-interpreted as distance-related increasing difficulties in 
the transfer of specific, complex, cumulative technology (or, more generally, of any tacit, and non codified 
knowledge). 
60 The most famous result being the "principle of minimum differentiation" illustrated by Hotelling 
(1929). 
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importantly this approach also sheds light on the relationship between radical innovation 
and birth of new urban centres and industrial clusters. 
The califomian school of industrial geography polemically states that location factors 
are unimportant. Industries produce regions and not vice versa, by attracting relevant 
location factors which, in the medium run, are all mobile. Locational patterns and 
industrial clusters are the result of historical accidents and of the inner spatial dynamics 
of capitalist economies, which can be divided into four phases: localisation, clustering, 
dispersal and shifting centres. 
The technological infrastructure approach offers an empirical confirmation of the 
relevance of geographical clustering and agglomeration economies for innovative 
activity. Product innovation is more likely where there are developed technological 
infrastructures (measured by number of related firms, size of university and industrial 
R&D and number of business service firms). If one assume that the best location for an 
high-tech firm is a site where the innovation rate is above average, then the endowment 
of technological infrastructures becomes the most important location factor for 
innovative firms. 
The lock-in approach is extremely powerful in its simple analytical framework: 
locational preference, plus increasing returns to location (limited or unlimited), plus a 
random order of location choice gives an incredible variety of possible results, from 
even distributions to spatial monopoly. A further interesting result (complementing 
Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation) is that agglomeration economies can, 
in special cases, cause a particular form of geographical dispersion (locational 
shadowing). 
The contributions by Porter and Jacobs put forward two altemative explanations for the 
process generating the growth of an industrial cluster and a city. The first stresses the 
role played by intra-industry localisation economies and local competition, while the 
second underlines the influence of industrial variety and urbanisation economies, in 
conjunction with small average firms size. 
The bio-ecological approach highlights the issues of spatial self-organization, non 
linearities, plurality of equilibria and of level of analysis, non competitive relationships 
and has called for numerical simulations to understand complex dynamic systems. 
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Being interested in the analysis of high-tech clusters, we have selected the most relevant 
suggestions within each approach to delineate an original research scheme analysing 
clustering from a twofold perspective. The first is a macro perspective, the second is a 
micro one. The fon-ner focuses on the overall dynamics of high-tech cluster: why they 
occur, where they develop and how they evolve. The latter concentrates on the different 
factors which determine the location decisions of a firm. In the following section we 
discuss these two perspectives which will be built upon in the next chapter. 
3.14. Moving forward 
One of the most relevant features of industrial development, as shown in chapter 2, lies 
in its unequal spatial distribution. Other clear empirical evidence shows that different 
industries choose different geographical locations and sites in which to cluster. Thus, 
one would assume that firms location processes and industrial cluster dynamics should 
constitute the core of any analysis of locational issues. 
On the contrary, as it has been shown in the pages above, these two intertwined 
phenomena have been analysed under different headings (location theory and regional 
economics) which share few (if any) elements6l. In this way, an encompassing 
perspective which focuses on the relationship existing between firms' location decision 
and industrial clusters development process has been unjustly sacrificed and 
neglected62. 
In order to build such an encompassing framework, we need to take into consideration 
the existence of a methodological trade-off which states the impossibility for a model to 
simultaneously maximise generality, realism and precision when describing, interpreting 
and explaining reality. We therefore decided to use two different modelling frameworks, 
in order to look at the same issue from two complementary perspectives, and to try to 
enrich each approach with some suggestions and hints deriving from the other one. 
For this reason, in sections 4.2,4.3, and 4.4. we use an analytical framework, derived 
from the population ecology approach, which trades off precision against greater 
61 See, for example, the structure of the first volume, devoted to regional economics, of the Handbook of 
Regional and Urban Economics (Nijkamp, 1986) which is divided into two separate parts: Part 1, 
"Location Analysis" and Part 2, "Regional Economic Models and Methods". 
62 With the notable exceptions of North (1955) and, more recently, of Swann (1993 and 1998). 
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generality and realism to describe different possible dynamic interactions which may 
arise between the development path of different high-tech clusters. In this model the 
original ecological approach has been modified in order to introduce some micro 
foundations for the macro-economic dynamics. Is this way, we have been able to 
analyse the effects of firms profitability expectations on the development dynamics of 
industrial clusters. The results obtained suggest that the development or, alternatively, 
the underdevelopment of an area is jointly determined by the composition of potential 
entrants' population, by the behaviour of neighbouring clusters, by the local economic 
conditions and, as stressed in section 4.4, by the depth and frequency of external macro- 
economic shocks. 
In section 4.5. we present a model, derived from diffusion theory, which trades off 
realism against precision and generality in order to analyse the specific decision making 
mechanisms involved in the location process of a profit maximising firm and to derive 
its effects on the overall location pattern. This model, derived from a contribution 
(Karshenas - Stoneman, 1993) originally designed for the analysis of firms' 
technological adoption process, is able to describe the locational choices of high-tech 
firms and their effect on the development pattern of an high-tech cluster. This model is 
alýle to take into account several determinants of firms' location: previous locations 
(epidemic effect), individual firm's characteristics (rank effect), price and non price 
interactions between firms (stock and order effects). The epidemic effect takes into 
account the spread of information on the profitability of a specific location site; the rank 
effect measures the relevance of individual firm's features such as size, financial 
structure, management style; the stock effect describes the dynamics of agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies; finally, the order effect investigates the strategic 
components of firms' location process. 
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Chapter 4 
Modelling firms' location and cluster development 
Ecology is the study of patterns in nature, of how these patterns 
came to be, how they change in space and time, why some are 
more fragile than others. Population ecology is concerned with 
how populations interact with the environment and how these 
interactions give rise to the larger patterns of communities and 
ecosystems. The environment is more than just sun, air, earth 
and water: it includes other organisms which may help or 
hinder the survival of a species. Population ecology is also the 
study of how these organisms interact in competition and in 
co-operation. 
S. H. Kingsland (1985), Modelling Nature. Episodes in the 
History of Population Ecology. 
4.1. Introduction 
The second chapter of this thesis has shown the empirical relevance of high-tech clusters 
in four advanced countries, the third has presented a survey of different streams of 
literature which have directly dealt with, or that can be profitably used to analyse, the 
agglomeration dynamic and the emergence of spatial concentration of industries. This 
chapter is devoted to the elaboration of a new theoretical modelling framework able to 
explain, on the one hand, the location process of firms and, on the other, the 
development process of industrial clusters. 
Since the issue to be investigated is twofold, we decided to use a twofold theoretical 
approach. For this reason this chapter is divided into two main parts. Sections 4.2,4.3 
and 4.4 study the development path of a high-tech cluster interacting with other clusters 
and industries, and build some micro-economic foundations of firms' behaviour. 
Section 4.5 looks at the location decisions from the individual firm's perspective and 
obtains a development path of the cluster, considered in isolation, as a consequence. 
4.2. Firm location processes and the development of 
clusters: a macro-economic (ecological ly-derived) 
approach 
In this section we theoretically deal with the macro-economic aspects of the location 
process, concentrating on the patterns (and causes) of regional industrial clustering and 
104 
development, on the relationship between the development of different industries in the 
same clusters and on the intertwined development of clusters and industries. 
If one starts the analysis from this macro-economic perspective, the first issues to be 
addressed concern the existence and the extent of spatial clustering processes, the main 
questions to be answered being the following: why do firms cluster? and why do 
clusters have a finite size? 
4.2.1. The effect of previous locations on clustering dynamics 
In the population ecology literature, a generic modelling framework describes the 
growth process of a species in an environment as driven by its reproductive capacity and 
limited by the available amount of resources and the presence of other interacting 
species. From a mathematical viewpoint, the core of this situation can be represented by 
a differential equation (or by a system of differential equations) which describe the 
changes over time of a variable (birth minus deaths) as function of: the level of the same 
variable (the size of the population) at each moment in time; a ceiling level (which takes 
into account the limit imposed by the available amount of resources); and the level of 
other variables (which represent the interacting species). 
Similarly, in the following sections, firms' decisions to locate into a cluster (and 
consequently the entry rate and the development path of the industrial cluster) are 
explained in terms (as a function) of the "economic mass" of the cluster, measured 
through the number of firms already located there. 
However, these models do not merely postulate the existence of a stock-flow 
mechanism between the number of incumbent firms in the cluster and the entry rate, 
even if one may reasonably assume the number of spin-off firms, which are generated in 
each period within the cluster, to be a proportion of the number of firms already 
established there. Neither do they assume that the number of firms is the only relevant 
variable considered by potential entrants when taking locations decisions. Instead, as it 
will be shown in greater detail in section 5.1.3, the number of already located firms 
reduces potential entrants' search costs, signals the existence of geographic and 
agglomeration benefits, diffuses information, reduces uncertainty, and causes 
informational cascades. 
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What follows is thus a series of models aimed at explaining location decisions and the 
development path of a high-tech cluster when firms interactions (both effective and 
perceived) are relevant. For the sake of exposition, we first present a model describing 
the effects of the location decisions of monoplant firms (i. e. where firm and 
establishment coincide), belonging to a given industry, within an isolated cluster (i. e. 
when there is only one potential site for location). In the following sections, the scope of 
the analysis is enlarged to encompass a number of interactions between two (or more) 
clusters and/or industries. 
4.2. Z Locational benefits and costs and the development of an 
industrial cluster 
Firms decide to settle in a region on the basis of the expected profitability of being 
located there. This profitability depends on net locational benefits - obtained as the 
difference between gross locational benefits and costs - which, in turn, are based on both 
observable and unobservable elements. 
For simplicity it can be assumed that, in an uncertain world - with limited information 
regarding local costs and revenues available to the outsiders - profitability expectations 
for any particular location will be based solely on the number of firms already located 
there (the number of previous locations being the only observable variable). 
Furthermore section 4.3.1. will present several other reasons for explaining why 
outsiders can use the cluster industrial mass (i. e. the number of located firms) as the best 
available indicator of a cluster's profitability and, consequently, as the main variable to 
be considered when taking locational decisions. 
Let us assume, as in Arthur (1988 and 1990), that locational gross benefits Bfqfor firmf 
locating in cluster q are composed of geographical and agglomeration benefits I. 
1 For analytical convenience we split locational benefits in two classes: geographical and agglomeration 
benefits. The first class refers to those components which are unaffected by the number of incumbents; 
while the second refers to those components which depend on the number of incumbents. By adopting this 
formulation, however, we do not intend to state that agglomeration benefits refer only to spillovers of 
scientific and technological knowledge and know-how. On the contrary we are convinced that relevant 
agglomeration benefits derive also from external economies of scale in the use of local resources. The 
same variable (i. e. labour productivity) has a fixed geographical component, which depends on the quality 
of local workers, and a variable agglomerative component which depends on the number of firms already 
located in the region. 
106 
Geographical benefits Gfq depend on the intrinsic features of the site (such as the 
quality of local factors of production: capital kq and labour 1q; the efficiency of the 
local network of specialised suppliers and business service firms sq ; and the quality of 
urban and industrial infrastructures uq). Agglomeration benefits Af. 
(nq) 
are a concave 
non monotonic function of the number of incumbents (i. e. firms already established in 
cluster q) nq . Thus: 
Bfq = Gfq(kq 91q I Sq 1Uq)+ Afq(nq 
) (4.1) 
The assumption of concavity and non monotonicity in Aqimplies that, as the number of 
firms located in cluster q increases, gross benefits firstly increase because of 
agglomeration economies (due to productive specialisation; scientific, technical and 
commercial spillovers; reduction in both transport and transaction costs, increases in the 
quality of the local pool of skilled labour force and in the efficiency of the local credit 
market); then decrease when congestion more than compensates for agglomeration 
economies. 
Locational costs cfq, symmetrically, include two components: geographical costs gfq 
(reflecting the cost structure of the cluster in terms of locally prevailing wage w. and 
interest rate rq ; average price of business services d.; and level of land rent and 
taxation tq ), and agglomeration costs aq . which are assumed to be a convex non 
monotonic function of the number of regional incumbents nq . 
r fq 9fq 
(wq 
9q fdq Itq) + af, (nq (4.2) 
The assumption of convexity and non monotonicity in aq implies that, as the number of 
firms in cluster q increases, locational costs initially decrease until some "optimal" 
number of users for a given set of urban, industrial and environmental infrastructures 
and resources is reached. Then they increase due to the competition, between a larger 
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number of firms, for a limited pool of local inputs (i. e. capital, labour, business services, 
land and public infrastructures) which raises their prices2. 
Net locational benefits can now be calculated as the difference between equations (4.1) 
and (4.2). 
Nfq 
= 
Bfq - cfq = Hfq 
(Wq 
. rq, 
dq tq, kq Jq 
Isq 9Uq)+hfq(nq 
) 
(4.3a) 
Assuming that the geographical benefits and costs do not change overtime, if we focus 
the analysis of the location process on the dynamics of the interactions between the level 
of available locational benefits, what becomes relevant for describing firrns' location 
decisions is just the net benefit function Nfqin the incumbents' space. We can therefore 
summarise the geographic components Hfqwith a parameter a., which vertically shifts 
the locational net benefits function, and write the following expression: 
Nfq = Bfq - cfq = ccq + hfq 
(nq ) (4.3b) 
It easy to see that the locational net benefits function (4.3b) is always concave, since 
Nf. is equal to the difference between a concave function Bf, 
(nq) 
and a convex one 
cfq(nq)' In other words, each marginal firm, which enters the cluster, increases the 
average profitability of locating in the region only up to a threshold. After that point, any 
new entrant lowers the average net benefits available to each resident firm and new 
entrant3. 
This formulation recalls some general results, obtained in the industrial location and 
urban/regional economics literature (Weber, 1929; Isard, 1956; Richardson, 1978; 
Papageorgiou, 1979; Tauchen - Witte, 1983; Miyao - Kanemoto, 1987), which show the 
2 An alternative explanation for the convexity of the locational costs function for firm f runs as follows: 
the locational costs function is compose by a "fixed" and a "variable" component. The fixed part of the 
costs (geographic costs) decreases as the number of entrants increase; while the variable part increases 
(because of competition) as the number of entrants increase. The combination of these two effects produce 
an U-shaped (convex) cost curve as the interaction between fixed and variable costs of production in 
standard microeconomics textbooks. A symmetric reasoning may also explain the inverted U-shaped 
benefits function. This interpretation is surely more realistic than the one used in the thesis, however it is 
not as theoretically efficient as the other one since both components become dependent on the number of 
incumbents. 
3 However, as it is made graphically evident in figure 4.2, because of the inverse U shape of the marginal 
benefits function, there is a range, within the number of incumbents, where marginal net benefits are 
already decreasing, but still higher than average ones, and average net benefits are still increasing. 
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existence of an optimal dimension of a given spatial agglomeration of firms and/or 
households because of the concavity of the various benefits functions. 
We can therefore state that - if the number of potential entrants is sufficiently large and 
there are no relevant entry barriers - as net locational benefits initially increase, the 
number of incumbent firms increases; then they decrease and are finally driven to zero. 
If we assume that the number of potential entrants is not constant but it is changing 
overtime, than the entry pattern will be determined by the rate of birth of potential 
entrants, since a proportion of such firms will locate in the cluster. If we allow the 
number of actual entrants to be proportional to the average locational benefits available 
in the cluster - as a first approximation (or, alternatively, as a macroeconomic 
hypothesis without explicit micro-foundations4) - and we assume that the entry rate of 
firms into the cluster is proportional to the current level of locational net benefits5' then 
the cluster growth will initially be fast, then will slow down and finally will stop6. 
If this is the case7, one would expect the industrial growth of the cluster to follow an S- 
shaped path with a slow start (when locational benefits are still low), an "explosive" 
central period of rapid increase (when the average net benefits in the region are highest) 
Another part of this story refers to the role played by spin-off firms. If we believe that average net 
locational benefits give incumbent firms some extra profits, workers (or, better, managers) of incumbent 
firms, which see these extra profits, will decide to start a new firm to appropriate them. Therefore the 
number of spin-off firms, which are generated by parents firms, is positively related to the level of 
locational benefits in the cluster, generated by the incumbent firms. 
5 It is evident that, for the moment, we are implicitly assuming firms to behave in a non-strategic manner 
(i. e. although their entries modify radically the locational benefits available in the region, they do not take 
into account such a modification) and to be totally myopic (i. e. their entries are only dependent on the 
current level of locational benefits and not on some discounted value of the flow of locational benefits 
they enjoy from the moment of entry onward). In section 4.3, we will relax some of these hypotheses. 
6 This is not to say that, from a certain moment onward, entries will not take place. On the contrary, once 
the equilibrium level of the region is reached, new entries are still possible, but these happen at the 
expenses of some incumbents which are driven out of the cluster (or, more probably, out of business). 
This continuous series of entries and exits may determine a continuous oscillation of the cluster's 
industrial mass around the equilibrium level. 
7 And we collected some empirical evidence supporting this story (see Maggioni, 1993; Maggioni - Porro, 
1994; Gambarotto - Maggioni, 1998). 
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and a final part when the region gradually reaches and then settles to its "equilibrium" 8 
size as in figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. The development path of an industrial cluster 
number of 
incumbents 
maximum 
dimension 
(K) 
time 
What is needed now is a fon-nal model of the location process and the development of 
clusters, which will allow a rigorous testing of all these assumptions. 
4. Z3. A logistic model 
The simplest growth model for an industrial cluster q- which stresses the relevance of 
firms spatial interactions - can be expressed in the following format: "the rate of growth 
of the industrial mass equals the product of the individual firm's contribution9 to the 
regional population's growth and the number of firms already in the region" (Maggioni, 
1993). 
If only agglomeration economies and positive spillovers are taken into account (and 
these are assumed to be constant), then each individual firm's contribution to the level 
8 It should be bore in mind, however, that this notion of equilibrium value can be changed in the long run 
by radical innovations, exogenous demand shocks and appropriate regional policies (see section 4.3 and 
chapter 7). 
9 In terms of changes in the average locational net benefits, due to the interactions of agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies. 
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of average locational benefits and, consequently, to the growth of the cluster would be 
equal to a constant rq . In this case cluster industrial growth would follow an 
"explosive" exponential pathIO, formally: 
dn, 
- fq "q(t) dt 
(4.4a) 
Alternatively one can solve the equation for n, 7(t) as a 
function of the exogenous initial 
industrial mass of the cluster n. (0) : 
e r, 
t 
n. (4.4b) 
On the other hand, if congestion and competition effects are included, then some 
modifications to this simple model are required to allow for some "density dependent" 
factors to progressively depress the level of locational benefits and to slow down the 
process of industrial growth of the cluster. A simple dynamic model, which takes into 
account these features is the logistic equationl I, which can be written as (4.5a) 
Anj q 
dt 
(t t) 
(4.5a) 
is the incipient (or maximum) rate of increase and K. = limn W, is called the where rq 
I-+- 
cluster "equilibrium" level12. Integrating equation (4.5a) and solving for n, (O) one 
obtains (4.5b): 
K. n. (O)erq' 
Kq + n. 
(0)(erq' 
- 1) 
(4.5b) 
Here the individual finn's contribution to regional growth decreases as a linear function 
r 
of regional population size and is equal to r. -q nq (t) (Roughgarden, 1979). Kq 
10 The higher is rq, the faster is the growth process. 
11 The logistic equation - firstly developed by Verhulst (1845) and Pearl - Reed (1920) for demographic 
studies, then adopted by the ecological literature since Lotka (1925) - "is the simplest model containing 
negative density dependence interaction. Further, it is the first two terms in a power series expansion of a 
more general growth model where the growth is a function of the actual size of the population" 
(Dendrinos - Mullally, 1985, p. 38). 
12 K in the original ecological jargon is called carrying capacity: "a measure of the amount of renewable 
resources in the environment in units of the number of organisms these resources can support" 
(Roughgarden, 1979, p. 305). 
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Plotting n, (t)against time yields an S-shaped curve due to the counteracting roles 
played by rq and Kq . When the region is small (nq 
W is near to zero) the term in 
brackets in equation (4.5a) is close to one (hence the logistic equation approximately 
describes an exponential growth path); but as nq(t) approaches Kq , the term in brackets 
tends to zero, driving the growth rate to zero and terminating the entry process. Both Kq 
and rq play a major role in shaping a logistic growth path: the greater is rq the steeper is 
the S shaped curve, the larger Kq the higher the ceiling level of the function (and the 
equilibrium size of the cluster). 
rq is the incipient rate of growth. In the ecological literature it is often approximated by 
the difference between the birth and mortality rates of a population. This observation 
can be translated into the economic framework when net entry (and consequently the 
intrinsic rate of industrial growth of a cluster) is calculated as the difference between 
total entries (or start-ups) and exits (or bankruptcies) in the period considered. The same 
value of rq can therefore correspond to two very different situations: a steady growing 
cluster where few new firms enter and no one exits, and a perturbed cluster where a high 
"birth" rate is almost compensated for by a high "death" rate. Hence rq is a composite 
index that describes the cluster growth "potential" and the probability that firms, once 
entered, survive in the cluster. 
Kq defines the regional industrial carrying capacity: the maximum number of profitable 
firms the region can sustain in isolation (i. e. when inter-regional interaction are not 
considered). Kq will depend upon: 
i) the finite quantity of geographical benefits (which is related to the limited 
availability of local "resources" such as: labour, capital, land, and infrastructures); 
ii) the decreasing part of the agglomeration benefits function (which depends on the 
strategic interactions between firms: competition, congestion and lobbying of 
incumbents). 
Kq is therefore determined by the relationship between the amount of resources (inputs) 
available in the region and the (technical and organizational) efficiency of incumbents in 
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the use of these resources. Therefore in the long run Kq may change as result of the 
inflow of additional skilled workers, the provision of new advanced public 
infrastructure, the diffusion of (technical, organisational, etc. ) innovations. 
For a given cluster q and a given population of Mq outsider firmS13, therefore, we 
assume that there is an equilibrium level Kq :5M. acting as an upper limit to the 
cluster's growth. In each period t, the number of entries therefore depends both on the 
actual number of potential entrants Kq - nq W (i. e. the number of outsider firms which 
can enter the region in time t and still make profits) and on the number of firms already 
located there nq W*K. and nq W in fact determine the level of average locational net 
benefits available to incumbent firms in each period of time. 
The logistic equation thus establishes a parametric relationship between the level of 
locational benefits and the entry rate through the introduction of the term K.. But what 
exactly is Kq and how is it determined? Is it an endogenous or exogenous parameter of 
the model149 For it to be endogenous, some assumptions about the locational cost 
structure of a region are needed. 
In section 4.2.2 we described the functional forms of locational benefits and costs. In 
this section, with the help of figure 4.2 (which shows both marginal and average 
locational costs and locational benefits schedules), we want firstly to highlight the 
existence of several "optimal" sizes15 of the region, and secondly to show how K. is 
endogenously determined by the structure of locational benefits function. 
13 Composed of two main categories: firms already established outside the region and potential 
entrepreneurs inside the region looking for the right moment to start their own business. 
14 In the original ecological literature (Lotka, 1925; May, 1974; Roughgarden, 1979) K is dependent on 
the physiological features of the population. 
15 Throughout the chapter the "industrial size" or "economic mass" of a region is approximated by the 
number of located firms. This index can easily be substituted by a more realistic proxy of firms' dimension 
(such as employment or sales). However the number of firms has an obvious advantage in its simplicity 
and is the best indicator when the inter-firms relationships at study (i. e. knowledge spillovers) are 
independent of firm's size. 
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Let us consider the costs and benefits derived from entering a region; for the sake of 
simplicity let firms outside the region experience zero locational benefits16 and assume 
that geographical benefits are set to zero. Firms are assumed, for the moment, to be 
locationally identical (i. e. the agglomeration economies and diseconomies, locational 
benefits and costs are the same for every firm). Therefore we can study the behaviour of 
a representative firmf and analyse its average net benefits function17. 
Figure 4.2. Agglomeration costs and benefits for incumbents and critical sizes of 
a cluster 
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A is the minimal sustainable dimension of the cluster (i. e. where agglomeration net 
benefits start to be positive and, consequently, 
A, (t) 
> 0). Prior to A no firm will dt 
spontaneously enter the region (because agglomeration benefits are negative). A can be 
called the "critical mass" of the region. A can be reached only by a group of co- 
ordinated firms entering together, or by direct intervention of a public authority aimed at 
subsidising entries until n(t) = A. 
B is the dimension where average agglomeration costs are minimum. BI is the cluster 
dimension which maximises gross average agglomeration benefits. B and B' underline 
the importance of analysing both costs and benefits of location to avoid harmful 
16 However, this assumption can easily be relaxed by assigning the locational benefits of the cluster a 
value equal to the difference between the locational benefits available outside and inside the cluster. 
17 By considering average functions we indirectly assume that some market mechanisms is at work in the 
cluster and makes both benefits and costs equal for each incumbent. 
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misrepresentation of the economic reality, as in some early contributions of location 
theory. Obviously, it could also be the case that BI < B. 
C gives the maximum per firm net benefits (i. e. average net benefits). Up to C every 
new entrant increases (by its very entry) the average benefits of all incumbents; after C 
the average benefits decrease. C is therefore the optimal size of cluster for incumbent 
firms; however, it is neither the social efficient outcome (given that marginal benefits 
are still greater than marginal costs) nor the maximum possible dimension (average 
benefits are still positive). At C, several firms outside the region might still want to 
enter, while firms already in the region would like to deter further entries. Here we have 
a contrast between incumbents, outsiders and public authorities, each of them with a 
different view of what is the optimal outcome 18. 
X is the economically efficient (i. e. social optimum) dimension. At X marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits, therefore the total benefits (number of firms times per capita 
benefits) are maximised. However, as the average benefits at X are still positive, some 
outsiders would still like to enter. Such entries would reduce the total amount of benefits 
available to incumbents. 
D is the maximum dimension of the region (in terms of economic mass) since Bfq = cfq . 
From D onwards no more net entry is deserved because, after this point, average 
benefits are negative and therefore there are no incentives to enter. However, new 
entries are still possible but these would be at the expense of some incumbents who 
would be driven out of the cluster19. Thus D identifies the ceiling level Kq of the 
logistic model. 
By choosing specific functional forms for locational benefits and costs, one can thus 
endogenously determine Kq , the maximum dimension of the region, corresponding to 
"size" D in figure 4.2, where net locational benefits are equal to zero. If, for example, 
we assume a quadratic formulation for the average net benefits function (i. e. 
18 For more on these policy issues, see chapter 7 of the thesis. 
19 After D new entries thus support a turnover process without causing relevant changes to the 
equilibrium level. 
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N= an 
2+ bn + c, with a<0, b>0, and c> 0), then the regional equilibrium level fq qq 
D would be equal to: 
-b+ \rb 
2- 4ac 
D= 
2a 
(4.6) 
By similar calculations every other critical dimension of the cluster can be found2O. 
In this first formulation, the number of located firms directly generates (through 
agglomeration dynamics) the level of locational benefits; since the entry rate is assumed 
to be proportional to the level of locational benefits, it also indirectly determines the 
location of new firms into the cluster. 
Such a formulation of the location process is very simple but can be used to empirically 
estimate key parameters of the location path of different clusters2l. These estimated 
parameter could also be used as dependent variables in cross-section analyses in order to 
assess the influence of different factors on the level of the intrinsic growth rate of a 
cluster or on its maximum dimension. 
However this formulation can be criticised on a number of grounds. The first refers to 
the "isolation hypothesis": firms' location decision are modelled as a dichotomous 
choice, in the sense that there is only one possible site for location and the choice 
variable is just the timing of the entry. The second concerns the individual rationality of 
these firms: the entry rate is modelled as proportional to the level of locational benefits 
and firms do not anticipate the effects of further locations on such benefits. 
The following sections are thus devoted to the presentation of two different modelling 
frameworks which can be used to overcome, at least partially, the main drawbacks of the 
simple logistic growth path. 
20 Referring to figure 4.2. other main critical dimensions - in terms of the underlining parameters of the 
net benefit function - are as follows: Ab--, 
rb 2- 4ac, 
C=:: 
b, 
X= -b+Tb2 -3ac 
2a 2a 3a 
21 Where the difference may refers to different industries in the same geographical site, or to different 
geographical sites in the same industry. 
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4. Z4. Location process in a two-regions framework 
Several different interactions may arise when a framework with two regions (I and 2) is 
considered. The first concerns the location decisions of a set of industry-specific 
potential entrant firms confronted with the choice of locating in one out of two regions. 
This problem can be formally described through a model of inter-regional competition 
with a given number of potential entrant firms22. The entry decision is again modelled 
as dependent on the number of firms located in each region, reflecting the effects of 
agglomeration economies and diseconomies, as described in the previous section. 
Formally, the multi-region situations can be described through the following system of 
equations which directly recalls the monoregional development process of equation 
(4.5a): 
dn, n, (t) + c,, n, (t) 
dt K, 
dn2. 
r2 n, 
(t) n, 
(t) + c,, n, 
(t) 
dt K2 
(4.7a) 
where r, and KI are respectively region I incipient growth rate and equilibrium levels 
and c12, is the "competition coefficient" which measures the extent to which region 2 
compete as an alternative location to region 1. 
However - for expositional purposes - it is more convenient to replace this formulation 
(which underlines the similarities between the two-regions case and the model of 
development of one isolated region depicted in 4.5a) with an altemative formalisation 
which is able to model different multiregional interactions through simple differences in 
the sign of parameters. We thus replace (4.7a) by (4.7b), where time references are 
dropped for the sake of clarity: 
dn, 
dt = 
(a, 
- a, ln, - a,, n, 
)n, 
dn2 
= 
(a. 
- a,, n, - a. 1n, 
)"2 
dt 
(4.7b) 
22 This peculiar approach to the process of multi-regions development (where the region is modelled as 
an agent and firms as passive industrial mass) reveals its advantages when modelling active policy pursued 
by different local authorities willing to foster the industrial development of their respective territories. 
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In system (4.7b), nj and n2 are the "economic masses" (number of incumbents) of each 
region, a, and a2 are the intrinsic rates of increase of each region in isolation (r,, r2 in 
system 4.7a), all and a,. 2 - the parameters on the quadratic terms which reflect the 
concavity of the net agglomeration benefits function - i. e. that reflect the inhibiting 
effects that a firm's entry has on the growth rate of the same region23 (intra-region 
competition parameters); a12 and a2, show the inhibiting effects that one firm - locating 
in a region - has on the growth of the other region24 (inter-regions competition 
parameters). 
According to the relative value of these parameters, three main outcomes25 are possible, 
as shown by phase diagrams in figure 4.3. 
Phase diagrams are useful tools to describe systems of differential equations. At any 
moment in time the state of the system is fully described by the number of firms located 
in each region (n, and n2), Within the phase plane one can further draw for each region 
the locus of points (i. e. combination of n, and n2)lwhich is called the isocline, where 
the region's industrial mass does not change (i. e. where 
n-- 
=0 and 
dn2 
0). The 
dt dt 
multiple equilibria of the system are thus identified by the intersections of one isocline 
with either the axes or the other isocline26. The arrows in the phase planes indicate the 
direction in which the system, at that point, will move; the colours and shapes of the 
dots show whether an equilibrium is either stable or unstable or a saddle point. 
23 a, 
and 25-in this formulations are the regions' maximum size or isolated equilibrium values (KI 
a,, a22 
and K2). 
24 Different interpretations for these parameters are possible: the simplest relates the values of inter- 
regional competition parameters to the fact that - given a certain number of potential entrants - each firm 
that locates in region 1 does not locate in region 2. Then the inter-regions coefficients should be equal, i. e. 
a12 = a2,, Another interpretation explicitly relates to the possible differences in the logistic growth path 
of the two regions in isolation (which reflect differences in the net benefits function). In this case inter- 
regions competition coefficients can be different. 
25 Selected from the analysis of 13 possible consistent cases. For a more complete analysis, see Capelo 
(1989, pp. 165-169) and Beltrami (1987, pp. 72-73). 
26 The intersection of an isocline with an axis is an equilibrium point since one region in deserted and the 
other does not change its industrial mass, the intersection of two isoclines is an equilibrium point since 
both regions do not register any changes in the number of located firms. 
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Figure 4.3. Inter-regional competition 
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Figure 4.3a shows the persistent coexistence of two regions (both recording a positive 
number of locations) as a stable equilibrium when: 
a, 
> 
a. 
and 
a, 
< 
a. 
(4.8a) 
a,, a,, a,, a,, 
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Figure 4.3b shows the coexistence of two regions as an unstable equilibrium, which is 
extremely vulnerable to local perturbations and initial biases27 when: 
a, 
< 
a2 
and 
a, 
> 
a2 
a, 2 a22 a,, a2, 
(4.8b) 
Figures 4.3c and 4.3d show the total exclusion of one region from the location process 
that occurs only in the other region (irrespective of the initial state) which reaches its 
carrying capacity leaving the opponent deserted 28. In particular, only region 1 is entered 
when: 
±-, 
> 
±2 
and 
a, 
> 
a. (4.8c) 
a12 a22 all a., 
while only region 2 is entered when: 
a, 
< 
±2_ 
and 
a, 
< 
a. (4.8d) 
a, 2 
a22 a,, a2l 
Since the industrial growth of the region in isolation follows a logistic path, then the 
isoclines are linear and the stability of equilibrium depends on the equilibrium point 
being above the line29 joining the maximum dimensions of each region in isolation: 
( a, a2 30 
a,, , 
0) and 
(0, 
a22 
This presentation of the possible outcomes of firms location processes in a two-regions 
framework would seem to suggest that inter-region competition leads - almost 
necessarily - to a situation of locational. monopoly, in which only one region is chosen as 
the preferred site by industry-specific firms while the other remains deserted. Although 
the economic history of industrial regions displays few cases supporting this result, the 
27 More precisely the equilibrium defining the coexistence of two regions is a saddle point; any initial 
state off the stable manifold, or any perturbation that move the system far from it, leads to the 
"deprivation7' of one out of two regions. 
28 This case includes two opposite situations of only region I surviving and only region 2 surviving. 
a 11). 
29 Whose equation is n, 
a, 
30 Alternatively, if one expresses the regions size in "equivalent numbers" (i. e. as fractions of their 
maximum dimension), the equilibrium is stable if the total equivalent number at the joint equilibrium is 
greater than unity (i. e. greater than the equivalent number at the isolated region's equilibrium). 
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coexistence of multiple non-empty regions is a more common phenomenon. This must 
therefore be caused by factors still missing from the above analysis. 
One way to explore the problem assumes the intrinsic growth rates of two regions to be 
equal (i. e. a, = a2). Then the persistent coexistence of both regions is achieved when: 
a,, > a2l and a22 > a, 2 (4.8e) 
These two inequalities state that, to obtain persistent coexistence of both regions, an 
increase in the numbers of incumbents in either region must inhibit its own growth more 
than it inhibits the growth of the other (e. g. that the degree of intra-region competition 
and congestion must be larger then the degree of inter-regional competition). This result 
is likely to be achieved if the regions are, at least partially, "attracting" different types of 
firms or, in other words, if firms have significantly heterogeneous locational 
preferences. 
This observation has been acknowledged within the population ecology literature for a 
long time under the name of the "Gause principle', 31. This principle states - in the 
original biological terms - that in a situation where "two species are resource-limited, 
[ ... I only one species can survive on a single resource" (Levin, 1970, p. 413). Translated 
into an economic framework, the Gause "principle of competitive exclusion" states that 
- if firms are completely homogeneous in their locational preferences - then the most 
likely outcome is the unanimous choice of one single region (the one ensuring at the 
start the highest level of geographical benefits). The existence of a plurality of non- 
empty regions inhabited by firms belonging to the same industrial sector can therefore 
be explained in terms of the existence of different types of firms which have different 
locational needs and preferences32. 
The degree of competition between two regions is therefore proportional to the degree 
of locational homogeneity of the firms population. The same concept can be expressed 
in a rather different way: the degree of inter-regional competition is inversely 
31 Being formally stated by Gause (1934), even though an earlier and slightly different formulation is 
ascribed to Volterra (1926). 
32 It is very interesting to compare this result to very similar ones - obtained independently and following 
a totally different approach by Arthur (1988 and 1990) - reviewed in section 3.11. 
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proportional to each region's specificity33. According to this observation, each region 
should foster the development of specific regional characteristics in order to develop a 
"niche" strategy able to limit the degree of inter-regional competition. This observation, 
which has a general value, has a particular interest for any public authority willing to 
start a new industrial region in an area where there are already other established regions. 
The identification and the attraction of a specific subset of firms is the crucial element 
which determine the success, or the failure, of the regional development project34. 
4. Z5. Co-operative interactions 
The analytical representation, used in equation (4.7b) to describe the location decisions 
of a set of potential entrants between two alternative locations, can be easily 
encompassed to describe other significant interactions which may arise during the 
development process of regions and/or industrial clusters. These different relationships 
can be modelled simply by changing the signs (or values) of the inter-regional 
coefficients a, 2 and a2, in the system of equations (4.7b) as shown in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Different types of bilateral interactions 
Types of interactions 
Sign and values of 
interaction coefficients 
a 12 and a2l 
Competifition 
Mutualism ++ 
Commensalism +0 
Predation +- 
. 
Neutralism 00 
jAmensalism 0- 
The regional economics literature records several contributions on predatory 
relationships (see for example; Dendrinos - Mullally, 1985; Maino, 1989; Nijkamp - 
Reggiani, 1991). This section therefore concentrates on co-operative relations that - 
despite their empirical relevance - have been neglected by the main stream of population 
ecology and, consequently, by the early pioneers of "ecological" regional economics35. 
33 Where regional specificity means that each region is the ideal location for a different type of firm 
34 More on this issue can be found in chapter 7. 
35 There are two different reasons why mutualistic and amensalistic relations have been ignored. The first 
reason is an historical one: both Lotka and Volterra - generally acknowledged as the forerunners of 
population ecology - limited their analyses to predation and competition. The second reason is a 
theoretical one: in its purest formulation, a mutualistic model does not have a stable equilibrium and one 
122 
These relationships describe a set of co-operative interactions where the development of 
a certain set of firms, such as an industrial cluster in a given nation (or one industry in a 
given region) is not obtained at the expense of the development of another industry (or 
cluster) but the two processes enjoy synergistic effects. 
Both ecological and economic systems record empirical evidence of mutualistic 
relationships between two populations over a long period of time. There are plenty of 
historical cases and empirical evidence of these phenomena: from the development of 
the textile districts in the mining regions of Britain and Belgium in the 19th century36, 
to the synergistic development of an industrial and a residential bordering area37, from 
the development of a subcontractors' belt around a main industrial core, to the long 
timed establishment of a cluster of integrated producers and craftsmen in one specific 
quarter within a city, 38. 
in particular, we think that the model analytically described in expression (4.9) could 
well describe the behaviour of two technologically related industries within the same 
industrial cluster (such as Computers and office machinery and Electronic components), 
each receiving positive benefits from the development of the other one39. We think that 
the analysis of inter-industry relations is as important as (if not more than) the analysis 
of inter-regional competition since one of the main findings of the literature on high- 
or both populations undergo "an unbounded exponential growth in an orgy of mutual benefaction" (May, 
1976, p. 95). A growth model without stable equilibrium seemed of no interest to regional and applied 
economists. However, more sophisticated models of mutualistic interaction allow for saturation in the 
magnitudes of reciprocal benefits and obtain - as general result -a stable equilibrium with both 
populations (usually regions, but they can equally be industries) developing larger than in isolation. It 
must be said, furthermore, that this equilibrium is less stable - in the sense that perturbations are more 
slowly damped - than in correspondent systems without mutualistic relations. 
36 Textiles firms, in these locations utilised the female components of the miners' fan-dlies as source of 
cheap labour force. 
37 The first demanding workers and offering wages, the second demanding goods and offering labour. 
This interaction goes well when there are not relevant negative externalities (such as pollution, noise etc. ) 
spilling from the industrial region to the residential one. In such a case we may well describe the situation 
as amensalistic. 
38 For an example of such clustering dynamics, see Storper - Walker (1989, p. 81) which report an 
amazing map showing the agglomeration in the London watch and clock making quarter of Clerkenwell, 
in 1861. 
39 However it is also theoretically possible that inter-industries relations, within a cluster, become 
conflicting because of competition on non industry-specific inputs such as real estates, financial services, 
fiscal and accounting consultants etc. The prominence of co-operative versus competitive interaction must 
therefore be empirically assessed. 
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tech clusters, and of the original empirical evidence presented in section 6.3, is that the 
physical proximity of firms belonging to different but interrelated industries i= (1,2) 
act as an engine sustaining the cluster's long run growth40. 
The above remarks can thus be described more formally as follows: 
dn, 
dt = 
(a, 
-a,, n, +a,, n, 
)nl 
dn, 
=(a. - a. 2n2+a2ln, 
)n, 
dt 
(4.9) 
In this model each industry in isolation would follow a logistic growth pattern, but the 
presence of one industry in the same cluster has a positive influence on the rate of 
growth of the other one. The system's dynamics - which is described through a phase 
diagram in figure 4.4 - always displays three trivial unstable equilibria (figure 4.4a): the 
origin (corresponding to the underdevelopment of both industries) and each industry's 
isolated maximum dimension. However, under certain assumptions concerning the slope 
of isoclines (figure 4.4b), a fourth stable equilibrium (ED emerges which enables both 
industries to reach a higher level in the cluster. The coexistence of two industries in the 
same cluster allows both industries to grow larger than would have been possible in the 
isolated case, but intra-industry competition effects prevent the system from 
experiencing explosive growth. 
40 Swann defines such a process as "convergence between technologies" and shows that "single 
technology clusters, while they might grow faster in the formative stages, did not have the lasting power of 
diversified clusters" (Swann, 1998, p. 64). 
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Figure 4.4. Inter-industry facultative mutualism 
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The conditions for an equilibrium solution in which both industries survive can be re- 
expressed as a strict positivity requirement on the co-ordinates of E3 in the 
(n, 
, n2 
)space, formally: 
(a2a, 
l +aa2, 
) 
>0 (4.10a) (a, 
a22 - al2a2l 
) 
(a, 
al2+ ala2, I>0 (4.10b) (al, a22- a, 2a2l 
) 
Given that all coefficients are positive, the two conditions reduce as follows: 
a,, a22> al2a2, (4.10c) 
A stable equilibrium in a mutualistic interaction is therefore achieved when the product 
of the two intra-industry competition coefficients exceeds the product of the inter- 
industries cooperation coefficients. The same analytical framework may describe the 
mutualistic growth of two neighbouring clusters, specialised into complementary 
productions, where the driving forces of the joint development are vertical and 
horizontal productive linkages established between clusters. 
125 
EO El nl 
Other stimulating results are obtained when the symmetry assumption required by 
facultative4l mutualism is relaxed. An interesting case concerns a situation in which the 
first cluster in isolation will grow according to a logistic path and its growth is further 
fostered by the presence of industrial activity in the neighbouring one, whilst the second 
cluster is strictly dependent on the existence of the industrial activity in the first cluster 
for its very survival. A typical example of this kind is the relationship existing between 
the "core" of an industrial area (where the large companies are located) and the 
surrounding area, "periphery", crowded by several small firms (i. e. sub contractors and 
suppliers) - specialised in accessory productions - which are vitally linked to the 
industrial success of the core42. Similar relationships (which do not imply any spatial 
differentiation) may well arise between two different industries in the same cluster. A 
typical example (thoroughly discussed in Swann, 1993) is constituted by the 
relationships between the manufacturing core of an high-tech cluster and the network of 
specialised service sectors. Since these specific business services must be "consumed" 
in the very place of their production and cannot be exported to other areas, the existence 
of a service sector within the cluster is crucially dependent on the existence of a 
prosperous manufacturing core. 
These interactions can be formally described as follows: 
dn, 
dt = 
(a, 
- a, n, + al, n2)nl 
dn2 
= 
(- a2+ a2, nl)n2 dt 
(4.11) 
Where n, is the economic mass (number of located firms) of the manufacturing core 
region and n2 is the economic mass of the specialiscd service sector. 
With the aid of a phase diagram (see figure 4.5), it is possible to see that the system has 
three equilibria. The first is trivial, unstable and corresponds to the origin; the second, 
stable, corresponding to the isolated maximum dimension of the core manufacturing 
41 Where the term "facultative" refers to the fact that each industry, in isolation, develops and reaches its 
equilibrium level. The presence of an industry is therefore no necessary condition for the development of 
the other one. 
42 The Motor vehicle industry (which is clustered around Detroit in the USA, Coventry in the UK, 
Besangon in France, and Torino in Italy) displays a core-periphery spatial configurations in almost every 
countries. 
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industry; the third, which is a saddle point, corresponds to a balanced co-operative 
relationship43, in which manufacturing and service sectors coexist with mutual benefits. 
When the system lies in this unstable mutualistic equilibrium, small positive 
perturbations lead the system to an unlimited growth while small negative perturbations 
may cause the "extinction" of the service sector. This is the only possible outcome when 
a2 
< 
a, (see figure 4.5b). 
a2, a,, 
Figure 4.5. Core-periphery dynamics (inter-industry commensalism) 
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Various type of interactions coexist within the development dynamics of high-tech 
clusters. The qualitative identification of such interactions and the quantitative 
measurement of their effect on the growth rate of industries is thus left to the empirical 
analysis of chapter 6. The effects of the variability of macro-economic conditions on the 
behaviour of the systems have been extensively discussed in Gambarotto - Maggioni 
(1998) and are briefly reviewed in section 4.4. 
43 Which exists if and only if 12 >2-1 (see figure 4.5a). 
02, a, 
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4. Z6. Multi-cluster interactions: some methodological remarks 
Previous sections have shown some results that can be obtained by using a series of 
ecologically-derived models to analyse the growth of a high-tech cluster (or industry) in 
isolation and of a system of two interacting clusters (or industries). 
It would seem therefore natural to extend these results to the case in which more than 
two clusters are involved. Unfortunately, this extension is not straightforward for 
empirical as well as theoretical reasons. The firsts refer to the geometrical increase of 
the relevant interaction parameters, while the second concerns the dynamic behaviour of 
the system which becomes qualitatively complex. 
Two different approaches can be used to overcome this problem. The first relates to the 
possibility of constructing a large computational model, assigning plausible parameters' 
values and then simulating the dynamic of the system; the second consists of 
abandoning the description of individual cluster behaviour - within a multi-cluster 
complex - and focussing entirely on some overall aspects of the resulting structure, such 
as the relation between the increase in system complexity and its overall stability44. 
Even though it is difficult to draw some general conclusions, here are some principles 
and guideposts for multi-cluster analysis which could be derived from the original 
population ecology literature (see Levins, 1968; Levin, 1970; May, 1974; Roughgarden, 
1979) which may give some indications on possible behaviour of such a model. 
i) Equilibria may exist only within limited ranges of the interaction and environmental 
parameters (such as cluster's incipient growth rates, maximum dimension, and 
macro-economic variability). Outside this restricted range, equations may undergo 
sustained oscillations and describe a collapsing system in which one or all clusters 
are completely deserted by firms. 
ii) Even when the value of parameters ensure an equilibrium solution, this equilibrium 
may be unstable to large perturbations in the "economic mass" of the cluster. This 
44 In this section "increased complexity' is, rather loosely, defined in terms of increased number of 
cluster, more interactions and therefore more parameters. Stability is described as a lower level of 
fluctuations in the economic mass of the clusters, and as the ability of the system to recover from 
perturbations. 
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feature involves the concept of "resilience45,, of the system and highlights the 
difference between global and local stability conditions. 
iii) Fixed parameter values have been assumed throughout the above analysis; on the 
contrary, in the real world, both interaction and environmental parameters may 
fluctuate through time, causing further perturbations to the system. 
iv) Studies based on a generalisation for n-agents of equation (4.7b), in which the 
coefficients are assigned randomly, show that as the number of agents involved 
increases, the probability to find a "feasible" equilibrium (i. e. where all clusters 
register a positive number of located firms) decreases. Biological models also show 
that dynamic stability typically decreases with the increase in the number of 
populations, or in the number and strength of inter-populations interactions46. 
V) The previous statement should not be interpreted as a general law stating that, in the 
real world, complex systems are less stable than simpler one. If a long run 
perspective is assumed - and we allow the market to act as a selection device - then 
it is likely that, in a relatively stable environment, a complex and fragile system will 
persist forever; whilst, in an highly unpredictable and exogenously determined 
environment the same system will collapse. 
vi) The Gause principle of competitive exclusion holds for multi-cluster systems as 
well. In its original ecological formulation it reads as follows: "no stable 
equilibrium can be attained in an ecological community in which some F, 
components are limited by less than F_ limiting factors" (Levin 1970, p. 419-20)47. 
In economic terms this means that only one cluster can be sustained through a 
single-industry development which is based on one single type of firms. In other 
words a system of F, regions is stable only if there are at least rr, different types of 
firms. 
45 Which can be defined as a measure of the magnitude of the populations' perturbations that the system 
will tolerate before collapsing into some qualitatively different dynamic regime. 
46 '7hus, as a mathematical generality, increasing complexity makes for dynamic fragility rather than 
robustness" (May, 1974, p. 160). 
47 Some similarities (not simply formal) can be found between Gause principle and the requirement on 
the number of objectives not to exceed the number of instruments in the theory of economic policy, and 
the relation between number of factors and number of commodities in international trade theory. 
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4.3. Micro-economic foundation of ecological models: the 
role of expectations 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The ecological models presented in section 4.2 give a rather effective description of the 
macro-economic relationships existing between locational benefits, firms' entry and the 
growth of an industrial cluster. These models have empirical relevance and are 
analytically simple. We thus used them as a basis for analysing the development path of 
an "isolated" cluster and the interactions arising between the developments of several 
clusters. However these models suffer from one main drawback: namely the total lack of 
an explicit explanation of individual firm's expectations and behaviour in a dynamic 
framework. In particular the main problem concerns the difficulty in reconciling a 
logistic formulation of the entry rate in the cluster implicitly modelled as dependent on 
the average level of locational net benefits, with an explicit fon-nulation of an individual 
firm's expectations and behaviour. 
From a micro-economic perspective then, as long as: (i) individual firms have even the 
most primitive rationality, (ii) the presence of incumbent firms signals to outsiders the 
existence of positive average locational net benefits in the region, and (iii) there are no 
entry barriers; then (referring to figure 4.2) every outsider will rush to enter until the 
region has reached the maximum size. Such a process will therefore instantaneously 
drive the average locational net benefits to zero leaving the region without any appeal 
for future net entries. 
However, this theoretical outcome is in direct contrast with the empirical evidence 
which shows that the process of firms' locations in a cluster, and consequently the 
process of regional industrial development, is a gradual and lengthy process (with an 
average duration of, say, twenty years for high-tech cluster and 50 - 70 years for some 
traditional industrial districts). 
Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, we are left with an open question: why is 
entry spread over time? Or, in a more formal way, what justifies equation (4.5a)? For 
answering the questions, it is therefore necessary to identify some sort of mechanism 
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which will control firms' entry (or better, the speed of entry) in the region. This 
mechanism can either be exogenous or endogenous. 
The exogenous mechanism story may run as follows. Either a public agency or some 
other local authority dejure regulates the entry process or - as it is generally assumed by 
standard epidemic models - the high-tech cluster is initially unknown (as a suitable 
location) to outsiders and the information on its existence diffuses gradually through the 
population of potential entrants. 
The endogenous mechanism story runs as follows. The time intensity of the entry 
process necessarily derives from some sort of heterogeneity of firms which affects the 
actual or perceived locational net benefits available to the single incumbent and 
determines therefore, different dates of entry for different firms. This heterogeneity can, 
in turn, be of a twofold nature: 
i) objective: i. e. depending on existing differences in the (technological, productive, 
organisational, financial) structure of finns I; 
ii) subjective: i. e. depending on existing differences in the expectations or in the risk 
aversion of firms. 
In reality this sharp distinction may well become blurred, as it seems reasonable to 
assume that both expectations and risk attitudes of firms (i. e. subjective elements) 
depend on some objective difference within the firm population. 
Given that the literature on the process of inter-firrns diffusion of innovation has already 
extensively discussed the issue of objective heterogeneity (and an explicit application to 
location pmcess will be presented in section 4.5), we will restrict ourselves to the 
analysis of the subjective source of firms' heterogeneity. 
4.3. Z Subjective heterogeneity: the role of expectations 
Assume that all firms, both outsiders and incumbents, are identical as far as technology, 
size and any other relevant variable are concemed2 but differently perceive the 
1A similar hypothesis is made in Davies (1979) where different adoption dates are explained in therms 
of: size, management's education and age, seff-financing rate, profit rate, growth performance etc. 
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distribution of locational net benefits. Assume also that the population of outsiders is 
composed of an infinite number of "types" x, of firms (each type being characterised by 
a specific curve of locational net benefits as a function of the number of incumbents in 
the region). 
Let: 
N, 
(n, )=a., 
n 
2 
+bn +c (4.12) qqx 
2 
-bx where ax < 0; b, > 0; cx < 0; 4a, +C X) >o 
to be the function of expected average locational net benefits of a type-x firms observing 
n firms already located in cluster q (see fig. 4.6). 
Figure 4.6. Expected locational net benefits for type-x firm 
average expected 
locational net 
benefits 
(N) 
From equation (4.12) it is easy to see that firms expect different locational benefits to be 
available at different sizes of the industrial mass located in the region. In particular, as 
already assumed in the previous sections, they expect the relationship between 
incumbent and locational benefits to be concave and non monotonic (as in section 
4.2.2). For the sake of analytical simplicity, and without any loss of generality, we 
assumed the functional form to be parabolic. 
2 From this assumption we may derive that firms already located in the region share proportionally both 
local resources and public infrastructures and therefore that the relevant variable becomes average net 
locational, benefits. 
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number of incumbents (n) 
Further assume, for the sake of presentation, that differences between outsiders can be 
reduced to the position of the x axis. This is equal to assuming that all firms know the 
general dynamics of the agglomeration/congestion process but do not know the exact 
initial (critical mass) and final (carrying capacity) dimension of the same process3. 
Different firm types have therefore different expectations regarding the minimum 
number of firms (entry thresholds) sufficient to generate enough external economies to 
make entry profitable and the cluster maximum dimension. Optimistic outsiders will 
think that even a small number of incumbents will generate the required amount of 
external economies, while pessimistic outsiders will think that the required externalities 
could be generated only by a much larger number of incumbents. 
The location process will then work as follows: in period Q) the outsiders observe the 
number of firms already located in the cluster. According to their type (and consequently 
to their expectations) they decide whether to enter in period (t + 1), which they do if the 
number of observed incumbent is larger than their perceived critical mass. 
The expectations of potential entrants can thus be represented by a "family" of parabolic 
functions described by equation (4.12), where each type of entrant is identified by 
different co-ordinates on the horizontal axis. The family of parabolas can be described 
through the following restriction parameters values. 
b! 
+cx =Z VX; ZE91+ (4.13) 4ax 
-Tbýf- 
2 4-a c,, 
=H Vx; HE91+ (4.14) 
a., 
4a, c, <M Vx; m, magl+ (4.15) 2a,, 
3 This last hypothesis ensures that expected benefits curves of all types have the same shape, and that the 
difference in expectations is described through different positions of these curves on the x axis. The 
interest in the agglomeration dynamics driving the entry process of firms, and consequently in the regional 
industrial development, justify this rather heroic assumption. However alternative modelisations of the 
differences between firms' expectations (i. e. different shapes of the expected benefits functions) would 
modify the agglomerative dynamics but without changing the basic features. 
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Condition (4.13) requires the maximum value of the expected benefits functions to be 
identical for all firms. Any firm (irrespective of its type) has the same expectation 
regarding the maximum level of locational benefit (or profits) it can enjoy in the region. 
Condition (4.14) ensures that the distance between the two intercepts on the horizontal 
axis is equal for all firms. This is to say that the difference between critical mass and 
carrying capacity is perceived as equal by any firm irrespective of the type it belongs to. 
Condition (4.15), defines an interval (M -Q in which the smaller intercept of the 
locational net benefits must fall and thus strictly defines the family of parabolas. This 
condition ensures that every type of finn has a finite value for its entry threshold. 
From (4.14) we derive that: 
2 4ýý4a., -c x Ha,, 
Thus (4.15) can be re-expressed as follows: 
M+ :5b., :5 M+ 2 2a., 2 
Therefore the most optimistic outsider (which needs the smallest number of incumbents 
to expect sufficient external economies to justify its entry) will have the following 
minimum intercept on the x axis: 
-b,, 
-111+ 
H 
2a 
x2 
while the same value for the most pessimistic outsider will be as follows: 
-b, =M+ 
H 
2a, 2 
The whole family of expected benefits functions is depicted in figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Expected locational net benefits for different types of firm 
average expected 
locational net 
benefits 
(N) 
Assume that different firm types are distributed on a density function f (x), with a finite 
domain [x., i., x., J which is unknown to potential entrants. Fig. 4.8 shows, as an 
example, a uni-modal "bell shaped" f (x) function. In this case the population mass 
distributed on intermediate values is larger than the mass attributed to either extreme 
values. In other words it is assumed that extremely optimistic and pessimistic firms are a 
minority of all potential entrants while the larger majority is composed by 
"intermediate" type of firms. 
Figure 4.8. A distribution function of firm's types 
density 
function 
f(x) 
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-<--->- number of incumbents (n) 
In M 
optimistic intermediate pessimistic 
types of firms (x) 
The results presented in this section do not depend in any way on the choice of a 
particular density function. However different density functions will generate different 
entry patterns. 
Re-state condition (4.15) as (4.16): 
-b Xmn H 
2a xnn 2 
-b.,. =M+ 
H 
2axmýx 2 
(4.16) 
and define the function of actual average locational benefits which belongs to the family 
of parabolas describing the expectations of potential entrants as follows: 
N(n. 
) 
= an q2+ bn q+c (4.17) 
where a<0; b>0; c<0; 
b 
+C) >o 
( 
4a 
This function is identical for every firm, does not have stochastic components and is 
unknown to the outsider; however it may be reasonable assumed to be known to 
incumbents which can directly observe the level of locational benefits they are enjoying 
in a certain time period, given the number of firms located in the region. Although very 
similar from a formal viewpoint, equations (4.12) and (4.17) are substantially different, 
since actual and expected benefits usually differ for two main reasons: 
i) the expected benefits function of a firm and the actual benefits function are 
generally different (expectations are generally different from reality); 
ii) the expectations of any potential entrant for period t +I are based only on the 
number of incumbents which have been observed in period t. This is due to the 
hypothesis that outsiders do not know the density function of their types, therefore, 
they cannot forecast how many outsiders will decide to enter the region in period 
t+1. Once entered, firms observe the actual benefits which arc determined by the 
number of firms located up to period t plus those entered in period t+1. 
In synthesis: each outsider observes the number of firms located in the region in period t 
and decides whether to enter the cluster or not (in period t+1) on the basis of expected 
benefits. It will enter the region if the expected benefits for period t+I are non 
negative: the outside option is assumed to be zero benefits. Once entered, the firm can 
observe its actual benefits level and, on this basis, decides whether to stay or to exit the 
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region. There are no fixed cost of entry and/or exit4. Actual benefits are unobservable by 
outsiders. Outsiders therefore do not learn anything from incumbents' experiences and 
continue to base their decision on the expected benefits function. 
4.3.3. Entry dynamics 
From the assumptions presented in the previous sections it is possible to derive a model 
of firms' entry dynamics and cluster industrial development5. 
Suppose that the economic activity for all firms is divided into an identical series of 
time periods and that any locational decision (entry/stay/exit) can be taken only at the 
beginning of each period. Further assume that in the first period to there is a number no 
of firms already located in the cluster. Their location - which is treated exogenously in 
the model and which will be later discussed thoroughly6 - will cause the entry (in the 
next period) of all the firms which believe that the presence of no firms in the cluster 
will generate a level of agglomeration economies so to ensure non negative locational 
benefits. 
Formally, the number n, of firms which will enter the cluster at time tj can be defined as 
follows: 
2 
n, =f f (x)dx where x, = 
IX 
E [Xinin 9 Xniax]: ax no + b.,, no + c,, ý: 
01 (4.18) 
X1 
Thus, in the second period there are (no + n, ) incumbents firms in the region. They can 
directly observe their actual locational benefits which, for the above mentioned reasons, 
are generally different from what they expected. Their decision on whether to stay or to 
exit the region in the next period is therefore taken on the basis of the actual benefit 
enjoyed. 
If they have experienced non negative benefits in period t, they will stay in the cluster 
despite the existing difference between expectations and reality (remember that the 
4 Alternatively an identical fixed cost for firms relocation (being either entry or exit) can be assumed for 
all firms without changing any further the model. 
5 Some of these assumptions have been analysed in greater detail in Maggioni - Porro (1994). 
6 Alternatively it can be assumed that the outsiders' distribution of types must include an extreme 
optimistic type of firms (a "pioneer") which will enter the region even in absence of any previous location. 
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outside option is assumed to be equal to zero)7. If they have suffered loss, then they will 
exit the region. All entry costs are assumed to be sunk cost; therefore they do not enter 
in the calculation of the net benefits for the incumbent firm which are equal to the 
difference between locational gross benefits and locational costs. 
By recalling the definitions of figure 4.2, we define A as the critical mass (i. e. the 
minimum number of firms needed in order to generate actual non negative locational 
benefits in the region). More fonnally: 
A= minin: an 
2+ bnq +Cý: ol q (4.19) 
The agglomeration process, and the regional industrial development therefore come to 
an end if (no + n, )<A, while it continues until the saturation of the region if the 
opposite holds: (no + n, ) 
In the latter case, we can easily calculate the entries in the second period n. as: 
n2 -"z 
ff (X) dX whereX2-2 XE[xriingxmax]: a, 
(no+ni)2+bý, (no+ni)+c., 2: 01 (4.20) 
X21 
The entry dynamics will they continue similarly in the following periods. 
It is worth repeating that the key assumption in the model is that outsiders cannot 
observe actual benefits. If this is not the case, outsider can observe the level of benefits 
enjoyed by incumbents and therefore they can know, right from the beginning, the actual 
locational. benefits offered by the cluster. Therefore if non negative benefits are already 
enjoyed by some firms in the cluster, in the first period, then entry will immediately take 
place driving8 the cluster to its maximum dimension D. 
To ensure that the entry process, once started by a sufficient number of incumbents, 
does not come to an early end, it is required that the density mass of outsiders is 
7 To make the argument manageable we assume firms to be myopic about other firms behaviour even if it 
is evident that the stream of net agglomeration benefits available in the future is crucially dependent on 
future entries and exits. 
8 The model does not ensure neither the existence nor the stability of the equilibrium. However it is worth 
noting that in this very special case, the entry dynamics would be heavily conditioned by the outsiders' 
learning processes. 
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distributed in such a way that for each n ý: (no + n, ) there exists at least one firm willing 
to enter after having observed the presence of (no + nj) incumbents in the region. 
If, on the other hand, the distribution of potential entrants (according to their 
profitability expectations) is concentrated on extreme values, it may happen that the 
entry process is abruptly terminated. In this situation, however, one would observe the 
emergence of positive economic rents for the incumbents, for in the cluster there are 
enough firms to generate a level of agglomeration economies which would ensure 
positive benefits (while the outside option of every finn is still zero); nevertheless no 
other firm would enter the cluster, leaving the incumbents experiencing positive 
revenues forever. 
This paradoxical situation derives obviously from the assumption of the impossibility 
for outsiders to observe actual benefits. Otherwise the observation of a number of firms 
obtaining average revenues continuously larger than those obtainable outside the region 
would, sooner or later, induce further entries. 
4.3.4. The initial critical mass 
The distribution of expected locational benefits described by the density function f (x) 
may, in special cases, reduce the size of the initial critical mass needed to get the entry 
process started. 
If potential entrants knew the exact function of actual benefits, then the critical mass 
needed to generate for new entries would be equal to A. However, some very peculiar 
distributions of the expected benefits functions may start and foster the entry process 
even with a critical mass smaller than A. In particular this may happen when: 
i) there are a number of firms which overstate the extent of agglomeration economies 
and therefore overstate actual benefits; 
ii) the density distribution is such that the process of clustering is started right from the 
beginning in the first period; 
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iii) for each ný: (no+ni) there is at least one finn. that will enter the region when 
observing (no+ni) incumbents9. 
Let us go back to the assumption of the existence of no firms within the region at the 
beginning of the first period. The exogenous presence of these earlier entrants can be 
due to the following reasons: 
i) these firms have spontaneously developed within the region. (i. e. they are existing 
traditional firms which recently transformed and moved into high-tech industries); 
ii) these firms have been "imported"10 by a local public authority or development 
agency to start and foster the industrial growth of the cluster; 
iii) the initial critical mass no is composed partly by indigenous firms, partly by 
outsider firms imported by a public agency with the scope of generating enough 
agglomeration economies so to start the clustering process. 
The last is probably the most realistic representation of the development of an high-tech 
cluster where both history (previous industrial culture and tradition) and policy actions 
(economic public interventions) play complementary role in ensuring the success of an 
area. 11 
4.3.5. Firms 
In this model all firms (both outsiders and incumbents) are identical but they do not 
know it. They are equal, so they share the same actual benefits function; however they 
must ignore this, otherwise, even without observing the incumbents benefits, outsiders 
could induce that, if an identical firm can survive in the region, then their expectation 
9 Only condition (i) is crucial for the reduction of the required critical mass. The other two conditions are 
needed in order to ensure the further development of the agglomeration process. 
10 Through some sort of incentive (tax rate reduction, infrastructures provision, public contracts 
subscription). 
11 In this case, when no <A the critical mass is smaller than what is required to grant non negative 
benefits for the locating firms. If some firms locate in the cluster sponsored by a public authority, then 
these costs will be covered by the community of firms through some sort of taxes. This fact involves 
problems of social welfare distortion that will not be dealt with in the thesis. It is also possible that the 
initial mass no is formed through a co-ordinating action of a group of firms, deciding to enter the region 
together. However, in this last case, it must be taken into account the possibility of free-riding behaviour 
between co-ordinating firms. 
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are too pessimistic and they are underestimating the agglomeration economies available 
to incumbents. This would accelerate the entry process so to compress it, in the extreme 
case, to just two periods. 
It is worth noting that the assumption of identical firms in the model serves only to 
simplify the modelling of firms decision-making process and the consequent entry 
dynamics. If, on the other hand, one supposes that firms were different, then this fact 
could be described through a whole family of actual benefits (i. e. the benefits which are 
used by firms to decide whether to stay or to exit the region, once entered) instead of the 
unique function used here. This fact would cause an increase in the formal complexity 
of the entry/stay/exit processes and would increase the probability of the entry process 
being stopped once started, while causing little if any change to the inner mechanics of 
the firms decision making process. 
4.3.6. Exit dynamics 
Following the entry sequence described in the previous sections, in period t there will be 
M, finns established in the region, 
Mt = Ml-I + n, 
where M, -, 
is the number of firms already located in period t-1, while n, is the 
number of new entries during period t, more formally: 
n, =f f (x)dx where xt=lxE[x i , xmax]: a.  M(2_1 +b. Mt-, +c, 2: 01 
(4.22) 
x# 
If D defines the maximum size of the cluster (i. e. the maximum number of firms the 
cluster can profitably sustain), formally: 
D=maxln: an 2 +bn+ c 2t 01 (4.23) 
then until M, :5D entry will continue, given that any firm entering the cluster will 
experience non negative benefits. 
When M, > D, on the contrary, every firm in the region will experience losses. Now, 
because the revenues outside the region are equal to zero, some firm will be driven out 
of the region (or business). 
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The model in itself cannot forecast in advance which type of firms will leave the region 
first. However two contrasting alternative hypotheses can be formulated: (i) it is likely 
that the first firms to exit the region will be those who entered last (i. e. the more 
pessimistic). This is due to the fact that these firms have gained positive revenues for a 
very short period of time and, therefore, they are financially weaker and less capable to 
sustain losses; (ii) it is likely that the first firms to exit the region are those who enter 
first (i. e. the more optimistic). Optimistic firms are in fact convinced that the number of 
incumbents that fill the cluster up to its equilibrium level is smaller than expected by the 
average firm. These firms will be the first to think the cluster agglomeration benefits to 
be almost totally exploited and will likely exit the region in search of alternative 
locations12. 
The second situation sounds more reasonable if applied to a stochastic version of the 
model above. In this case, optimistic firms will observe positive revenues even when, 
according to their prior beliefs, the cluster should have already reached its maximum 
dimension. But they will attribute these results to fortuitous shocks introducing 
stochastic elements in the locational benefit function. However, when all firms in the 
cluster will start to obtain negative locational benefits because of the continuous process 
of entry, they would think that their expectations were right and they will be the first 
leaving the cluster13. 
Exits due to the observation of negative revenues will likely cause oscillatory dynamics 
around D14. This dynamics will either be converging or diverging, depending on two 
phenomena which are not explicitly considered in the model: (i) the level of the exits 
and the types of firms which will leave the region first; (ii) the leaming processes, that 
can modify firms' expectations, based on the difference between expected and actual 
benefits. Without going into many details, it is evident that any leaming process will 
12 Although empirically appealing (describing the behaviour of a class of "pioneer" firms which look for 
new interesting locations, settle in there, then leave as soon the competition grows), this second hypothesis 
- in a deterministic framework - must assume the existence of a plurality of location (in contrast with the 
bases of the model). 
13 Following the same line of reasoning, it should be the case that these firms would be prone to stay in 
the cluster in the early phases of its development, despite suffering some losses. because these losses 
could be easily attributed to negative random shocks. 
14 It is worth noting that oscillatory dynamics around a supposed equilibrium value is the most relevant 
feature of mature clusters (i. e. which have reached their maximum dimension). 
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dampen the oscillations around the equilibrium level; while, depending on the 
distribution of firms types in the population of potential entrants, the exit of pessimistic 
firms may start a divergent oscillatory dynamics. 
4.3. Z Concluding remarks 
Section 4.3 contains an attempt to model the nexus between firms' location decisions 
and clusters' development dynamics. This nexus has been unjustly neglected by the 
"ortodox" literature which has always analysed separately the micro-economic location 
issues and the macro-economic development issues. A further contribution to the 
oblivion of this nexus comes from the so called "implicit approach" to industrial 
location (Storey, 1985; Keeble, 1988; Ciciotti, 1993) which underlines that, for the 
majority of firms, the location is a mere by-product of the formation process. According 
to this approach, a firm's location decision is implicit and often depends on the place 
where potential entrepreneurs live and work. 
The model described above builds upon the ecologically-derived literature and aims to 
solve some micro-economic problems and dynan-tic inconsistencies of the model 
presented in section 4.2 by explicitly introducing the role of firms' expectations in the 
location process. Firms have been modelled as myopic agents with limited rationality 
and their heterogeneity has been assumed as dependent on "subjective" elements (i. e. 
depending on existing differences in the expectations or in the risk aversion of firms). 
Even though this model cannot be empirically tested, one may assume that the 
subjective differences in expectations and/or risk aversion depend on objective elements 
such as size, industry etc. If these assumptions can reasonably be justified, then one may 
substitute the "psychological" distribution of figure 4.8 with an "objective" distribution 
based on some measurable characteristic and check whether the correspondence 
between the distribution function of firms' attributes and the cluster's development path 
confirms or rejects, even if in an indirect way, the model. 
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4.4. Appendix: Cluster development policies in variable 
macro-economic conditions 
4.4.1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s the importance of local development policies has been stressed both 
from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Academics and public decision makers 
have acknowledged the central role played by industrial clusters and local systems of 
production in determining growth potential and the economic success of a country. Even 
the European Union has shifted the focus of its policy towards the regional and the local 
levels and is currently targeting lagging regions and declining (both industrial and rural) 
areas in order to create a more cohesive European Union, achieve a stable long term 
development path and foster the international competitiveness of Europe (CEC, 199 1). 
If regional and local policies play a relevant role in fostering the industrial and economic 
development, it is necessary to identify a number of criteria for evaluating different 
interventions and measuring their efficiency and effectiveness. In a context of increasing 
global interdependence, these policies cannot however be evaluated without reference to 
the external macro-economic conditions. 
This section presents a model of the development of an industrial cluster which extends 
and complete the "ecological models" presented in section 4.2. by taking into account 
the effects of external factors such as the variation of the macro-economic conditions at 
the national and international level. In this way we are able to discuss the role of 
economic policies which can foster the industrial development of an area through a 
number of interventions aimed at supporting the maximum rate of growth industrial 
mass of the cluster (r-policy) or the carrying capacity of the cluster (K-policy). 
Aim of this section is to show that the desirability of a given local development policy 
(which, in this section, spans from pure K to pure r, passing through intermediate and 
mixed types) depends heavily upon (i) the development stage reached by the cluster and 
(ii) the external macro-economic conditions and their variationsI. 
1 This section introduce the discussion of policy issues which are thoroughly discussed and analysed in 
chapter 7. 
144 
4AZ Policy interventions for local development 
The development path of the cluster, as in section 4.2., is described by the logistic curve: 
dnq n (t) 
- qnq 
W1- 
dt 
ýq 
which is crucially dependent on the value of two parameters: r and K. 
A pure r-type policy is designed to increase the positive externalities which are 
endogenously generated by the location of a new firm in the region. The intrinsic rate of 
growth, r, expresses the largest possible "attraction and generation" power of a given 
number of located firms and influences the speed of growth of the cluster. An r-type 
policy explicitly supports the role played by agglomeration economies and knowledge 
spillovers in the development process of an high-tech cluster through appropriate 
interventions (such as innovation diffusion supporting policies, start-up incentives, 
provision of business planning services, diffusion of venture capital activities, etc. ). 
A pure K-type policy is designed to increase the regional "carrying capacity", i. e. the 
region's ability to sustain a given number of profitable firms. Since the carrying capacity 
is a function of the local endowment of resources (inputs and infrastructures) and of the 
average level of use of these resources made by resident firms, then a K-type policy 
aimed at increasing the quantity and/or quality of local inputs and infrastructures, and at 
raising the efficiency of local firms. 
r-type policies generate results in the short run, while K-type policy needs a longer time 
period to be effective. On the other hand, while r-type merely influence the speed of 
development, K-type policies are the only ones capable of moving the cluster size from 
a lower equilibrium level to an higher one, thus ensuring higher sustainable long-run 
development. r-type interventions are suited to be implemented in the early stages of 
development of an innovative industrial cluster when the main problem is the 
establishment and survival of an initial core of high-tech firms. K-type interventions do 
their best in the late stages of development of a cluster when competition on inputs and 
congestion of infrastructures are the main obstacles to the further development of the 
high-tech cluster. 
It should be stressed that a public authority with a given budget available for its local 
policies faces, at least in the short run, a trade-off between r-type and K-type policies: a 
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large value of r must be "purchased" at the expense of a low K and vice-versa. This 
trade-off is explained by the fact that a cluster willing to increase its r must support an 
indiscriminate firms' entry, irrespective of their technological capabilities, which 
consequently decreases the value of K. If the objective of the policy is the increase of the 
value of K, then this is achieved through a strict selection of entrants (based on 
production and technological efficiency criteria) which results, at least initially, in a 
reduction of the incipient growth rate r. 
In addition to these pure-types of policy, there are two other alternatives available to 
public decision makers willing to foster the economic development of an industrial 
cluster, these being the mixed and the intermediate policies (whose role will be better 
explained in section 4.4.5). 
Mixed policies involve the implementation of a mix of pure r and K policies to support 
the development of a cluster, with this mixture being weighted according to the 
expected probability (see note 7, below) of different macro-economic conditions. These 
interventions present a combination of instruments aimed at increasing the cluster rate 
of growth and of other instruments aimed at raising the technological and organisational 
level of incumbents firms. 
Intermediate policies identify hybrid interventions which lie in the range existing 
between pure r and pure K policies. These interventions support the development of the 
region by fostering the creation of agglomeration economies and knowledge spillovers 
but limiting these interventions within a selected group of firms2. 
4.4.3. The relevance of external macro-economic conditions 
The desirability of these two policies is also dependent on the macro-economic 
conditions (both at the national and at the international level) which can affect the 
economic performance of the cluster. 
The definition of the relevant external environment is crucially dependent on the nature 
of the economic structure of the cluster and in particular on its degree of openness. It is 
therefore possible to rank regions according to the geographical level of the relevant 
2 Science parks are the best example of intermediate policies. For more on this issue see sections 7.6 and 
7.7. 
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economic environment from the "isolated cluster" which operates within local input and 
output markets, to the "open cluster" whose industrial structure has relevant productive 
and commercial linkages within the national economy, to the "global cluster" which 
operates within international markets3. 
In an undisturbed environment (when the relevant macro-economic conditions are good 
and firm's death rate is "density dependent" i. e. depends only on congestion and 
competition effects within the cluster) a K-type of policy achieves its best results. Strict 
entry selection and innovation supporting policy produce a slower development path but 
a higher equilibrium level of the cluster. 
In a disturbed environment (when the relevant macro-economic conditions are poor and 
firm's death rate is influenced by "density independent" factors which impinge heavily 
upon the local population of firms even before the cluster achieves its carrying 
capacity), then the only viable policy is to sustain r. 
Let the state of the relevant macro-economic environment be described by Eg -a 
binomial variable where E, stands for a boom and E2 for a slump period - and Y, be the 
specific type of policy (i. e. the position of the implemented policy on a continuum 
stretching from pure r to pure K policies) implemented in the cluster. 
Vq . the growth rate of cluster q, depends on the combination of Yh and Eg. Formally: 
Vq = Vq 
(Eg, Yh ) g=1,2 and hE P where P=fr, KI (4.24) 
Without any loss of generality it can be assumed that vq- which in the original 
ecological literature is defined as "fitness function" - approximately follows a normal 
distribution as a function of Y, for any type of prevailing macro-economic conditions 
Eg (see figure 4.9). 
3 This taxonomy is thoroughly discussed and empirically implemented in Maggioni - Gambarotto (1997). 
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Figure 4.9. Growth of the cluster in two different macro-economic environments 
growth rate of 
the cluster 
A 
vq (E 1, Y) 
implemented policy (Yh) 
The position of the distribution peak Eg on the Yh axis represents the best development 
policy to be implemented in the cluster given the prevailing macro-economic conditions, 
the height of the peak v,, 
(Eg ) 
measures the best performance (in terms of growth rate of 
the cluster) which can be obtained by implementing the policy Y., and the width of the 
curve (expressed by the horizontal distance between the peak and the inflection point of 
the distribution, cr,, ) measures the tolerance of the cluster for non-optimal policies. 
The fitness function vq measures the impact of public policies or, in other words, the 
dependence of the cluster growth performance on policy interventionS4. Although the 
height of the peak is undoubtedly limited by the intrinsic characteristics of the firms 
entering the cluster, it is reasonable to assume the existence of a trade-off between the 
width and the height of the fitness function so that the width of the function cannot be 
increased without lowering its height. 
The distance between two different macro-economic conditions can be measured by the 
degree of overlapping of the fitness function; in particular if the nearest inflection points 
of the fitness functions overlap, then the macro-econon-dc conditions can be considered 
4A "tall and thin" fitness function (where vq(tj) is large and CFq is small) identifies a cluster which is 
deeply dependent, and thus very reactive to, on public interventions; a "flat and thick" fitness function 
(where vq(tj) is small and crq is large) identifies a cluster which is unresponsive and/or indifferent to 
public interventions and whose development and growth depend only on its internal forces. 
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A K-type EI r-type 
relativelY similar; if this is not the case, then the macro-economic condition can be 
considered to be significantly different from one another. 
These two alternatives can be more effectively illustrated through another representation 
(see figure 4.10) where the fitness function (i. e. the growth rate) of the cluster for each 
macro economic condition is plotted on each axis. The frontier of the resulting "fitness 
set"s T EI, E2 
(K ), 
synthetically represents the optimal growth rate of the cluster for each 
state of the world (i. e. the macro-economic conditions plotted on the axes). When the 
states of the world are significantly different, the set is concave along the north-east 
boundary; when the states of the world are similar, the fitness set is convex. 
If the horizontal distance between the peaks of the fitness functions is greater than twice 
the tolerance or, more formally, if 
jyh (PI) 
- yh 
(R2 ý> 
2aq (4.25) 
then the fitness set is concave; if the opposite hold, the fitness set is convex. 
4.4.4. Variable macro-economic conditions 
In order to study the effects of temporal variations in the macro-economic conditions we 
need to introduce a concept which, in the original ecological literature, is defined as 
grain5 and measures the frequency of temporal variation in the macro-economic 
environments. In particular when high frequency variations dominate, the series of 
different macro-economic conditions (e. g. booms and slumps) is said to have a fine 
grain; if, on the contrary, low frequency variations are the most common, the series is 
said to have a coarse grain6. 
According to the grain of the series we can define two different types of adaptive 
functions, Af (E,, E2) and A,, (E,, E2) where f stand for fine and c stands for coarse 
grain, which measure (as monotonic increasing functions of their arguments) the fitness 
of the cluster for different grains (i. e. different frequency of variation) of variable 
5 "Grain refers to the pattern of mixing different environments either in a spatial or temporal distribution" 
(Hannan - Freeman, 1989, p. 106). 
6 High and low frequency are defined in relation to the average life span of a firm within the cluster. 
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macro-economic conditions. If, for example, we define as p the proportion7 of macro- 
economic condition E, (booms) and, consequently, p-1 the proportion of macro- 
economic condition E2 (slumps) in a given time period, then a fine-grained series of 
macro-economic shocks will be perceived by the cluster industrial mass (i. e. by the 
incumbents firms) as an average of the two different macro-economic conditions. The 
cluster adaptive function (i. e. the cluster's long-run growth) can therefore be represented 
by a linear combination of the fitness functions in each state of the world, weighted by 
the duration of each macro-economic condition. Formally: 
Af (EI 
9 
E2) = Ph + 
(1 
- P)V2 (4.26) 
When the series of shocks are coarse-grained, the resulting environment will no longer 
be perceived as an average of the two macro-economic conditions. In order to grant a 
stable long-run growth of the cluster the implemented policy must ensure the ability to 
grow (or at least to survive) in both macro-economic conditions. The cluster adaptive 
function in this case can therefore be represented by a multiplicative function of the 
fitness functions in the different environments. Formally: 
Ac (El , 
E2 )= Vl* +V 2(1-P) (4.27) 
The difference between a fine and a coarse series of macroeconomic conditions is made 
graphically evident in figure 4.10 where the first is represented by a straight line, while 
the second by a convex curve. 
4.4.5. Optimal long run development policies 
The optimal long run development policy (i. e. the one ensuring the best growth 
performance) can be identified by the tangency point between the fitness set and the 
highest adaptive function (see figure 4.10 and table 4.2). These tangency points indicate 
the maximum growth rate attainable over the entire period considered. 
7p can be defined as a proportion in an ex-post perspective or as a probability in an ex-ante perspective. 
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Figure 4.10. Optimal long run development policies: a graphical representation 
4.10a 
v(E 1, Yh) 
4.10d 
v(E I, Yh) 
v(E2, Yh) 
v(E 1, Yh) 
v(E 1, Yh) 
Source: adapted from Hannan - Freeman (1989) 
4.10b 
4.10e 
While stable environments obviously favour specialisation - regardless of the grain of 
the adaptive function (i. e. the frequency of changes in the macro-economic conditions) 
and of the shape of the fitness set (the difference of two macro-economic conditions) -, 
variable macro-economic conditions produce more complex effects, which can be better 
described by table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Optimal long run development policies: a matrix 
difference between macro-economic environments 
Convex fitness set Concave fitness set 
(the environments are similar) (the environments are different) 
Fine grain 
(shocks are frequent) 
Intermediate policies Pure policies 
frequency 
of shocks Coarse grain 
(changes last long) Intermediate policies Mixed policies I 
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v(E2, Yh) v(E2, Yh) 
v(E2, Yh) 
In particular if the fitness set is convex (i. e. the macro-economic conditions are quite 
similar) the optimal long run intervention is an intermediate policy between r and K, 
irrespective of the grain of the series. Intermediate policies are most effective when the 
depth of exogenous shocks is limited. 
If the fitness set is concave (i. e. the macro-economic conditions are very different), then 
the optimality of the policy is crucially dependent on the prevailing grain: when fine 
grain prevails, the best development strategy is a pure type of policy; when coarse grain 
prevails the best development strategy is a mixed policy. When these turbulent 
conditions prevail, the choice of such eclectic policies diminishes the risk of being 
locked-in to ineffective development policies and allows, through the change in the 
relative weights of r and K components, a sharp drift towards pure policies when the 
8 macro-economic conditions settle . 
4.4.6. Concluding remarks 
Section 4.4 has shown an application of ecologically derived models to the analysis of 
local industrial development and local development policies, which emphasises the 
influence of macro-econon* conditions on cluster's performance. This simple 
analytical framework has not prevented the attainment of significant results. In 
particular, the above model has clearly pointed out that the success of a development 
policy for an innovative industrial cluster is heavily dependent on a number of 
conditions, these being: 
i) the development stage of the cluster (i. e. how far is the cluster's industrial mass 
from its carTying capacity? ); 
ii) the level of dependence of the cluster on policy interventions (i. e. is the 
development of the cluster heavily dependent on public intervention or is it an 
autonomous process driven by private investments? ); 
iii) the scale of the relevant macro-economic environment of the cluster, in terms of its 
productive and commercial relations (i. e. what is the most influential external geo- 
8 Maggioni - Gambarotto (1997) contains an empirical application of this modelling framework to 
regional development in Italy. 
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economic context for the cluster economy; what is the degree of national or 
international openness of the cluster? ); 
iv) the state of the relevant macro-economic environment (i. e. is the national or global 
economy in a boom or in a slurnp? ); 
v) the depth and frequency of shocks which hit the relevant macro-economic 
environment (i. e. how different are booms from slumps and how turbulent are the 
macro-economic conditions? ). 
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4.5. Appendix: Firm location processes and cluster's 
development: a micro-economic (innovation diffusion 
derived) approach 
As it has already been signalled in section 3.10, it is possible to consider the process of 
firms' location, which generates the outset and the development of a spatially defined 
innovative industrial cluster, as a special case of a diffusion process. The process 
through which firms choose to adopt a particular innovation does not seem very 
different from the process through which firms choose to locate in a particular site. The 
similarity between the dynamics of location and diffusion can be better appreciated if 
one thinks of a few stylised facts of these two processes. 
i) Diffusion and location are time-intensive processes. The saturation of an entire 
market from the first appearance of a new technology, as well as the saturation of an 
high-tech cluster from the location of the first high-tech firm, can easily take some 
years (with the location process being, in general, slower than the diffusion one). 
ii) When the market penetration of a given technology, and the growth of the industrial 
mass of an high-tech cluster, are plotted against time, the resulting curve is usually 
S-shaped, suggesting that diffusion and entry rates are slower at the beginning and 
at the end of the process, while faster in a middle phase. 
iii) The speed of diffusion of technology, and the speed of growth of an industrial 
cluster, display a significant variance across technologies, industries, countries (and 
regions). 
If the location process can be seen as a kind of diffusion process, it is possible to search 
for a modelling framework - describing the location decision of high-tech firms and the 
consequent development dynamics of an high-tech cluster - within the vast literature on 
the diffusion of technological innovation. 
Furthermore, models of location process have a strong advantage on the original 
"technological" counterparts, since they can be conceived of as entirely demand driven 
on a sound theoretical basis. In location processes, the only rational agent is the 
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potential entrant firm, whilst the supplier of the service/location (i. e. the region) plays a 
mere passive rolel. 
In this appendix we therefore firstly (and briefly) consider a "revised version" of 
epidemic and probit models and, secondly, we derive a modified version of the 
encompassing model proposed by Karshenas - Stoneman (1993) in order to look at the 
different roles played by epidemic, rank, stock and order effects in shaping the 
development process of an high-tech cluster. 
4.5.1. Epidemic models 
The basic model of diffusion-location processes is the epidemic model. According to 
such a model firms, in order to locate in the cluster, must know of its existence and of 
the profitability of being located there. The total number of firms located in the cluster 
at the end of the location process is exogenously determined by the resource endowment 
(in terms of inputs and infrastructure) of the cluster. The development rate of the cluster 
is therefore proportional to the probability of interaction between a potential entrant and 
a firm already located in the cluster. 
It is possible to analytically describe such a situation according to an "internal 
influence', 2 version of an epidemic diffusion model (Mahajan - Peterson, 1985). If this 
is the case, then the entry dynamics in the cluster can be described as follows: 
dn, 
= bn, (t) 
(Kq 
- n(t)) dt 
(4.28) 
where nq W is the number of firms located in the cluster at time t and Kq is the 
maximum number of firms that the cluster can profitably sustain. 
Equation (4.28) states that the speed of the location process is proportional to the 
frequency of contacts (or social interactions) between incumbents n, (t) and potential 
entrants K. - n. (t). b is a behavioural parameter which describes the potential entrants' 
1 In chapter 7 we relax this assumption and we distinguish between spontaneous clusters and science 
parks according to the active or passive role of the supply side. 
2 The internal influence model is most appropriate when: (i) the location decision is complex and socially 
visible, not adopting it places firms at a competitive disadvantage in business; (ii) the set of potential 
entrants is relatively small and homogeneous; and (iii) there is a need for experiential or legitimising 
information, prior to location (Mahajan - Peterson, 1985). 
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propensity to imitate. For this reason equation (4.28) may well represent a pure imitation 
location model where potential entrants, once they become aware of the existence of the 
cluster through the interaction with a firm already located there, decide to imitate the 
incumbents behaviour and to locate in the clusted. 
When n. (t) is plotted against time, equation (4.28) describes the logistic curve, an S- 
shaped curve, which is often chosen for modelling diffusion processes for its convenient 
mathematical features4. 
Alternatively, we may assume that the location decision is influenced by some external 
constant factors a (e. g. incentives to location offered by the local authority). In this case, 
the time path of the location dynamics become a decaying curve in which, over time, the 
cumulative number of entrants increases, but at a constant decreasing rate5. Formally: 
dnq 
dt a 
(K. 
n. (t)) (4.29) 
where a is a parameter describing the efficiency of the external information spreading 
mechanisms. 
It is also possible to consider these two models in conjunction, allowing both internal 
and external factors to influence the location process. More formally: 
dn 
= 
(a +bnq(t))(K. - n, (t)) dt 
(4.30) 
These epidemic models can be further enriched by allowing a certain degree of 
heterogeneity within the set of potential entrant firms. 
It can be firstly assumed - by allowing different groups to have different b (as in Davies, 
1979) - that there are two (or more) distinct types of firms within the set of potential 
3 This formulation of the location process is similar to the ecological model of single-cluster development 
used in section 3.3. 
4 The logistic curve is symmetrical, has an inflection point at n(t)12, and can be linearly estimated through 
a logarithmic transformation. 
5 The rationale for such a model is the following: the source of information on the new potential location 
site is external to the set of firms. Then the rate of location becomes dependent only on the number of 
potential entrants at each moment of time (and this number is always decreasing as more and more firms 
decide to locate in the cluster). 
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entrants. One is either more anxious to locate in the cluster or more easily influenced by 
the entrants' decision than the other. 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that only the first type of firms is influenced by the 
external factor a whilst the second type changes its behaviour via direct interactions and 
therefore is influenced only by the number of firms already located in the cluster through 
the interaction parameter b (as in Bass, 1969; Mahajan - Schoeman, 1977). 
Another way to look at the location process (as in Mansfield, 1968) takes into 
consideration the differences existing between potential entrants (in terms of location 
benefits and costs) and explicitly refers to the level of uncertainty which may exist, for 
the potential entrant, on the profitability of location in the cluster. In this model, it is the 
uncertainty on the profitable location, and not the mere ignorance of the cluster's 
existence, which deters potential entrants to locate in the cluster. In the model, firms 
compare the profitability of the location in the cluster with location (or re-location) 
costs. Uncertainty is dependent on the date of the first location in the cluster and on the 
share of incumbents on the total number of potential entrants Kq. In particular it is 
assumed that as nq(t)lKq increases (i. e. as the cluster becomes the best location for a 
certain industry), uncertainty will be reduced. The proportion of potential entrants which 
enter the region between t and t+1 is therefore modelled as a function of the profitability 
of location, 7c; the proportion of firms that have already entered, nq(tyKq; and the 
location (or relocation) costs C. 
q 
(t + n, nq 
(t) 
Kq - n(t) 
9 
Kq , 
7r, (4.31) 
The function g is firstly approximated by a Taylor's series expansion with the third and 
higher order terms ignored as well as the quadratic term in (nq(tyKq), and rearranged in 
order to write the behavioural. parameter b of the original epidemic model (described in 
equation 4.28) as a linear function of location profits and costs (which can easily be 
estimated by OLS): 
=A+ P2 7r + P3 (4.32) 
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4.5.2. Rank models 
According to these models, the location process is driven by the differences within the 
set of potential entrants. Firms differ according to some specific characteristic z (e. g. 
different location costs) which are distributed across the population as ftz) with 
cumulative distribution F(z). 
At time ta potential entrant f will enter if its characteristic level zf is smaller than its 
critical level zt and the proportion of potential entrants which have entered the cluster 
by time t is equal to I- F(z, ). If one further assumes that, as time passes, z, shifts 
rightward, the model produces a time intensive location process whose pattern, when 
plotted against time, is strictly dependent on the shape of the distribution function f(z) 
(see figure 4.11). 
Figure4.11. Location costs structure and locational gross benerits 
firms' 
distribution 
function f(z) 
location costs (z) 
Let's look at the location dynamics in greater details. When a firm of characteristic level 
z enters the cluster in time t, from that moment onward it will gain a gross locational 
benefit Gf which is directly related to the agglomeration benefits (e. g. benefits deriving 
from the location of other firms in term of inputs price reduction, because of the 
existence of production externalities and technological spillovers)6. 
6 Since we assume that the firm sells its output on a perfect competitive international market, and 
transport costs are negligible, we can concentrate the analysis on the demand side and model the benefits 
arising from the location in the cluster as being dependent only on the difference existing between the 
input prices within the cluster (pj) and outside the cluster (po). 
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We can further assume that the price of inputs in cluster q at time t- which depends on 
the agglomeration economies - is equal for any firm in the cluster. The price of inputs Pq 
diminishes as the number of firms increases until a threshold level n. ' is reached. After 
that threshold, the relation is inverted (input prices rise, within the cluster, because of 
congestion and increased competition between firms over a limited supply of inputs7). 
Formally: 
n. (t) - n. ' 
dg 
>0 (4.33) Pq (t) = P, (0) - g( dn(t) 
We can therefore express the locational gross benefits for any firm located in the cluster 
in time t, Gq(t), as the difference between inputs price within and outside the cluster 
Ap(,,, (t)). 
Gq (t) =AP(nq 
(1)) (4.34) 
Assuming that firm's behaviour is myopic, then a profit maximising firm will enter the 
cluster if locational gross benefits, deriving from the location in the cluster, are greater 
than location costs. The development path of the cluster is therefore determined by the 
structure of the location costs across the population of potential entrants, and by the 
dynamics of input prices8. 
The dynamic of input prices works as follows. In the first phase, when agglomeration 
economies are prevailing, the relation between price reduction and firms' entry displays 
a positive feed-back: as input prices diminish, more firms enter the cluster, and as more 
firms enter the cluster, input prices diminish. When the number of located firms reaches 
the threshold level, the relation between entry and price reduction reverses and the 
process instantaneously stops9. If the locational costs structure of potential entrants has 
a uni-modal distribution (as in figure 4.11), then an S-shaped development path for the 
7 Swann (1998) presents a detailed discussion (and empirical tests) on the different role played by 
congestion and competition (Cournot) effects. 
8 The relevant difference between this model and the standard probit model used in the technological 
diffusion literature is that in this model the dynamics of the benefits is endogenously determined by the 
location of firms in the cluster. 
9 When the entry of the marginal firm decreases Ap(n(t)), no other location in the cluster can take place. 
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cluster emerges. In particular, if location costs are normally distributed, then a logistic 
path is determined. 
An alternative interpretation of the rank model assumes that the relevant difference 
within potential entrants is psychological. In such models, surveyed in Stoneman (1983) 
and Thirtle and Ruttan (1987), the population of firms is divided into different 
psychological classes (pioneers, early movers, early majority, late majority, laggards) 
and the relative size of these classes makes the overall population to be normally 
distributed as in figure 4.12. 
Figure 4.12. Psychological distribution function of potential entrants 
psychological 
distribution 
function of 
potential 
entrants 
Source: adapted from Stoneman (1983) 
What is assumed - by using a normal distribution - is that, generally, within a given 
population of potential entrants, few firms (pioneers and early movers) will decide to 
enter a newly developed cluster; a great majority displays a kind of imitative 
intermediate behaviour; few firms (laggards, or conservatives) wait until the cluster is 
definitely established as the best location for that industry, before deciding to locate 
there. 
The psychological version of rank models can be further developed by explicitly 
assuming that the location behaviour of potential entrants crucially depends on previous 
location decisions (or, which is much the same, on the number of incumbents). In this 
way the engine of the entry process is made intrinsically endogenous, since present 
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required number of already located firms 
locations are caused by previous locations, and some peculiar dynamic phenomena 
begin to appear. 
A detailed analysis of dynamic systems, and their application to social sciences, can be 
found in Schelling (1978) and in Hofbauer - Sigmund (1984). A presentation of the 
major results (in the population ecology modelling framework) is displayed in section 
4.3 of the thesis. Here it is worth mentioning that a uni-modal distributionIO of firm 
types based on such an endogenous criterion (the distinction between pioneers and 
laggards is in fact based on the number of previous locations, or threshold, that the two 
types require in order to locate in the cluster) generates a sigmoid cumulative 
distribution of firms which, in general, exhibits three dynamic equilibria: two extremes 
(e' and e ... ) being stable, whilst the intermediate one (e") being unstable (see figure 
4.13). 
Figure 4.13. The emergence of a critical mass in the development of the cluster 
Firms 
cumulative 
distribution 
ei 
An interesting feature of such a model is the emergence of an endogenously determined 
"critical mass" (A), which is the minimum number of located firms which is necessary 
for the cluster to sustain its growth. Any number of firms located in the cluster smaller 
than A is doomed to exit since there are not sufficient firms in the set of potential 
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A Number of incumbents, thresholds (t) 
entrants which think it is sufficiently profitable to locate in a cluster which has been 
chosen by so few firms. A consequence of such a result is that firms will never 
autonomously start a new cluster and, thus, policy intervention (implemented by an 
external agent) is required in order to allow the would-be cluster to overcome its critical 
massIl. 
4.5.3. Rank, stock and order effects in the location process 
As already stressed in this chapter, the essential prediction of a location model is that 
potential entrants have different (preferred) entry dates; or, which is the same, that, at 
any given date, only a part of the potential entrants actually locate in the cluster. In this 
encompassing model, derived from Karshenas - Stoneman (1993), we try to show the 
different role played in the location process by all the different effects 12. 
Assume that all potential entrants are initially aware of the cluster's existence. Assume 
also that an outsider firmf can locate in a cluster q in time t by incurring location costs 
P(t). Define gfq(-r) as (gross) locational benefits obtained by firm f in period T from the 
entry in cluster q. Further assume that these per period benefits are determined by the 
rank, stock and order effects as follows. 
i) Rank effect: firms have different inherent characteristics (size, technology, 
management abilities etc. ) and, as a result, obtain different gross benefits from 
entering the cluster. Different benefits can thus generate different entry dates. By 
ranking potential entrants in terms of their returns from entry, a benefit distribution 
across potential entrants is obtained. A simple entry rule - relating location benefits 
to entry costs (and depending on the expectation assumptions, changes therein) - 
enables the derivation of a distribution of reservation entry costs from the benefits 
distribution. Firms enter the cluster as entry costs fall below reservation entry 
costS13. 
10 As the one described in figure 4.12. 
11 The policy implication of these models are discussed in chapter 7. 
12 In order to directly relate to the original source, in this section we use the same notation of Karshenas - 
Stoneman (1993) and reinterpret it. 
13 Alternatively, rank effects can be modelled as if they could determine only the proportion of the 
benefits, generated by the other effects (stock and order), that are effectively exploited by the firms. In a 
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ii) Stock effect: this effect concerns the existence of agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies. In a static perspective, location benefits enjoyed by the marginal 
entrant follow a concave non-monotonic path (agglomeration benefits increase until 
a certain number of entrants is reached, than decrease). In a dynamic perspective, if 
firms are assumed to last longer than the average life cycle of a cluster and their 
discount rate is relatively low, then it is optimal for any firm to enter the region as 
soon as possible to enjoy the stock effects for the longest possible period of time. 
iii) Order effect: location benefits also depend upon the firm's position in the order of 
entry, with earlier entrants achieving a greater return than later ones. This can be 
explained by two different lines of reasoning. The first stresses that early entrants 
can locate in best geographical sites within the cluster or pre-empt the pool of 
skilled labour. The second (Fudenberg - Tyrole, 1985) refers to the fact that, 
because of stock effects, earlier entrants get greatest benefits and this induce an 
entry race 14. 
As in the original Karshenas-Stoneman (1993) model, therefore, here order and stock 
effects push the firms towards earlier entry dates, whilst the rank effect set the earliest 
possible date for each firm. The only counteracting forces are locational costs, 
exogenously falling over time, and the discount rate. 
Specifically define Cf as a vector of firm characteristics (rank), K,, Q) as the number of 
firms in cluster q at time t (stock); and Sq(t) as the number of previous entries in the 
cluster (order). It is evident that, if exits are not allowed, Sq(t) = Kq(t); however, for 
expositional convenience, it is useful to distinguish between stock and order effects. 
The (per period) benefits in time r for the fth firm entering in cluster q at time t will be 
as follows: 
gfq 
(r) 
= g(Cf , 
Sq (t), Kq (T» T 2: t; 92 :50; 93: 5 0 (4.35) 
sense rank effect can be represented by a parameter ai (where 0< ai <1) that acts as a "filter" between the 
firm and localization benefits. A high ranked firm will enter the cluster also in presence of relatively low 
locational benefits, whilst a low ranked firm will enter only if the benefits are high. 
14 This explanation emphasises the "first mover advantage" experienced by earlier entrants which can 
influence the date of entry of their followers, whilst the opposite process is unfeasible. 
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If r is the discount rate - and assuming no depreciation - then the present value of gross 
benefits from entry cluster q at time t is: 
Gf (t) f- g(Cf , S(t), K(r)) e-"(-')dr t 
(4.36) 
where the subscript q has been dropped for convenience, since firms are considering 
only cluster q for future locations. 
In this framework, the location decision becomes the choice of an optimal value for t, t* 
which is determined by two conditions: the profitability condition, which states that the 
present value of the net locational benefits Z. (t) (i. e. the difference between gross 
locational benefits G, (t) and costs P(t)) at time t must be non negative. Formally: 
Zf (t) = Gf (t) - P(t) ý: 0 (4.37) 
and the arbitrage condition (net location benefits must be not increasing over time): 
dyf (t) dZf (t) e-" *N 
-=<0 d(t) dt 
(4.38) 
The profitability condition determines, at each moment in time, the set of potential 
entrants, whilst the arbitrage condition governs optimal entry time, t *, for each 
potential entrant. 
Under reasonable conditions the arbitrage condition dominates the profitability 
condition and, therefore, the optimal entry date for firnaf tf* is given by: 
dyf (t; ): 5 0 
d(t) 
(4.39) 
where the inequality allows for comer solutions (i. e. when it is optimal to enter the 
cluster immediately on its "discovery" 15). 
15 In this context, "discovery" is not to be intended in a strict geographical but in broader economic 
sense, related to the moment in which a given site become known as a profitable location for a given type 
of firms. 
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Assume that firms maximise profits, conjecture that their own decisions do not affect 
the decision of other firms and use (4.36) and (4.37) to obtain the following expression 
for 
dyf 
d(t) 
dyf (t) 
= rp(t) - 
dP(t) 
- g(Cf ,S 
(t), K(T)) + dt dt (4.40) 
+f 92(Cf, S(t), K(-r)) 
dS(t) 
e '-)dr dt 
where 
dS(t) 
and 
dP(t) 
measure the expected change in the number of located firms dt dt 
and in the location costs in the small time interval It, t+ dt). 
Equation (4.40) shows that the benefits for waiting a period before location equal the 
sum of interests saved (rP(t)), plus any expected reduction in the location costs, minus 
the net present value of the changes in location benefits which results from a move 
down the entry order for all T ý: t (the integral term), and minus the benefits foregone for 
not being located in the cluster for a period. 
Equation (4.40) shows also that 
dy ý-(t), the change in the location benefits deriving dt 
from waiting a period before entering the cluster, is positively related to rp(t), S(t), and 
K(-z); negatively related to the expected change in the location costs 
dP(t) 
and in the dt 
number of located fin.. 
dS(t) 
and is also a function of the vector of firm's dt ' 
characteristics Cf, with sign to be determined (since it crucially depends on what 
characteristics are chosen and how they are measured). 
This equation could be used for empirical analysis by making the model stochastic, 
defining hýt) as the hazard rate16 - or the probability that firm i locates in the cluster in 
time t, by (t - 1) - and utilising the definition that Sq(t) = Qt). The final result is as 
follows: 
16 In Karshenas - Stoneman (1993) the hazard function is chosen so to incorporate in the model the 
epidemic effects. 
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dK(t)" 
hq(t) =F rP(t), K(t), Cf , 
dP(t) dt (4.41) 
dt 'r 
10 
where F, < 0, F2 < 0, F3 <O, 
F4 > 0, Fs >0 
We therefore expect the probability of location for firmf in period t, given that it has not 
entered the cluster in the previous periods, to be negatively related to the level of 
discounted location costs and to the number of incumbents, positively related to the 
expected change in the location costs and in the number of incumbents. We have no a- 
priori on the sign of the rank effects, since it crucially depends on the chosen feature. 
In order to estimate the model, however, we would need data on a series of variables 
(the level and change in location costs, the individual firm characteristics - such as size, 
date of establishment, corporate status - and, above all, the entry date of individual firm) 
which were not available in the acquired data set17. 
For these reasons, even though we consider the above as a good framework to set up a 
series of empirical investigations on the process of location18 - which can capture most 
of the essential features of the economic theories on cluster growth - we decided to 
adopt a macro-economic perspective and look at the location process in a modelling 
framework derived from the population ecology literature. However, in chapter 6, where 
the empirical analysis is presented and discussed, we succeeded in testing some 
hypotheses embodied in equation (4.41). 
17 Which does not contain any individual firm level data. It must also be stressed that, to our knowledge, 
there were not available data series which would contain such information. 
18 And this is a priority in our future research agenda. 
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Chapter 5 
Survey of empirical literature 
Precisely why particular technologies cluster is not well 
understood. Innovations often occur in more than one location 
at about the same time; largely because of different 
environmental conditions, however, commercial exploitation 
flourishes in a much smaller number of places. Powerful 
agglomeration advantages develop in the specialised 
technopolis. Supplier and service firms arise to serve the 
growing industry ( ... ). Firms that represent downstream markets join the cluster. A specialised labour market forms, which 
reinforces the growth of the industry (which, in turn, attracts 
more specialised labour). Local educational and research 
institution collalýorate with industry to develop programs to 
meet the need of the industry. University thus develop national 
and international reputation for excellence in the specialised 
field of the regional industry. In mature technopolises, 
diversification of the industrial base occurs (as) a natural 
consequence of the agglomeration process and linkages among 
certain technologies. ( ... ) The large technical labour force 
attracts other industries that demand skills similar to those 
needed by the core industry. ( ... ) Service industries that rose to 
meet the demand of local industry find export markets and 
become an independent source of growth for the technopolis. 
Universities and other research institutions sometimes broaden 
their areas of specialisation and generate new growth in new 
fields. 
R. W. Preer (1992), The Emergence of Technopolis. 
5.1. Why do firms cluster? 
In general, firms aim at maximising profits, therefore firms will choose a location which 
maximises locational net benefitsl. These in turn are composed of geographical benefits 
- i. e. benefits deriving from the quality of the site in terms of inputs endowment, costs 
and consumers location (i. e. the spatial distribution of demand)2 - and agglomeration 
benefits (i. e. benefits deriving from the location of other firms in the same site). 
If only geographical benefits were considered, then clustering would be the only 
possible outcome of the location process. For any type (or industrial sector) of firms 
1 Net benefits are obtained as the difference between gross benefits and costs. 
2 Because the thesis is focused on innovative and high-tech firms - which generally sell their products on a 
global market with low transportation costs - we will not consider, as relevant, the demand side (market 
areas etc. ), but we will mostly concentrate on the production side of the location problem. 
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there would exist an industry-specific "best location" which potentially attract the entire 
set of firms. Once this "first best" location has reached its carrying capacity3, other 
"second best" sites will be chosen. When representing firms as dots on a geographical 
map, the final picture will thus be a scattered pattern with roughly circular spots 
marking "good7 locations, the density of the spot decreasing steadily as the distance 
from the spot centre increases, and the size of spots signalling the quality of each 
location (larger spot, better location). 
When agglomeration benefits are added to the picture, the complexity of the situation 
increases exponentially. Such benefits in fact depend (in a non-linear and non- 
monotonic way) on other firms' location decisions. This fact introduces two elements of 
difficulty into the analysis: non linearities and strategic behaviours. As far as non 
linearities are concerned, one may think of them as being the results of two conflicting 
forces. On the one hand, agglomeration economies (or agglomeration gross benefits) 
which produce increasing returns to location in certain sites4, facilitating the clustering 
process; on the other hand, agglomeration diseconornies (congestion effects) and inputs 
competition5 which push firms apart from each other. 
As far as strategic behaviour is concerned, one may see the location process as a game in 
which each firm must play against a large numbers of, often unknown, rivals in order to 
find the best site and the best moment to locate in that given site6. 
A rich empirical literature - which is summarised in the following sections - identifies 
four main reasons why firms cluster: 
i) because they want to benefit from agglomeration economies; 
ii) because they want to benefit from a localised "source" of inputs and/or consumers; 
iii) because they want to reduce locational search costs and are sensible to 
informational cascades; 
3 Le. its maximum dimension either in physical terms: no more land and labour available, or in price 
terms: because of competition, inputs price has risen over a certain threshold. 
4 And, sometimes, cause locational lock-in phenomena. 
5 The two negative effects can be summarised under the heading of agglomeration costs. 
6 This is not to say that sometimes (i. e. when agglomeration net benefits prevail) location can result in a 
co-ordination game where each firm benefits from the location of other firms in the same site. 
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iv) because they want to increase their market power. 
5.1.1. Agglomeration economies 
Regional economists, in their jargon, distinguish within the general headings of 
agglomeration economies between localisation. economies (i. e. sector-specific 
agglomeration economies) and urbanisation/regionalisation7 economies (i. e. 
agglomeration economies which are not sector-specific). 
* Localisation economies include several elements, such as: intra-industry 
specialisation economies (permitting greater specialisation among firms), labour 
market economies (reducing search costs for industry specific skills), 
communications economies (facilitating inter-firm spread of innovations and 
diffusion of sectoral best practice techniques), scale economies in industry-specific 
services and intermediate industry-specific goods provision (reducing the individual 
firm's factors cost). Localisation economies have been empirically measured by 
using, as a proxy, the local number of firms (or the local level of employment) 
belonging to a certain industry. 
Urbanisation/regionalisation economies include: inter-industry specialisation 
economies (allowing a higher degree of specialisation among industries and the 
development of specific production service sectors such as technological auditing, 
marketing and financial consulting etc. ), labour market economies (reducing search 
costs for generic skills), communications economies (facilitating the cross- 
fertilisation of innovative activities, the pervasiveness of innovations, and the 
diffusion of best practice techniques across sectors), scale economies in the 
production and provision of local public services, goods and infrastructures (reducing 
general firm's location costs). Urbanisation/regionalisation economies can be seen as 
external scale economies for a wide variety of economic activities and can be 
empirically measured by the local level of total employment or by the total number of 
firms located in a given area. 
7 The first term, urbanisation, is the most used in the literature and refers to the various benefits, 
associated with the close proximity to other firms, which arise from the location in an urban area 
irrespective of the industry. However, following Isard - Schooler (1959), we prefer to add the second 
term, regionalisation, to stress the point that such benefits can be enjoyed in a spatial environment which 
is different from a city (such as an innovative industrial cluster). 
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Agglomeration economies, together with the presence of critical mass phenomena, may 
also produce the emergence of so called penguin effectS8 (Farrel - Saloner, 1986b). This 
term defines a situation where there is a number of different innovative industrial 
clusters all in their initial stages of development and each potential entrant is reluctant to 
move first as long as there is a possibility that his/her choice may turn out to be so 
inferior as to orphan his/her location decision. He/she may prefer to wait for another 
user to choose first, in order to free-ride on the informational externalities generated by 
the location decision. 
Agglomeration economies are relevant elements which are taken into account in the 
location decision problem of every firm (Fujita - Thisse, 1996). However, for some 
specific types of firms (and in particular for small high-tech firms) agglomeration 
economies are even more relevant, since they play a crucial role in determining the site 
and timing of location. 
Small firms need to cluster in order to reach the minimum efficient scale for advertising 
and marketing (which are then collectively performed), R&D and innovative activities 
(which are easier in a cluster thanks to informational spill-over), labour recruitment and 
training (a cluster of firms often produces, directly or indirectly, a local pool of skilled 
labour), easier access to capital markets (bank managers prefer financing firms locating 
in established industrial sites, because they can use previous information to assess the 
profitability of the venture)9. 
High-tech firms cluster to enjoy agglomeration benefits because of their high 
requirements of information and know-how (higher than those of traditional firms 
belonging to mature and traditional sectors). The prominence of information in modern 
economic activities obliges every firm to minimise the costs of acquiring information. 
However, agglomeration within the innovative sectors, not only minimises the costs of 
obtaining information, but also allows a firm to maximise the opportunities of acquiring 
8 which are also known, in the game-theoretical literature, as "wars of attrition". 
9 However, the fact that location has a primary importance for small firms does not necessarily imply that 
these firms actually pay a lot of attention to the locational issue or that they are able to select the best 
location for their needs and to locate there. An empirical analysis (Barkeley - McNamara, 1994) - 
conducted in 1990 over a sample of over 300 US manufacturing firms from Georgia and South Carolina - 
shows that small firms exhibit little consistency between locational factor ratings and actual firms 
locations. This seems to suggest at least that these firms perform a very inefficient (if any) locational 
search process. 
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and exchanging it. Finns need also a pool of highly educated and skilled labour (which 
is usually available where other similar firms are already located) and an established 
network of backward and forward productive and innovative linkages. Furthermore one 
should consider that firm spin-off phenomena are very frequent in high-tech sectors and 
that spin-off, by itself, is a powerful creator of clusters since new entrepreneurs seldom 
locate their firms far from previous employers (Keeble, 1988; Ciciotti, 1993). 
5.1. Z Localised sources of demand and(or supply 
Finn clustering also emerges as the result of a series of independent decisions taken by 
several firms aiming to locate their establishment in proximity to a particularly well 
endowed geographical site. The empirical literature on the issue underlines that, for 
high-tech firms, best location sites can be found within large metropolitan areas close, 
but not too close, to a great city, near a university and/or research centre, and endowed 
with efficient transport facilities. Pressure from management and R&D personnel can 
also influence the location of the firm towards sites with outstanding natural and cultural 
amenities. 
It is difficult to decide whether the location of a skilled labour pool may be classified 
under this heading because, in theory, labour is a mobile production factorlO and it is 
definitely easier to relocate a household than a plant. Thus, workers should concentrate 
where firms are located and not vice-versa. If on the contrary labour, and especially 
skilled labour, is almost immobile, its location becomes one of the main reasons for 
establishment location and, indeed, clustering. 
5.1.3. Search costs reduction, diffusion, and Informational cascades 
Finn clustering can further emerge because of the explicit decisions of individual firms 
to follow location decisions of other similar firms, without explicitly taking into account 
agglomeration economies. Localisation decisions and the regional development process 
can thus be explained mainly in terms of the economic mass already established in the 
10 However in the real world, labour mobility depends heavily on cultural tradition and national 
institutional frameworks. US labour force is in fact more mobile than UK one one (according to 
Eichengreen, 1993, the elasticity of interregional migration with respect to the ratio of local wages on the 
natioal average is 25 times higer in the US than in the UK) which, in turn, is definitely more mobile than 
French or Italian labour force. 
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region, measured through the number (or, alternatively, through employment or total 
sales) of already located firms. This "going with the stream" behaviour is not at all 
irrational, for it can be the external manifestation of three different phenomena: 
i) imperfect information and search costs: it is often difficult (and/or extremely costly) 
for outsider firms to observe relevant local variables (such as local factors costs, 
quality and productivity) needed to forecast future profit streams. The number of 
located firms (being the joint outcome of two different processes: the location 
decisions and the effective survival rate in the region) may then be used by outsider 
firms as the cheapest, easily available proxy for those "hidden" variables. 
Furthermore, the number of similar firms already located in the area signals the 
presence of a set of specialised inputs (mainly skilled workers) and the existence of 
a network of complementary service providers, which can be difficult to assess 
from outside the region; 
ii) uncertainty and information diffusion: location decisions in an uncertain 
environment involve the risk of choosing an unprofitable location. This risk is 
decreased by observing the behaviour of other firms and/or by establishing 
relationships with firms already located in the chosen area. Both actions (to observe 
and to communicate) are directly related to the likelihood of interactions between 
outsiders and insiders (i. e. potential and actual residents) which is, in turn, 
positively related to the number of potential entrants and the number of firms 
already located in the region 11; 
iii) informational cascades, herd behaviour, and imitation: when economic agents have 
limited and differentiated information sets, it may be rational to try to improve their 
decision-making process through the observation of other agents' actions (since 
actions speak louder than words, the information conveyed by actions can be more 
credible than verbal reports in any case). This process can easily lead to the 
formation of informational cascades causing imitative behaviour even in the 
absence of payoff interactions, conformity preference or sanctions against deviants 
(11irshleifer - Welch, 1994). This phenomenon might help in explaining why, when 
11 This situation is formally depicted in the epidemic diffusion model, where the frequency of interactions 
(which are assumed to follow a random process) is exactly equal to the product of the number of potential 
entrants and incumbents. 
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outsiders can see incumbents' actions more easily than their actual revenues, past 
entries can act as a rational incentive to enter even when personal source of 
information suggest either to wait or not to enter that particular region. 
5.1.4. Increase in market power 
Finns can also cluster because of competition. If consumers are evenly spread out over a 
territory, then firms, according to the corporate geography literature (de Smidt - Wever, 
1990), can cluster because of two different location strategies: predation and matching. 
In the first case entrants try to locate in a particular location - endowed with relevant 
location benefits12 - to drive out of business (or, at least in the medium run, out of the 
site) their incumbent competitors. Thus predation, which is a strategy aimed at reducing 
spatial concentration of firms in the medium term, produces clustering in the short term. 
By matching strategy we mean that often smaller firms do what larger firms (usually 
sectoral leaders, which are often first-movers too) have previously done. A matching 
strategy13 therefore refers to a leader(s) - follower(s) framework, in which followers 
react to leaders moves in order to eliminate (or reduce) the leader's emerging 
competitive advantage based on temporary locational monopoly (Folloni - Maggioni, 
1994). 
More generally one can also remember that - under certain hypotheses regarding the 
spatial structure of the market and transportation cost functions - clustering can be the 
simplest results of an Hotelling type oligopolistic location game (the so called minimum 
differentiation principle). 
5.2. How do firms cluster? 
Usually firms cluster by industries or by sets of interrelated industrial sectors and create 
what Isard calls an "industrial complex": "a set of activities (i. e. productive processes) 
occurring at a given location ( ... ) which are subject to important production, marketing, 
or other interrelations" (Isard - Schooler, 1959, p. 20). 
12 This behaviour could also be filed under the previous heading "localised source of demand and/or 
supply". 
13 Which sometimes is also labelled "catching-up" strategy when the normal industry-specific reaction 
time-lag is exceeded. 
173 
Most of the above mentioned reasons for clustering are in fact relevant only for firms 
belonging either to the same industry or to some technologically-related industries. In 
particular, localisation economies and localised sources of inputs imply a high degree of 
technological integration and productive disintegration and co-ordination. This process 
can occur in two distinct but interrelated ways: namely in an horizontal and in a vertical 
way. Horizontal links define the technological and productive links arising between 
different firms at the same level of the productive fiWre (these links are the ones 
ensuring the existence and availability of external economies of scope). Vertical links 
describe technological and productive links existing between different firms at different 
levels of the productive fiWre (these links are the ones ensuring a high degree of 
producer-user interactions, the existence and availability of economies of 
standardisation and the feasibility of just in time production systems and total quality 
control processes). 
Urbanisation/regionalisation economies, on the other hand, may help to explain why 
these industry-related clusters often happen to be located near urban centres and/or large 
metropolitan areas. 
The empirical literature on firm location contains a whole set of indicators and factors 
that have been identified - in different sectors, countries and years - as the most relevant 
location factors. The following list is the outcome of an extensive review of the 
literature composed of empirical tests, surveys results (obtained by direct interviews 
and/or mail questionnaires), econometric analysis, and statistical descriptive studies. 
Given that each survey ranks these factors in a different order, we decided to list them in 
the most neutral possible way: by alphabetical order. 
i) business climate 
ii) credit market 
a) efficiency 
b) presence of venture capital 
iii) governmental influence 
a) public contracts 
b) regulation 
c) taxes and subsidies 
iv) labour 
a) availability 
b) direct costs 
c) productivity 
d) skills 
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e) unionisation 
V) material inputs 
a) availability 
b) costs 
vi) quality of life 
a) cultural amenities 
b) level of educational institution 
c) natural amenities 
vii) site characteristics 
a) accessibility to information 
b) accessibility to labour 
C) accessibility to markets 
d) housing facilities 
e) geological and climatic features 
f) land price 
g) size of land parcel 
h) transportation infrastructures 
viii) spatial competition 
a) competitors location 
b) consumers location 
ix) technological infrastructures 
a) dimension of industrial R&D 
b) dimension of university R&D 
c) number of business service firms 
d) number of firms in related industry 
The above list, as complete as possible, gives an account of the many reasons which 
have been empirically found to determine the location decision of firms. However, 
being a mere list, it does not give many insights on single issues and on the relationships 
which exist between different issues. Furthermore, in the above list, location and 
agglomeration benefits are mixed and tangled. It is therefore worth looking in greater 
detail at some of these issues in order to assess their empirical relevance. 
5. Z 1. Relevance of innovative infrastructure 
Empirical estimates, based on US data, show that innovative firms actually locate in 
areas with strong "innovative vocation" or "well developed technological infrastructure" 
(Feldman - Florida, 1994; Feldman, 1995). These contributions - based on the analysis 
of 13 most innovative sectors (ranked according to the number of innovations produced) 
and using State level data - show that innovative performance is highly correlated with 
the presence of a sound "technological infrastructure", defined in terms of spatial 
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concentration of (i) firms in related industries, (ii) amount of R&D activity performed 
by local universities, (iii) local amount of industrial R&D activity, (iv) number of 
business service firms in the State. Furthermore, Jaffe (1989) and Acs - Audretsch - 
Feldman (1992 and 1994) note a positive productivity effect for firms associated with 
the proximity of industrial and academic R&D. This stream of literature14 aimed at the 
empirical testing of the R&D spatial spill-over hypothesis, gives a sound economic base 
to the phenomenon of agglomeration economies for high-tech firms. 
5.2.2. Relevance of urbanisationlagglomeration economies 
Chinitz (1961) contrasts two different metropolitan areas (namely New York and 
Pittsburgh, one industrially differentiated, the other specialised) to analyse how a local 
corporate structure might influence the local supply of i) entrepreneurs, ii) capital, iii) 
labour, iv) land and v) locally produced intermediate goods. He shows that the 
differentiated city performs better than a "company city". This result can be interpreted 
as an indirect proof that urbanisation/regionalisation economies can act more strongly 
than localisation. economies. A simflar point is made by Jacobs (1969) who compares 
the development of two UK cities (Manchester and Birmingham) in the nineteenth 
century15. 
Townroe - Robertson (1980), summarising the results of a plethora of empirical studies 
conducted on both sides of the Atlantic, conclude that: i) in a highly developed, 
urbanised and compact economy, local external economies have diminished relevance; 
ii) such economies remain however important for certain categories of firms and plants 
(but these sectors and categories remain ill-defined); iii) urbanisation/regionalisation 
economies are more important than industry-specific localisation economies. 
David (1984) and David - Rosenbloom (1990) show the relevance of externalities, 
arising from the density of labour force congregating at the site and from the size of the 
14 Which is often quoted, as empirical reference, in the endogenous growth literature. 
15 "At the time of all the intellectual excitement about Manchester, nobody was nominating Birmingham 
as the city of the future. But as it turned out Manchester was not the city of the future and Birmingham 
was. ( ... ) Was Manchester, then really efficient? It was indeed efficient and Birmingham was not. Manchester had acquired the efficiency of a company town. Birmingham had retained something 
different: a high rate of development worle' (Jacobs, 1969, pp. 88-89). 
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capital stock assembled thereupon, in determining the growth and fortunes of a 
metropolitan area. 
5. Z3. Relevance of institutional framework and national 
characteristics 
Geneau de Lamarli6re (1991) stresses the point that the same industry can cluster in two 
radically different ways according to the existence of different institutional frameworks. 
The case of the semiconductor industry in the US and Japan illustrates how very similar 
firms decided to privilege access to market (in the first country) versus proximity to 
production factors, and in particular skilled labour (in the latter) when making their 
location decisions. Furthermore the concept of "same industry" as defined by industrial 
statistics classifications may be at risk in international comparisons, due to the wide 
differences (in market structure, firms dimensions and strategies) existing between 
different countries. These observations must be therefore considered when making 
international comparison of development patterns of innovative firms clusters and their 
respective factors of agglomeration. 
5. Z4. Relevance of the availability of skilled labour 
Barkeley - McNamara (1994) show that for high-skilled labour intensive firms (a 
category in which most high-tech companies fall) the most valuable factors when fin-ns 
are taking location decisions are: "availability of skilled labour" and "quality of 
education". 
The importance of local availability of technical skills and labour for different 
innovative sectors - such as Aerospace (Bluestone et al., 1981) and Instruments (Oakey, 
1981a) - has been empirically tested in different countries. Castells (1985 and 1988), 
Scott (1988a and 1988b), and Twaites - Oakey (1985) stress the point that R&D workers 
are mobile, because of their relative scarcity, but their mobility is firstly restricted to a 
subset of geographic locations endowed with natural and cultural amenities, and 
secondly is limited by social inertia. Markusen et al. (1986) find that high-technology 
industries are associated with higher wages and higher level of unionisation. Oakey 
(1981b) underlines that the employment needs of most high-tech firms (which are 
generally small in size) tend to be incremental and long term. He further stresses that 
labour cannot be considered as a resource input to the production process in much the 
177 
same manner as capital, since, in these industries, labour plays a crucial role as a source 
of new firms formation and, indirectly, as a potent stimulator of innovation (Oakey, 
1994). 
5. Z5. Relevance of venture capital and financial institutions 
First developed in the States, in the late 60s and the early 70s, venture capital is the pre- 
eminent source of start-up funding for over 30% of the high-tech firms located in San 
Francisco Bay area (Oakey, 1984). A study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee 
of the US Congress (Premus, 1984)16, shows that this particular form of financing has 
developed strongly following the 1978 capital gains tax reduction and, more 
interestingly, that this development continued both during the severe 1981-82 recession 
and the economic recovery of the mid 80s. The geographical distribution of its sources 
and, above all, of its recipients is strongly biased in favour of four main States - 
California, New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts - which account for over 75% of 
the total venture capital deals in 1983 (OTA, 1984). Venture capital has taken a long 
time to be exported to Europe - where it developed mainly in the UK - but the matching 
of high-tech and venture capital firms still seems very difficult. A survey conducted on 
40 UK venture capital firms (Murray - Lott, 1995) shows that US venture capital firms 
invest nearly three times as much into technology based start-ups and early stage 
investments as their UK counterparts17. In Europe, technology based venture capital 
investments represented 17% of total investments in 1993, with a 20% percent decline 
relative to 198818. The opposite has happened to venture capital activity in the US, 
where approximately 80% of venture capital investments financed high-tech firms 
(Murray, 1996). 
16 Based on a mail questionnaire answered by more than 250 leading venture capital firms 
17 While UK venture capital firms focus on management buy-outs and buy-in and on other later stage 
refinancing activities. 
18 The difficulties encountered by small innovative firms in obtaining start-up and early stage funding 
have been acknowledged by the European Commission which, in 1988, has launched a pilot programme 
(the European Seed Capital Fund Scheme) (Murray, 1994). 
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5. Z6. Relevance of the quality of life 
Several authors stress the importance of the local level of "quality of life" for attracting 
skilled labour to a specific location. Quality of life largely represents urban commercial 
amenities (the potential for sophisticated leisure and consumption) and other correlates 
of city cultural and natural resources endownment. Ady (1986), reporting the results of a 
survey conducted on a sample of 3000 US research engineers, shows the importance of 
such factors as: housing costs and availability, climate, quality of primary and secondary 
schools, job opportunities for partner, community attitudes, cultural opportunities, taxes 
and municipal services. Begg - Cameron (1988) and Keeble - Kelly (1986) show that a 
high quality of life and the reputation that a place is "high-tech" can outweigh, 
according to the judgement of surveyed scientists and engineers, the need to locate near 
major universities. According to Storper - Scott (1989) this does not means that skilled 
worker preferences determine the location of high-tech firms, but rather than the 
common interest of mobile professionals19 and their employers are satisfied best in 
specific areas. 
5. Z 7. Relevance of the proximity of R&D plants to head quarters 
locations 
Lund (1986) and Malecki (1979), demonstrate that organisational reasons keep a 
majority of R&D laboratories and divisions near firm's headquarters. The same point is 
made by Browning (1980) and Molle et al. (1989), whose analyses show the similarity 
of the location factors stressed by firms for the two facilities (R&D departments and 
headquarters). Howells (1984) found that the marked clustering of UK pharmaceutical 
R&D plants appears to be largely attributable to the location of firms' headquarters (in 
the South-East area). If one assumes that large firms are early movers in the location 
process and that imitative behaviours prevail within small firmS20, then he/she can 
conclude that the location of high-tech industries may be heavily dependent on large 
firms headquarters prevailing sites. This pattern of location seems still to be prevailing 
19 Buswell (1983) points out the peculiar mobility of high-tech workers. Their relative scarcity gives them 
labour market mobility; however their locational preferences restrict their geographical mobility to a 
relatively small subset of places. 
20 As it is suggested by the empirical evidence of US high-tech clusters which shows, over a period of 50 
years, a general reduction in the average size of the located establishments. 
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(especially in Europe) despite the diffusion, since the early 80s, of the Japanese R&D 
model of "technical branch plants" where R&D is decentralised to actual production 
sites (Markusen et al., 1986). 
5. Z8. Relevance of site reputation, prestige and business climate 
The relevance of the above is rarely corroborated by robust empirical results. The most 
common sources of information are in fact sketchy and rather anecdotal chronicles of 
the formation and development of famous high-tech clusters (Silicon Valley, Route 128, 
Research Triangle Park) The analyses listed below are however more rigorous. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities constitute a strong location factor for R&D workers. The 
reputation of a site in promoting new firms formation and the number of local spin-off 
companies act as a strong incentive for highly skilled workers (Malecki, 1987; 
Macdonald, 1986; Oakey, 1984). The prestige of the area is a very important location 
factors in the case of "artificial" sites (as science parks). Monck et al. (1988) reported 
the results of an analysis based on a sample composed of 284 British high-tech firms, of 
which 183 were located in science parks. The main locational factor for this last group 
of firms was the "prestige and overall image of site and premises". In other studies, 
extensively surveyed in Malecki (1991, p. 213), the term "business climate" - defined as 
"a rough metric of a location's expected ability to maintain a productive environment 
over the foreseeable future" - acts as a sort of composite variable which summarises the 
length and complexity of some lists of location factors2l. Sometimes, under the heading 
of "business climate", one may also find references to the role played by tax rate 
differentials in determining the location of finns. On this very issues, public decision 
makers and businessmen on one side, economists on the other, have different and often 
contrasting, opinions (Moriarty, 1980). Empirical estimates on the issues give blurred 
results, which are heavily industry-dependent. Schmenner (1982) notes that low taxes 
may be somewhat more valued by high technology industries since they are less 
locationally constrained by other factors (e. g. access to markets and material inputs). 
21 It must be stressed that, at least in the US the concept of "business climate", despite its weak scientific 
basis, is deeply influencing both the location decisions of firms and the territorial marketing of local 
public government. Annual reports on "States business climates" produced by consultancy companies, 
have forced local government to promote specific industrial policies in order to improve the State ranking. 
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More recently, Papke (1991)22 shows that, in general, the effective tax rate is negatively 
correlated with new firm formation but that this correlation loses its significance the 
higher the technological level of the industry. 
5. Z9. Excellence and success do not necessarily bring success 
This final remark acts as a sort of caveat to the previous sections. Feldman (1994) 
illustrates - through the analysis of the relationship between Johns Hopkins University 
and the city of Baltimore - that a prominent research university, on its own, sometimes 
is not enough to create an environment in which high-tech firms can flourish. Further 
examples come from researchers studying the dynamics of particular high-tech clusters. 
Using the case history of Boston Route 128 minicomputer industry, Norton (1992) 
showed that past success can sometime lead to decline and failure. He stresses the point 
that clustering can be the vehicle of advantages during good times, but also the 
incubator of epidemics of failures and bankruptcy, because of the close links existing 
between the local industrial and financial sectors, during bad times. A similar issue is 
raised by Saxenian (1994) by contrasting the diverging experiences of Silicon Valley 
and Route 128. The success of the Californian experience and the crisis experienced by 
the Boston area in the late Eighties cannot be attributed to lack of scientific excellence 
(Stanford and MIT are both prominent Universities in the most high-tech related 
scientific fields). The first difference between the two clusters is technological in nature: 
Silicon Valley exhibits a much more diversified industrial structure than Route 128 
(which was, and partly is, still concentrated in computer manufacturing, especially 
minicomputers). The second reasons relates to the lack of managerial flexibility of firms 
in Route 128 and their relative inability to adapt to changed technological and market 
environments23. 
22 Estimating a panel data of 22 US States and five manufacturing industries, from 1975 to 1982 
23 In Saxenian (1994) the lack of flexibility shown by Route 128 is explained in terms of heavy 
dependence on defence contracts, strong power of professional associations (such as the Massachusetts 
High Technology Council), and prevailing old-fashioned hierarchical corporate culture. For a contrasting 
view, based on Route 128 initial comparative advantages, see Dorfman (1983). 
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5.3. How to study clustering? 
In the surveyed empirical literature there seem to be four main research techniques used 
to identify the relevant location factors for a given industry (or set of industries): direct 
surveys (through personal interviews or mailed questionnaires), descriptive statistical 
studies based on secondary data, econometric analysis, and simulations. This section is 
therefore devoted to the analysis and discussion of advantages and disadvantages of 
these methodological approaches. 
5.3.1. Advantages and drawbacks of direct surveys 
The advantages arising from the use of survey-based data are the following. Surveys are 
addressed to the person responsible for location decisions and allow researchers to 
acquire direct information, thus eliminating the need to make inferences from secondary 
data. Surve s also enable researchers to identify minor as well as ma or factors in yj 
location decisions. Surveys results are easy to interpret and report. However, surveys do 
suffer from a series of drawbacks. 
The first is the possible inaccuracy of responses. This may result because individuals 
may complete the survey in a cognitive dissonant fashion (listing factors believed to be 
locational. attributes but actually not important for the location decision); because firms 
responses may be sensitive to the design and structure of the survey instrument; because 
questionnaires may inadequately distinguish between various location factors or omit 
important factors in the provided list; because the respondent may be less than truthful 
in the hope of influencing public policy. 
The second drawback is related to the cost and the intrinsic features of surveys. Time, 
difficulty and expenses of the survey may in fact encourage the researcher to excessively 
limit the geographical and/or industrial scope of the study. The considered sample is 
generally censored since it is not possible (or, at least, not easy) to survey plants that 
have been closed or relocated. It is also difficult to determine both the 
representativeness of the sample and the transferability of findings to other regions or 
industries. 
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The third drawback arises from the possible inconsistency between the effective firms' 
location choices and the preferences they expressed, as it has been shown by Barkely - 
McNamara (1994). 
5.3. Z Advantages and drawbacks of statistical macro-level studies 
Statistical studies conducted at a macro level have an undoubted advantage: they are less 
expensive than surveys both in time and money. Usually such studies are based on 
already existing data sets which are often produced by national statistical offices24. 
However, these studies suffer from two main drawbacks: a methodological and an 
operational one. 
The first refers to the fact that this research technique focuses on actual firms (or 
establishments) location. Therefore there is no way to discover the process of locational 
decision (the considered factors, the set of alternative feasible locations etc. ). Data on 
firms location are then tabulated and confronted (or more simply juxtaposed) with other 
tables recording local endowment of various geographical benefits. Sometimes simple 
correlation coefficients are calculated, while very rarely other multivariate statistical 
analyses (such as principal components, and shift-share) are performed. 
The second drawback regards problems which may arise from the differences existing in 
industrial classifications used in different countries. Other problems may emerge when 
dealing with data on new firms formation. It is always difficult to discriminate between 
real "births" and simple legal re-denomination of the same finn, thus causing an 
overestimation of the turnover process. 
Finally these studies are intrinsically descriptive. The best they can give is a detailed 
mapping of the clustering phenomenon (which is surely worth looking at) without 
providing any direct explanatory element. 
5.3.3. Advantages and drawbacks of econometric analyses 
Econometric analyses are based on the construction of an explanatory model and on its 
empirical test over a sample of selected observations. From the data gathering 
24 However, as it has been widely illustrated in chapter 2, to collect and transform data of four different 
countries, in order to allow international comparison, can be a rather expensive activity both in terms of 
time and money. 
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perspective this approach shares the same advantages as the previous one. Further 
difficulties arise when trying to model the actual location process. Firstly there is the 
problem of how exactly to establish firms' decision time - i. e. the time lag between the 
collection of the relevant information on the site's features and the date of the firms 
(re)location - in order to be able to used the correct time-lag structure in the model. 
Secondly it is often the case that the independent variables (i. e. the locational factors) 
are highly correlated (thus implying multicollinearity of the observation and inefficiency 
and instability of the estimated parameters). Thirdly there are problems connected to the 
censored nature of the variables (usually only data relative to actual located firms are 
available). Fourthly it is extremely difficult to effectively test a dynamic and strategic 
formulation of the effect that agglomeration economies play on firms' locations. 
5.3.4. Advantages and drawbacks of simulations 
Numerical simulations are another way to look at locational dynamics. They are 
frequently used in order to evaluate complex non linear dynamics, through sensitivity 
analyses, when analytical solutions cannot be calculated. Simulation techniques can be 
also used for empirical purposes. In this case the model is fed with past real data and 
then different solutions (or scenarios) are computed depending on particular values of 
key parameters. The final results are then compared with real data. Drawbacks of the 
techniques - when used for empirical interpretation - are connected both with the 
intrinsic features of the model (i. e. heavy dependence on initial conditions, possibility to 
display chaotic behaviours etc. ) and with the descriptive nature of simulation techniques 
(which cannot directly investigate the causal relationships between variables but are 
limited to the analysis of the effects of parameters variation). 
5.4. Final remarks 
In this thesis we used two out of four above mentioned research techniques: statistical 
macro-level studies have been conducted in chapter 2 and econometric analyses will be 
performed in chapter 6. 
Aim of the following chapter is to exploit the original database which has been 
expressly collected for this thesis in order to get empirical answers to the following 
questions: 
i) What are the relevant location factors for attracting high-tech firms and 
employment in a given area? 
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ii) Are scale economies stronger or weaker than agglomeration economies in 
determining the industrial specialisation of a cluster? 
iii) Which is the role of inter-industry linkages, geographical spillovers, and locational 
shadowing in the process of industrial location? 
iv) Are there any relevant competitive and synergistic effects in the dynamics of 
industrial clustering? 
V) Which is the more convincing explanation for the growth of an innovative 
industrial cluster? Arrow-Romer's which stresses the role played by geographical 
specialisation and monopolistic power, Porter's which underlines the influence of 
geographical specialisation and fierce competition, or Jacob's which states that 
local industrial differentiation and competition are the engines of growth? 
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Chapter 6 
Empirical analyses of the location of high-tech firms 
and of cluster development 
Semiconductor manufacture began in Phoenix (Motorola), and 
Dallas (Texas Instruments), at about the same time as Shockley 
Laboratories and Fairchild Semiconductor were established in 
Santa Clara County in the late 1950s. Aircraft production began 
in Wichita (Cessna), Buffalo (Curtis), Seattle (Boeing), Los 
Angeles (Martin, Lockheed, Douglas), as well as in Baltimore 
and Bridgeport. Farm machinery started up in Stockton (Holt), 
San Leandro (Holt), and San Jos6 (FMC), California, as well as 
in the Midwest. Yet Santa Clara County, Los Angeles and 
Illinois become the overwhelming centers of attraction in 
semiconductors, aircraft and farm machinery, respectively. 
Only these places developed large complexes of firms 
producing intermediate inputs as well as final outputs. 
M. Storper - R. Walker (1989), The Capitalist Imperative. 
Territory, Technology and Industrial Growth. 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present a collection of empirical analyses which have been 
performed in order to verify a number of theoretical hypotheses, stylised facts and 
logical conjectures on the location process of high-tech firms and the development path 
of high-tech industrial clusters. Because of the multifaceted nature of the issue at study, 
different empirical exercises have been performed and are surnmarised in the concluding 
section of the chapter. 
The existing empirical literature has mainly focused its attention on the identification of 
a list of the most relevant locational factors, while relatively few contributes, which are 
quoted in this chapter, have analysed the dynamic of clusters' development and its 
relations with the individual firm's location decision. 
Not all models presented in chapter 4 could be directly estimated. In particular the 
diffusion-derived model of section 43 could not be estimated because of the lack of 
individual firm-level data. We decided therefore to organise the empirical analysis as 
follows: we first investigate (section 6.2) the role of geographical benefits as 
determinants of the industrial high-tech specialisation of an area, we then move (section 
6.3) to the analysis of scale versus agglomeration economies for explaining the 
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clustering of innovative activities, we further analyse (section 6.4) the effects of inter- 
industry and intcr-rcgional relations in the dynamic of innovative industrial cluster and, 
finally, we test (section 6.5) three alternative explanations for the growth of high-tech 
clusters. 
Several reference to the theoretical literature, surveyed in chapter 3, are explicitly 
quoted in the appropriate sections of this chapter; however it is perhaps worth stressing 
that section 6.2 displays an empirical analysis in the tradition of classical location theory 
(and in particular of the least coast approach). Section 6.3 may be considered as an 
empirical test of both Krugman's and Arthur's approach to industrial location. Section 
6.4 builds an encompassing empirical framework able to test some hypotheses put 
forward by the industrial geography approach, the informational cascades approach and, 
obviously, by the ecological approach. Section 6.5 is explicitly devoted to discriminate 
between three alternative explanations: the first which may be ascribed to Krugman, the 
second to Porter and the third to Jacobs. 
6.2. The role of geographical benefits 
Even though throughout the thesis locational benefits have been assumed to be 
composed of two parts - geographical benefits, which derive from the intrinsic quality of 
the site in terms of inputs and infrastructures endowment and costs, and agglomeration 
benefits, which derive from the location of other firms in the same site - in most of the 
modelling framework and in the discussion of policy implications, our emphasis is 
always on the firm dependent part of locational benefits. 
However, many empirical contributions, reviewed in section 5.2, and the practice of 
day-by-day industrial policy, are focused mainly, if not entirely, on the role played by 
geographic benefits in influencing firms location decision to accomplish a desired social 
and economic target (in terms of income, employment, or growth rate of the local 
economic system). 
For this reason we decided to estimate a small number of empirical models which try to 
assess the relative relevance of different "location factors" in detennining the location of 
high-tech firms and, indirectly, the development of local industrial clusters. 
These models generally suffer from a very poor theoretical background. On the one 
hand, many dependent variables which are used in the regression equations may well be 
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influenced by firms' entry dynamics, thus introducing a problem of endogeneity; on the 
other hand, such empirical specifications do not take into account the interaction which 
may exist between the contemporary development of different regions and industries, 
thus introducing a problem of mi specification. 
Nevertheless we used part of our original data-set presented in chapter 2 and 
supplemented it with other statistical sources in order to relate the location decision of 
high-tech firms to "objective characteristics" of US States through cross-section and 
panel data estimations. 
The variables used in the analysis are the following: 
Dependent variables 
EMPOPst = level of employment in high-tech sectors in State s at time t 
ESTAPOPst = number of high-tech establishments in State s at time t 
GEMPOP, = growth rate of employment in high-tech sectors in State s (1986-1993) 
GESTAPOP, = growth rate of high-tech establishments in State s (1986-1993) 
RELEMPst = proportion of high-tech employment on total manufacturing employment 
in State s at time t 
RELESTA, st = proportion of high-tech establishments on total number of manufacturing 
establishment in State s at time t 
Independent variablesl 
APAY, t = individual worker's average annual pay in State s at time t 
UNIONst = unionisation rate of the labour force in State s at time t 
UNEMP, t = unemployment rate in State s at time t 
NIALEPTst = male participation rate to labour market in State s at time t 
1 We collected data on other variables (on female participation in the labour market, number of colleges, 
university R&D). However, in order to avoid multicollinearity problems, we selected a sub-sample of 
variables which were more significantly related to the dependent variables. All variables have been used 
in two different ways: for the cross-section analyses they have been normalised with the population level; 
while for the panel-data estimations the have been used in absolute levels. For this reason in panel data 
analyses, population is used as a regressor. 
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ECOLst = enrolment rate in college in State s at time t 
TRDst = total amount of R&D expenditure in State s at time t 
PATst = number of issued patent in State s at time t 
HWst = miles of highway in State s at time t 
FAILst = business failure rate in State s at time t 
INCOst = average per capita income in State s at time t 
EXPOst :: export rate on total sales in State s at time t 
METROst = rate of population living in metropolitan areas in State s at time t 
TAXst = corporate income tax marginal rate in State s at time t 
POPst = level of resident population in State s at time t 
6. Z 1. Estimating the role of geographical benefits in determining 
location decisions 
The first model which has been estimated reflects the simplest possible explanation for a 
location process determined by geographical factors. For each time period (1986 and 
1993) we run a separate regression. 
XPOP, =a+ bAPAY, + cUNION, + dUNEMP + eMALEPT, + JECOL, + 9TRDS + 
+ hPAT, + WWAY, + IFAIL, + mINCO, + nEXPO, + oMETRO + pTAX, + 
where s stand for the State, XPOP, = ESTAPOPin models 1 and 3 and XPOP, = 
EMPOP, in model 2 and 4; and es is a white noise error term, assumed well behaved. 
The estimated results presented in table 6.1, which are relatively stable for 1986 and 
1993, underline the fact that few locational factors are actually relevant for the location 
of high-tech firins2. 
2 All usual diagnostic tests have been performed on these rather unstructured and simple regressions, 
enabling us to reject any significant deviation from the classical model. The use of population as a 
weighting criterion allows us to eliminate the heteroskedasticity problem which may be generated by the 
size difference between US States. 
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Table 6.1. Geographical factors explaining the location decision of US high-tech 
firms (cross-section analyses for 1986 and 1993) 
model 1 2 3 4 
year 1986 1986 1993 1993 
dependent 
variable 
estapop empop estapop empop 
constant -0.130 1 14.625 -2.930 -6.149 
t-ratio -0.08 0.48 -1.46 -0.23 
APAY -0.006 -0.080 -0.008** -0.038 
t-ratio -1.18 -0.76 -1.77 -0.68 
UNION -0.009* -0.113 -0.016 -0.093 
kabo -1.89 -1.16 -1.34 -0.61 
UNEMP 0.002 1 -1.116 0.120 -0.732 
t-rabo 0.04 -1.31 1.98 -0.92 
MALEPT -0.009 -0.095 0.022 0.135 
kado -0.34 -0.23 0.81 0.39 
ECOL 10.190 115.398 10.425** -23.251 
kadd 1.57 0.90 1.67 -0.29 
TRID -0.090 0.204 -0.194 -1.060 
t-ratid -0.59 0.06 -1.20 -0.50 
PAT 2.0865* 31.642* 2.2445* 21.2408* 
kabd 3.39 2.59 4.02 2.91 
HWAY -0.036 -0.222 -0.049 0.695 
kado -1.481 -0.46 -0.98 1.06 
FAIL -0.0421 6.894 0.322 32.804 
t-rabo -0.14 1.15 1.49 11.64 
[NCO -0.010** -0.003 -0.011 -0.003 
t-ratio . 1.67 -0.02 -2.35 -0.05 
EXPO 0.015 0.64298* 0.002 0.29482* 
t-radd 1.18 2.58 ai5 209 
TAX 0.006 0.139 -0.009 -0.074 
t-ratio a35 0.42 -a48 -0.31 
METRO 0.006** 0.069 0.005 0.008 
t-ratio 1.83 1.10 1.44 0.16 
Adj. R sq. 0.61 0.45 0.50 0.79 
n. of obs. 1 511 511 511 
*= 5%, ** = 10% Lo. s. 
In particular, when clustering is measured through the number of establishments, the 
patent variable display a positive and significant coefficient at the 5% I. O. s. 3 and the per- 
capita income display a negative and significant coefficient; while, when the measured 
variable is the level of employment, patents play the same role and exports, with a 
positive and significant coefficient, take the place of per-capita income4. While the 
3 For the regression on the 1986 data, the unionisation rate displays a significant and negative coefficient 
showing that high-tech firms, when choosing their location, look for easier industrial relations 
environments. The rate of metropolitan population displays a positive and significant (at 10% Lo. s. ) 
coefficient too, signalling an influence of urbanisation economies. 
4 For the regression on 1993 data, the failure rate displays a significant and positive coefficient, showing 
that dynamic areas where firms turnover rate is higher than average, may encourage firms entry (possibly 
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positive correlation with the patent variable has an intuitive explanation - high-tech 
firms want to locate in highly innovative areas (as measured by the number of per-capita 
patents) - the negative correlation with the income variable seems rather odd. However, 
if one think that innovative firms may well look for green-field location far from 
established production centres (which are still based on traditional industries) and far 
from metropolitan congestion, then the sign of the correlation may easily be explained. 
We tried also to add some temporal dimension to these simple regressions, by using, as 
dependent variables, firstly the growth rate of ESTAPOPj and EMPOPt (GESTAPOPt 
and GEMPOPst); secondly, by regressing the 1993 values of the dependent variables on 
the 1986 values of the dependent ones. However these two empirical estimates do not 
give any valuable results. We decide, therefore, to exploit both the cross-sectoral and the 
time-series dimension of this data-set and we estimated the following panel data 
regression equation. 
RELY,, =a+ bAPAY,, +c VNION,, + dUNEMP,, + eMALEPT,, + fECOLt + (6.2) 
+ gTRD,, + hPAT,, t + iHWAY,, + IFAIL,, + mINCO,, + nEXPO.,, + pTAX, t + E.,, 
where, following the notation used above, s stands for the State, RELX,, = RELESTAt 
in models Ir and If, and RELX,, = RELEMP,, in model 2r and 2f, and Et is a white 
noise error term, assumed well behaved. 
We estimated two different regressions, the first where the industrial specialisation of 
the State is measured in term of establishments and the second where it is measured in 
term of employment. Doth equations have been estimated by considering individual 
effects to be either random or fixed. Table 6.2 shows the results: 
it is seen as a signal of low exit costs). At 10% Lo. s. the worker's average annual pay displays a significant 
negative coefficient; while the enrolment in college display a significant and positive coefficient. 
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Table 6.2. Geographical factors and the location of US high-tech firms (panel data 
estimation) 
models 1r if 2r 2f 
random eff ects fixed effects random eff ects fixed effects 
dependent 
variables 
RELESTA RELESTA RELEMP RELEMP 
independent 
variables 
coeff icients z coefficients t coefficients z coefficients t 
APAY -1.865 -0.443 -11.256** -1.895 -48.864 -0.691 -78.8 -0.415 
UNION 10.435 1.164 18.488 1.194 -267.731 -1.439 9.722 0.032 
UNEMEP 0.0664 
. 
0.002 65.483 1.548 -4161.789* -4672 -3294.324* -2.435 
MALEPT 15.976 0.455 -23.269 -0.667 -114.071 -0.175 680.644 0.61 
ECOL 6.625* 2.037 8.901 * 2.009 26.734 0.587 120.3 0.849 
TRD -0.000805 -0.01 
1 0.0399 0.465 -0253 -0.188 0.405 0.1471 
PAT 0.796* 2.206 0.132 0.336 13.126* 2.095 5.53 0.441 
INCO -0.00138* -3.595 -0.000552 -0.991 -0.0158* -2.125 -0.0104 -0.586 
METRO 0.00528** 1.649 -0.00338 -0.649 -0.00602 
. 
-0.145 -0.0203 -0.122 
EXPO -4.959 -0.245 2.43 0.108 991.524*1 3.053 577.069 0.805 
TAX -24.135 -0.616 -103.637* -2.261 646.7611 1.075 128.242 0.087 
HWAY 1.845 0.072 -20.799 -0.688 74.402 0.151 -28.799 -0.03 
FAIL -116.188 -0.512 -. 175.249 -0.87, 57202.8 
A 
10.289 54149.08* 8.405 
D93 681.922 2.288 1173.46* 3.203 -10857.77* -2.014 -5218.995 -0.445 
POP -0.701 * -2.40 -0.208 -0.35 -0-086 -6.928 -0.365 
constant 1828.086 0.668 6693.506* 2.336 42974.73 0.839 1774.83 0.019 
Adj. R sq. 0.37 0.37 0.601 0.22 
F test 6.59 F(15,36) 5.86 F(15,36) 
Hausman test 1 15.77 Chi2(15) 14.92 Chi2(15) 
Breusch- 
Pagan test 24.91 Ch12 (1) 18.16 CN2(1) I 
number of observations: 102 
*= 5%, ** = 10% Lo. s. 
The F tests show that individual effects are relevant, Hausman specification tests 
indicate that these individual effects should be model as fixed rather than random. As 
far as the industrial specialisation of States measured in term of high-tech 
establishments is concerned, when individual effects are treated as random, college 
enrolment, number of patents (and the dummy variable for. 1993, D93) show significant 
and positive coefficients, while population and per-capita income have significant but 
negative coefficients confirming that the presence of an educated labour force and 
innovative structures are important location factors for high-tech firms. When individual 
effects are treated as fixed, population becomes insignificant (since this source of inter- 
state variance is captured by the model's specification), the quality of the local labour 
force stays significant and positive and the tax coefficient appears to be significant with 
a negative coefficient. The worker's average annual pay records a negative coefficient 
(which is significant at the 10% Lo. s. ) 
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When high-tech employment is the dependent variable for detecting State industrial 
specialisation (using random effects), the number of issued patents, the export rate and 
business failure rate show significant and positive coefficients, while the unemployment 
rate has a negative coefficient. The use of a fixed effects specification results in only 
two significant coefficients (business failure and unemployment rate). These results 
indicate that an innovative, dynamic and internationally competitive environment is the 
best location for high-tech industries, while declining industrial areas are the worst. 
6.3. Clustering of firms or workers? Scale vs. 
agglomeration economies 
Recent papers (e. g. BrUlhart - Thorstensson, 1996; Davis - Weinstein, 1996; Dumais et 
al., 1997; Kim, 1997; Ellison - Glaeser, 1997; Rombaldoni - Zazzaro, 1997; Greenaway 
- Torstensson, 1998) have thoroughly discussed the phenomenon of firms location and 
regional specialisation both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. 
Classical location theory considers the firm's location decision as a spatial optimisation 
problem where the spatial distribution of inputs is considered as given and the only 
strategic element refers to the behaviour of the other firms. Recent theoretical 
contributions have instead shown that firms' locations and, consequently, regional 
specialisation patterns are caused by the interplay of the location decisions of firms and 
workers. In other words if classical location theory can be summarised in the claim 
"geography matters" - in the sense that the exogenous spatial distribution of inputs (and, 
sometimes, consumers) crucially determines fin-ns' location decisions -; more recent 
approaches seem to state that "history, and expectations", matter most. 
If this is the case, then the explanation of firms location decision could be found, 
without referring to exogenously determined locational. factors, within the actual firms 
locational. patterns. Krugman (1991a and 1991b) - referring explicitly to Marshall 
(1920) - stresses the role of economies of scale (which are internal to the individual 
firm) as the main centripetal force determining firms'5 location; while other authors 
(Scott, 1986; Arthur, 1990; Becattini, 1998; Storper -Walker, 1984) - quoting almost the 
5 The other centrifugal forces in his models are transport costs and the share of immobile agricultural 
workers. 
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same passages from Marshall (1920) - identify agglomeration economies (which are 
external to the individual firm) as the key determinants of industrial clustering. 
The contrast is extended also to the interactions between scale and agglomeration 
economies. According to Krugman, economies of scale are a pre-condition to the 
existence of agglomeration economies6 (thus these two factors coexist and, in general, 
they are mutually re-enforcing). On the contrary, according to Scott (1986) the very 
trade-off which exists between agglomeration and scale economies can explain why, in 
certain industrial sectors and in certain areas, large firms prevail; while in other 
industries and/or locations, small interdependent firms seem to be the general rule7. 
Thus the recent empirical literature (Henderson, 1994; Kim, 1995 and 1997; Hanson, 
1996; Brijlhart - Thorstensson, 1996; Ellison - Glaeser, 1997, Geroski et al., 1998 von 
Hagen - Hammond, 1998) has mainly tested the relative importance (among other 
factors8) of scale and agglomeration economies in determining the existence of 
increasing returns to locations and, indirectly, the emergence of industrial clusters. 
Some of these issues have been already raised in the second chapter of the thesis where 
it has been extensively shown that the use of different variables (number of firms versus 
employment) for measuring local industrial specialisation produces different results. It is 
however interesting to analyse in greater detail the role played by internal and external 
economies in determining the geographical distribution of high-tech industries. 
6.3.1. A rough indicator 
A first technique implies the use of a rough indicator of the relevance of agglomeration 
versus scale economies which, for each sector, is calculated as the difference between 
the value of the concentration or inequality indexes referring to establishments and those 
referring to employment. When the difference is positive (i. e. the sector is more spatially 
concentrated in terms of establishment) we may say that agglomeration economies are 
6 "If each firm could produce in both locations ( ... ), then the full portfolio of firms and workers could be 
replicated in each location and the motivation for localisation would be gone" (Krugman, 1991a, p. 40- 
41). 
7 "Vertical disintegration encourages agglomeration and agglomeration encourages vertical 
disintegration" (Scott, 1986, p. 224). 
8 Kim (1997), for example, stresses the relevance of the location of raw materials and natural advantages 
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prevailing; when the difference is negative (i. e. the sectors displays a higher 
concentration index on employment than on establishments) scale economies may well 
be the stronger engine of clustering dynamics. This procedure can be implemented for 
each inequality and concentration index. We have therefore built a general index for 
each industry, as shown in tables 6.3 and 6.4, adding up the values of all indexes. 
Table 6.3. Agglomeration versus scale economies at FLA level 
Industries USA UK FRA ITA 
170 -1.39 -0.67 0.21 
244 -0.70 -0.06 -0.77 -1.25 
300 -0.19 -0.12 -0.86 -2.72 
321 0.00 0.03 -1.29 -0.40 
331 -0.20 0.02 - -0.65 
332 -0.22 -0.03 - -1.03 
333 -0.44 0.01 - -0.21 
334 -2.33 -0.09 - -1.62 
330 - - -0.67 - 
340 -1.36 - -0.78 -2.77 
353 -0.82 -0.08 _ -0.73 -1.79 
total h-t -0.07 0.02, 0.09, -1.81 
D1 0.15 0.001 -0.951 -0.401 
Table 6.4. Agglomeration versus scale economies at SLA level 
Industries USA UK FRA ITA 
170 -1.53 -0.01 -0.01 
244 -0.63 0.01 --- -0.07 -0.10 
300 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.32 
321 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.02 
331 0.05 0.05 - -0.11 
332 0.03 -0.02 - -o. 
Tg 
333 0.09 0.36 - 0.25 
334 -1.47 0.04 - -0.16 
330 0.05 - 
340 -1.57 - 0.04 -0.14 
353 -0.70 0.12 -0.03 -0.08 
total h-t 
1 
0.03, 0.02, -0.03, -0.13 
D -0.121 0.081 0.061 -0.06 
According to these tables, agglomeration economies seem to play a major role at SLA 
than at FLA level. However some industry-specific features can be summarised as 
follows. Agglomeration economies play a major role in the Electronic components 
industry (321), and in the Instruments sector (330) (with specific reference to Medical 
and surgical instruments (331), and to Industrial process control instruments (333)); 
while scale economies are prevailing in the Textiles industry (170) (the only notable 
exception being Italy, at the FLA level because of the relevance of "industrial districts"), 
Motor vehicles (340) (here is France at the SLA level which display a surprising result), 
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and Optical and photographic equipment (334). When the high-tech sectors are 
considered as one single industry the results are somehow blurred and seem to be more 
influenced by national and institutional factors. These tables in fact show some 
interesting country-specific differences. In particular it seems that, while in some 
countries (such as the US and the UK9), a prominent role in high-tech sectors is played 
by small firms, in other countries (such as France and Italy), high-tech sectors are still 
characterised by large size, sometimes publicly owned, firms. The relevance of these 
results must however not be overstated, since inter-countries differences may have been 
exacerbated by the rough aggregation of different inequality and concentration indexes. 
It is therefore useful to follow the works of Kim (1995 and 1997) and Rombaldoni - 
Zazzaro (1997), integrating and modifying the approach used by these authors, in order 
to take into account three other phenomena which play a crucial role in shaping the 
development of high-tech clusters: the existence of non linearities (i. e. the existence of 
diseconomies), the presence of inter-industry linkages, and the role of geographical 
spillovers and locational shadowing. 
6.3. Z A model 
The aim of this empirical exercise is to test the relative importance of scale versus 
agglomeration economies in detennining industrial clusters. What we want to test is a 
general relation which explains the spatial concentration of an industry i in region r in 
terms of scale, agglomeration and other relevant variables. Fonnally 
spatial concentrationi, =f 
(scaleir 
9 aggl'ir I otheri, 
) (6.3) 
In principle, there are no a-priori reasons for choosing one particular functional form for 
the regression equation. However if one refers back to section 6.3, where the issue of 
whether these two forces are complementary or substitutes is discussed, it becomes clear 
that, by choosing a simple additive functional form, we implicitly assume that 
agglomeration and scale economies are substitutes. On the other hand, by choosing a 
multiplicative functional form, we implicitly assume that they are complementary. Even 
9 Even if it must be recalled that, because of confidentiality reasons (as explained in section 2.3.2) 
employment data for UK were almost unavailable. Therefore the index for UK has been constructed only 
on the basis of the spatial concentration ratio which, in general, seems to overestimate the effects of 
agglomeration economies. 
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though we had an a-priori weak preference for the complementarity version of the story, 
we let the data speak for themselves and we ended up choosing a multiplicative 
functional formIO which gave better results on the Ramsey RESET test for functional 
mi specification. 
We enlarged the original model of Rambaldoni and Zazzaro in order to include other 
relevant forces which can explain the emergence of industrial clustering, namely: 
geographical and industrial spillovers. In particular we modelled geographical spillovers 
as the effects caused by the industrial specialisation of a larger area (i. e. a SLA for a 
FLA), and industrial spillovers as the effects caused by the specialisation of the area in 
other high-tech sectors. We also tried to take into account the role played by non 
linearities in agglomeration and scale economies, to explain why firms and cluster do 
not grow infinitely. 
The variables which have been used (with few algebraic transformations) in the 
regressions are the following: 
Dependent variable: 
LQMiF --: index of industrial specialisation, calculated as the employment location 
quotientl I for industry i in FLA F). The employment location quotient has been chosen 
between various candidates, as the index for industrial specialisation, because it takes 
into account the size differences which exist among different establishments, different 
FLAs and the relative industrial structure of different countries. 
Independent variables: 
SCjF = index of economies of scale (calculated as the ratio between the employment and 
the number of establishments in industry i and in FLA F). The chosen variable is 
therefore the industry and region specific average size of establishment. 
AGjF = index of economies of agglomeration (calculated as the ratio between the 
number of establishments in industry i and in RA F and the number of manufacturing 
establishment in the country). The chosen variable weights the number of industry- and 
10 Which can be linearly estimated through a simple double-log transformation. 
As defined in expression (2.4) (see section 2.2.2). 
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region-specific establishments with the number of manufacturing establishment in a 
given country. 
RLQMjs = index of geographical spillovers (calculated as the employment location 
quotient for industry i in the higher geographical level SLA S, with the exclusion of the 
FLA under analysis). The chosen variable, in principle, would allow one to identify both 
positive and negative effects (locational shadowing) which derive from the industrial 
specialisation of the surrounding areas12. 
LQMHTiF'--- inter-industry-linkages (calculated as the employment location quotient for 
the other high-tech sectors - i. e. excluding industry i- in FLA F). This variable measures 
the extent of inter-industry spillovers which are assumed to be more relevant within the 
group of high-tech industries. 
For each industry i, the estimated model is therefore multiplicative and becomes 
additive in the double logarithmic specification: 
LLQMIF =a+ bLSCiF+ cLAGjF + dLRLQMis + eLLQMHTiF+ 14 (6.4) 
where all variables are in logs and 17,, is a white noise error term, assumed well 
behaved. 
We further tested for the existence of non linearities (i. e. of scale and agglomeration 
diseconomies after a certain threshold) by introducing two further variables, these being 
the square of the scale and of the agglomeration indexes. The best results were obtained 
in the linear additive specifications, where almost all squared coefficients had the 
expected negative sign and were significantly different from zero. However these 
specifications had to be rejected on the base of failed tests for mispecification based on 
the normality of residuals13. 
12 A better indicator for such a phenomenon would have been the relative specialisation of the bordering 
geographical FLAs. However the use of SLA is justified in terms of computational convenience and in 
terms of the hierarchical decision methods used by managers when taking location decisions (as reported 
by Premus, 1982). 
13 For these regressions no results will therefore be reported. 
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6.3.3. The data 
In order to estimate the relative importance of scale versus agglomeration economies we 
used part of the original dataset illustrated in the second chapter to estimate six 
industries specific cross-section versions of equation 6.2. based on first level areas 
(FLA) for 4 countries. 
For reasons of international comparison we restricted our analysis to 5 sectors: 244 
(Pharmaceutical), 300 (Computers and office equipment), 321 (Electronic components), 
330 (Instruments), 353 (Aerospace), plus a macro-sector HT (total high-tech) which is 
the sum of all previously quoted ones. 
The chosen functional form requires all variables to be strictly positive. We thus faced 
the alternatives of either dropping the observations where variables were equal to zero 
(introducing a sample bias) or substituting the zeros in the data-set with a small value 
marking these observations with dependent dummy variables. Although the second 
alternative seems neater we chose to drop the zero-variables observations because of the 
very nature of the variables. Each time the LQMiF is equal to zero, SCiF and AGiF are 
also equal to zero, because when in a RA there are no establishments in a certain 
industry, there are no employees too. 
Because of the nature of the data14, and the chosen variables and functional form, we 
were thus unable to use all 306 observations available at the RA level in our datasct. 
Each industry specific cross-section regression has therefore been estimated on a 
specific subset whose size spanned from a maximum of 255 (for the total high-tech 
sector) to a minimum of 162 (for the Aerospace industry) observations. 
6.3.4. The results 
Table 6.5 summarises the result of six industry-specific regressions. In general scale 
economies seem to prevail over agglomeration economics (the scale parameters are 
14 For a great majority of the UK counties data on sectoral employment have been withheld by the ONS 
for confidentiality reasons (see chapter 2 for details). 
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about 5 time largerl5), the exception being sectors 330 and the HT (where 
agglomeration parameters are, respectively, 3 and 1.5 times larger)16. 
Table 6.5. Scale versus agglomeration economies in the location of high-tech firms 
244 300# 321# 330 353 HT 
Pharmaceut. om uters ETronics Instniments Aerospace high-tech 
constant -3.86 -4.37 -2.43 -0.45 . 4.18 -0.76 
t-ratio -163.9.00 -25.57 -11.83 -3.81 -11.50 -6.14 
LSCiF 0.95 0.82 0.51 0.11 0.81 
t-ra tio 22.12 17.94 10.88 3.63 14.56 5.21 
LAGiF 0.20 0.13 0.03 0.34 0.17 0.27 
t-ratio 5.06 4.01 1.07 9.54 3.17 7.41 
LLOMHTiF 0.30 0.49 0.56 0.35 0.53 - 
t-ratio 5.21 6.03 8.77 5.83 5.16 - 
LRLOMiS 0.21 0.17 0.36 -0-10 0.16 0.56 
t-ratio 3.95 3.43 5.20 -2.11 1.89 7.76 
. 
FRI s 0.851 0.79 . 0.73. 0.581 0.771 . 
0.52 E 
n if . of 
Ebs. 
2141 204 1 2391 2471 1621 2551 
# indicates that regression parameters have been estimated using White's corrected version of the 
variance-covariance matrix of parameters; - signals that industrial spillovers could not be calculated for 
total high-tech. All coefficients of regressions are significant at the 5% Lo. s. (except LRQMif for 
Aerospace (353) which is significant only at 10% Lo. s. ). 
R2 for the specific sectors are always very high (spanning from 0.73 to 0.85) while for 
sectors 330 and HT the values arc lower (between 0.52 and 0.58) although still 
significantly high for cross-section analyses. All regression equations have been tested 
for functional form mispecification (Ramsey RESET test), non normality of residuals 
(skewness and kurtosis of residuals), heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan test), and 
multicollinearity (correlation ratios between dependent variables and auxiliary 
regressions) and no deviation from the classical model could be detected, apart from a 
slight heteroskedasticity for industries 300 and 321 which has been corrected by using 
White's procedure. 
It is interesting to note that scale economies seem to perform a larger role in 
Pharmaceuticals (this is consistent with the structure of the industry where larger plants 
prevail), while agglomeration economies largely contribute to the geographical 
concentration of the Instrument industry (where customised production and tailor made 
15 In the Electronic components industry, the agglomeration economies parameters is not significantly 
different from zero, therefore this ratio cannot be calculated. 
16 The results for HT are heavily influenced by the Instruments industry. This is due to the fact that this 
industry, which is characterised by a low average firm size, records the largest proportion of the total 
number of firms in high technology industries (64% of the total data-set). 
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products are the rule)17. In absolute terms, scale economies are very relevant also for 
Computers and office machinery and Aerospace. In relative terms, for the Electronic 
components industry, while scale economies effects are not as important as in other 
high-tech sectors, agglomeration economies play an absolutely insignificant role in 
determining the industrial specialisation of the area. However when the complex of all 
high-tech sectors is being considered, then the agglomeration economies seem, on 
average, to be more important than scale economies. 
By using a double log specification, regression parameters can be interpreted as 
elasticities. In the Pharmaceutical industry, therefore, a 1% increase of the average 
establishment size causes an 0.95% increase in the industry location quotient, while the 
same amount of increase in the relative number of establishments raise the industry's 
location quotient by a mere 0.2%. It is also worth noting that none of the parameters is 
higher than the unity. 
A further remark concerns the relevance of inter-industry linkages. All regression 
equations record a positive coefficient for this variable even if this phenomenon appears 
to be stronger in the Electronic components and in the Aerospace industries, which are 
benefiting more from the closeness to other high-tech sectors. One can explain this 
result in term of strong forward linkages for Electronic components (whose products are 
inputs in several high-tech industries) and of backward linkages for Aerospace (which 
uses, as inputs, several products of other high-tech sectors). 
The final test concerns the presence of spatial positive spillovers or the emergence of 
locational shadowing. For all but one sector LRLQMIS displays a positive and significant 
coefficient signalling that a positive relation exists between the FLA specialisation in an 
industry and the specialisation of the corresponding SLA. Instruments industry displays 
the existence of locational shadowing phenomena, while and Aerospace records such a 
low (even though positive) value of the geographical spillovcrs coefficients and of the 
relative t-ratio, that one would infer the insignificance of any role played by 
geographical spillovers, both in positive and negative terms. 
17 One must also consider that Instruments industry (especially in Italy and France) includes many 
different sub-sectors whose technological level (in certain countries) is not very high. 
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6.4. The growth of an isolated cluster 
If the set of potential entrants for one specific cluster were independent and separated 
(had no overlap) from the sets of potential entrants relative to other clusters, then the 
easiest estimation procedure for analysing the development path of a cluster would 
imply the estimation of equation (4.5a) which, for convenience, we report here as (6.5) 
dnq (t) 
q"q 
n (t) 
dt 
ýq 
(6.5) 
however, such formulation obliges one to determine an exogenous value for the 
maximum dimension of the cluster ( Kq ) 
An alternative formulation of 4.7b, which has been used in section 4.2.4 for dealing with 
bi-regional interactions, allows one to overcome such limitations. In this way it is 
possible to express the rate of variation of the cluster industrial mass as a function of the 
number of incumbents without any exogenously determined parameter. 
dn, (t) 
- uf&q(t)+b(nq 
(t))2 
dt 
(6.6) 
a Referring to equation (6.5), a= rq , the incipient rate of growth and b= 
Kq the 
maximum dimension of the cluster, 
One could then estimate an empirical version of equation (6.6) as follows 
dn, (t) 
= an, (t)+b(n,, 
(t))2 
+ eq (t) dt 
(6.7) 
where eq W is a white noise error term, assumed well behaved, to obtain the estimated 
coefficients for Kq and r. . 
Once these estimated coefficients have been obtained, one would use them in a 
regression where the incipient rate of growth and the maximum dimension of the 
population are functions of a series of locational factors. 
In particular, by using the variables' description of section 6.2, one would estimate the 
following regression equations for each industrial cluster q (i. e. for the industry i in 
State s) 
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Ki, =a+ bPOPi., + cLAND,, + dUNEMPi, + eMALEPT,, + fMANUFj, + gTRDj, + (6.8) 
+ hPAT,, + iHWAYu + IECOLj, + mINCO,, + nEXPOi, + pTAXi, + ej, 
where the variables used as regressors in (6.8) measure the endowment of input and 
infrastructures, which are crucial to the development of high-tech businesses and Ej, is a 
white noise error term, assumed well behaved. 
r,, =a +b- 
HT 
+ cMETRO,, + dUNIONi, + eECOL,, + JFAILI, + MANUF,, (6.9) 
+ gTRDj, + nEXPO,, + pTAX,, + Ej, 
where the variables used as regressors in (6.9) measure the ability to attract outsiders 
and generate new high-tech firms and Ej, is a white noise error term, assumed well 
behaved. 
However, since we believe that the development of a high-tech cluster is heavily 
dependent on the external conditions (and in particular on what is happening in other 
industries within the same region and in other regions within the same industry), we are 
convinced that such models would give biased and inefficient estimates. A possible way 
round this problem is the estimation of interaction models which can take into account 
inter-industries and inter-region dynamics. 
6.5. Competition and co-operation in the dynamic of 
clusters development 
According to this approach, the development path of a cluster, which is determined by 
firms' location decision, can be entirely represented by the interactions which exist 
between entrants and incumbents in different regions and industries. All pure locational 
factors are assumed to be either mobile or substituted by the developing industries 
which, in the words of Storper - Walker (1989) are capable of "producing regions". 
6.5.1. A model 
The analytical formulation of these interactions when the number of interacting entities 
is equal to 2 is as follows: 
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dn, 
= 
(ar 
- anr - arsns)n, dt 
dn, 
= 
(a., 
- assns - airn, 
)n, 
dt 
(6.10) 
where n, and n, are the "economic masses" (number of incumbents) in region r and s 
and all parameters are as in equation (4.7b). In particular ar and as are the intrinsic rates 
of increase of each region in isolation; a, and ass are the intra-regional competition 
parameters which reflect the inhibiting effects that a firm's entry has on the growth rate 
of the same region (because of congestion effects); ars and asr (inter-regional 
competition parameters) show the inhibiting effects that one firm, locating in a region, 
has on the growth of the other region (inter-regional competition parameters). 
One then would like also to take into account the inter-industry interactions which 
develop within the same region. If this is the case, then a two-regions, two sectors can 
be modelled as follows 
dn, ' 
= 
(a' 
- a' n' - a' n' + aJnJ)n' dt r rr r rs srrr 
dn, ' iiiii = 
(a. 
- assn., -a n +aJnJ)n' dt sr ris 
dnJ 
=(aJ-aJnj-a'nJ+a'n' ij dt r rr r rs sr r)l r 
dn, J 
= 
(a' 
-aJ n' -aJ n' + a'n, 
)nj 
dt s ss s sr rss 
where the subscripts r, s refer to regions, and the superscripts ij refer to industries. 
It appears evident that, even though this formulation is linear, and expresses the 
agglomeration diseconomies without exogenously determined parameters, its 
applicability is limited by the large number of parameters which have to be estimated. 
We thus proceeded by regressing the growth of each cluster (i. e. for the couplet 
industry-region) on the different interaction coefficients (these being both inter-regional 
and inter-sectoral). The results of these regressions were disappointing: in many cases 
the inner dynamics of the cluster growth (which are represented by the first two 
dn' 
dependent variables in equation 6.11) explained a large part of the variance of dt 
while the other estimated interaction coefficients were almost always insignificant. 
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Table 6.6 reports the only valuable results which we were able to extract from a set of 
over 50 regressions and refers only to inter-state intra-industry relations. 
Table 6.6. US high-tech cluster development and inter-state competition 
coefficients 
cluster growth period of time cluster size squared cluster size 
fi rst 
competitor 
second 
competitor 
third 
competitor 
fourth 
competitor 
Adj. Asq 
CAL357 1957-1994 TEX357 0.66 
0.254* -0.00016* -0.81 * 
t-raho 3.66 -2.88 -2.04 
CAL367 . 1957-1994 PEN367 MAS367 
TEX367 I LL367 0.40 
0.19* -0.12 -1.03* -0.85* -0.82** -0.52- 
t-ratio 3.78 -0.4 -3.49 -3.02 -1.90 -1.96 
CAL380 1949-1994 MAS380 0.72 
0.18** -0.00036* -0.31 *** 
t-ratio 1.96 -2.58 -1.80 
MAS357 1949-1994 TEX357 CAL357 0.55 
0.21 -0.00016 -0.24* -0.072* 
t-ratio 4.3 -0.47 -2.87 -2.11 
MAS380 1949-1994 PEN380 0.59 
0.17* -0.0001* -0.11 * 
2.53 -2.02 -2.18 
*= 5%; ** = 10%; *** = 25% Lo. s. 
From table 6.6 it appears that, as far as the Computer industry (357) is concerned, the 
first three States play very different roles: California is still the leading State but is 
beginning to suffer from the competition of Texas. Massachusetts, the old leader, is 
fighting directly with Texas and indirectly with California, while Texas Computer 
industry grows without any significant interference from other States. 
In the Electronic components industry (367) the leadership of California is clear in 
absolute term, but in the last ten years, when California has incurred some difficulties, 
other states (such as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Texas and Illinois) have shown their 
competitive strength. 
In the Instruments sector (380) - where New York has steadily reduced its presence and 
California has taken the lead - our estimates signal the existence of a competitive 
relation between two late-comer States (Massachussets and Pennsylvania), which are 
progressively catching-up. 
As already said, the main difficulty with such an empirical analysis is represented by the 
exponential increase in the number of regressors to be estimated. The interaction 
variables - which refer to the number of firms in each other high-tech sector located in 
the same State and to the number of firms belonging to the same sector located in other 
States - may easily overcome the number of available observations. 
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We found a solution to solve this problem by creating two composite variables which, 
for each high-tech cluster (defined as the couplet of state s and a sector i), summarise the 
inter-state/intra-industry relations n(, -., )i 
18 (i. e. the number of incumbents in all but state 
s belonging to industry i) and the intra-state/inter-industry relations n, (, -, ) 
(i. e. the 
number of incumbents in state s belonging to all but industry i). For each cluster we 
therefore estimated the following regression: 
dn., 
= (x + ß, n+ 
ß2n 2+ ß3n(s- 
SU-i) si dt si )i 
+ ß4n + F, (6.12) 
All regression equations have been tested for serial correlation (Lagrange multiplier), 
functional form mispecification (Ramsey RESET), non normality of residuals (skewness 
and kurtosis), heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan), and multicollinearity (correlation 
ratios between dependent variables and auxiliary regressions) and no significant 
deviation from the classical model could be detected. Table 6.7 presents the results. 
18 Table 6.7 shows two different measurements of the inter-state/intra-industry relations. The first 
(absolute) measures the number of incumbents in other significant industry-specific clusters. The second 
(relative) measures the ratio between the above and the number of US establishments belonging to that 
particular high-tech industry. 
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Table 6.7. The development of clusters: inter-regional and inter-industries effects 
cluster growth period of 
time 
number of obs. cluster size 
squared 
cluster square 
. 
interstate 
intraindustry 
relations 
interstate 
relative 
relations 
intrastate 
interindustry 
relations 
Ad]. Rsq 
DCAL283 1957-1994 0.40*** 0.0004 149.21 * 0.14* 0.37# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -1.16 0.49 2.24 3.51 
DCAL283 161.31 1 
t-ratio 2.58 
DCAL357 1957-1994 0.24*** -0.0002*** -0.13*** 0.048 0.44# 
t-ratio 38 obs. 1.26 -1.64 -1.36 0.32 
DCAL357 45.54 
t-ratio 0.15 
DCAL367 . 1950,1994 0.32 -0.0002** -0.04 
0.004 OIN 
t-ratio 35 obs. 0.64 -1.92 -0.10 0.3 
DCAL367 -1580.6*** 
t-ratio -1.19 
DCAL372 1957-1994 0.02 -0.0001 . 0.09**. 0.01 0.43# 
t-ratio 38 obs. 0.065 -0.34 -1.60 2.24 
DCAL372 254.69 
t-ratio 0.63 
DCAL380 1948-1994 -0.02 -0.00002 0.01 0.04 0.68# 
t-ratio 45 obs. -0.12 -0.30 0.07 0.88 
DCAL380 -527.17 
t-ratio 0.57 
DCAL737 1974-1994 0.08 0.00004*** -0.20 0.46 0.64. 
t-ratio 20 obs. 0.74 1.33 -0.73 0.81 
OCAL737 -0.24 
t-ratio -1.51 
DTEX283 1957-1994 -0.81** 0.0002 0.029* 0.02* 0.55# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -1.86 0.05 3.14 3.79, 
DTEX283 172.49* 
t-ratio 4.26 
DTEX357 1957-1994 -0.27 -0.00003 0.011 0.03** 0.34# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -1.2 -0.033 0.97 1.81 
OTEX357 
t-ratio 
DTEX367 1959-1994 -0.90* -0.00005 0.049** 0.27* 0.53 
t-ratio 1 35 obs. -2.68 -0.16 1.77 4.77 
DTEX367 
t-ratio 
DTEX372 1957-1994 -0.44* 0.0001 -0.14*** 0.20 0.52# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -2.61 0.61 1.16 0.91 
DTEX372 -81.09 
t-ratio -0.62 
DTEX376 1974-1994 0.78* -0.11* -0.14 0.004* 0.51 
t-ratio 20 obs. 2.63 -3.33 -0.33 3.76 
DTEX376 19.29* 
t-ratio 2.33 
DTEX380 1948-1994 1 -0.17 -0.0001 -0.002 0.097*** 0.33# 
t-ratio 45 obs. -0.48 -0.84 -0.08 1.26 
DTEX380 -471.75*** 
t-ratio -1.47 
DTEX737 1974-1994 0.46 0.00008*** -0.17*** 1.36 0.46#. 
t-ratio 20 obs. 0.54 1.32 -1.43 1.12 
DTEX737 -0.11* 
t-ratio -2.96 
DMAS283 1957-1994 -0.35 0.0003 0.036** 0.012* 0.44# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -0.65 0.047 1.73 3.24 
DMAS283 -14.94 
t-ratio -0.32 
DMAS357 1957-1994 0.35* -0.002* 0.09* 0.053* 
1 t-ratio 138 obs. 2.08 -2.72 2.12 2.09 
IDMAS357 
I t-ratio 
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Table 6.7. continues 
cluster growth period of 
time 
number of obs. cluster size 
squared 
cluster size 
interstate 
intrainclustry 
relations 
interstate 
relative 
relations 
intrastate 
interindustry 
relations 
Adj. Rsq 
DMAS367 1959-1994 -0.16 -0.0004 -0.00009 0.18** 0.05 
t-ratio 35 obs. -0.54 -0.89 0.0023 1.54 
DMAS367 -309.05 
t-ratio 0.59 
DMAS376 1974-1994 -0.33 0.04 -0.021 0.002* 0.57# 
t-ratio 20 obs. -0.65 0.51 -0.56 2.25 
DMAS376 
t-ratio 
DMAS380 1948-1994 -0.54 -0.0003** -0.029 0.033 0.38# 
t-ratio 45 obs. -0.26 -1.95 -1.12 0.82 
DMAS380 -316.68*** 
t-ratio -1.16 
DNY0283 1957-1994 -0.73* 0.0019* -0.058* 0.039 0.33 
t-ratio 38 obs. -2.69 2.47 -2.13 2.23 
DNY0283 -123.92*** 
t-ratio -1.31 
DNY0737 1974-1994 -1.02** -0.00008 0.26* -0.25 0.36 
t-ratio 20 obs. -1.98 -1.18 2.86 -0.21 
DMAS737 -0.36 
t-ratio -0.81 
DFL0372 1957-1994 0.31 -0.0069* 0.023* 82.30** 0.11 0.48 
t-ratid 38 obs. 1.32 -4.29 3.14 1.90 5.06 
DFL0372 
t-ratio 
DFL0380 1948-1994 0.12 -0,0002* -0.0026 0.27*** 0.66# 
t-ratio 45 obs. 1.07 -2.59 -0.25 1.19 
DFL0380 2.52 
t-ratio 0.024 
DCOL357 1 1957-1994 -0.31 -0.0008 0.016** 0.32# 
t-ratio 38 obs. -1.04 -0.32 1.97 
DCOL357 42.23 
t-ratio 0.82 
DILL737 1974-1994 1.80* -0.00014* -0.11 -2.15** 0.68# 
t-ratio 20 obs. 3.00 -2.68 -2.05 -1.44 
DILL737 -0.0055 
t-ratio -0.15 
DWAS372 1957-1994 0.21 -0.0013 0.0044 0.56# 
t-ratio 
. 
38 obs. 1.21 -0.99 0.52 
DWAS372 19.86 
t-ratio 0.40 
DNJE 737 1974-1994 0.80- 0.0001 0.21 0.95** 0.91# 
t-ratio 20 obs. 1.58 3.92 2.63 1.80 
DNJE 737 -1474*** 
t-ratio -1.72 
DPEN367 1959-1994 -0.28 0.0002 0.015* 0.01 0.47 
t-ratio 35 obs. -1.35 0.49 2.43 0.31 
DPEN367 195.62*** 
t-ratio 1.39 
DUTA376 1974-1994 0.47 -0.09*** 0.059* 0.54# 
t-ratio 20 obs. 0.73 -1.20 2.92 
-0.92. 
it-ratio 1 -0.151 
*= 5%; ** = 10%; *** = 25% I. o. s.; # regressors include also one or two dummies for particular years 
The results show that at 5% Lo. s. the extent of inter-cluster competition (i. e. different 
States competing as alternative locations for the same pool of potential industry-specific 
entrants) is limited. Significant negative coefficients are displayed only by 3 clusters: 
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Computer service and data processing industry (737) in Texas and Illinois and Drugs 
(283) in New York. However, with a larger Lo. s. (equal to 25%), the number of 
significant negative coefficients are recorded also by three industries in California 
(Computers (357), Electronic components (367) and Aircraft (372)), two industries in 
Texas (Aircraft and Instruments (380)), Instruments in Massachusetts, and Computer 
service and data processing in New Jersey. 
On the contrary, the results show a stronger influence of intra-cluster synergies (i. e. the 
level of other high-tech industries in the same state positively influence the development 
of a particular cluster). At the 5% Lo. s., 8 out of 28 intra-cluster regressors19 show 
significant and positive coefficient, while only Computer service and data processing 
industry in Illinois display a negative coefficient which may be interpreted as a sign of 
Inter-industry competition on some fixed pool of generic resources (capital and/or real 
estates). 
The empirical exercise shows also that, when interaction coefficients are taken into 
account, very few regressionS20 display the expected signs for both the number of 
incumbents (cluster size) and its squared value (squared cluster size). 
6.6. Market structure and industrial specialisation in the 
growth of high-tech clusters 
This section focuses on the empirical investigation of the claim that externalities - and 
in particular technological externalities, which are associated with knowledge spillovers 
- are the "engine of growth" of high-tech clusters. In particular, following Glaeser et al. 
(1992), we will test the empirical relevance of three alternative explanations which draw 
their respective theoretical background from three different streams of literature, these 
being economic growth, strategic management, and economic history. 
The first approach stresses the role of what Glaeser et al. (1992) call "Marshall-Arrow- 
Romer (MAR) externality". According to this view "concentration in a city-industry 
helps knowledge spillovers between finns and therefore the growth of that industry and 
19 Which become 13 at 25% Lo. s. 
20 Five clusters: Computers in California and Massachusetts, Missiles in Texas. Aircraft in Florida, and 
Computer services in Illinois. 
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of that city" (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1127). This approach also predicts that "local 
monopoly is better for growth than local competition because it allows externalities to 
be internalised by innovators. When externalities are internalised, innovation and 
growth speed up" (ibid. )21. Therefore the AR story reads as follows: geographical 
specialisation and monopolistic power are the best conditions for knowledge 
externalities and, therefore, for city (or cluster) growth. 
The second approach refers to the contribute of Porter (1990). According to Porter 
knowledge spillovers within geographically concentrated industries stimulate growth. 
However he also insists that "local competition as opposed to local monopoly foster the 
pursuits and rapid adoption of innovation" (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1128)22. The role of 
internal competiton is crucial in Porter's diamond of competitive advantages23, in order 
to prevent technologically advanced industry from resting on past successes and 
becoming obsolete. Porter's story is the following: geographical specialisation and 
fierce competition are the best conditions for knowledge externalities and, therefore, for 
cities (or clusters) growth24. 
The third approach derives from two contributes of Jacobs (1969 and 1984) which 
underline that, in general, "the most important knowledge transfers come from outside 
the core industry" (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1128). Jacobs logically shows, and gives 
many historical examples, that variety and diversity of geographically proximate 
industries25 together with local competition favours growth. Thus, for Jacobs, local 
21 This last statement, surely in line with Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). is, in my opinion, far away 
from what Marshall (1921) thought about the inner dynamics of growth. For this reason, in the following 
section we will refer to this approach as Arrow-Romer (AR) approach. Incidentally one may also note that 
the AR's argument is similar to most of Krugman's ideas on this issue. 
22 "Rivalry among firms with the same home base is particularly beneficial for a variety of reasons. First, 
strong domestic competition create particular visible pressure on firms to improve. It also often attracts 
new rivals to the industry. ( ... ) Geographical concentration of rivals in a single city or region within a 
nation both reflects and magnifies these benefits" (Porter, 1990, p. 119-120). 
23 See section 3.8 
24 Porter thus highlights the role played by localisation externalities. 
25 "Fhe great capitals of modern Europe did not become great cities because they were capitals. Cause 
and effects ran the other way. (.. ) Paris, Berlin and London became the genuine capitals only after they 
had already become the largest (and economically the most diversified) commercial and industrial city of 
their Kingdoms" (Jacobs, 1969, p. 143). 
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differentiation of the industry and fierce competition are the best conditions for 
knowledge externalities and, therefore, for city (or cluster) growth26. 
To test these hypotheses, Glaeser et al. (1992) build a specific data-set on the 6 largest 
industries (2 digit SIC) in the top 170 standard metropolitan areas of USA and test a 
model which explains the growth rates of employment and wage (for the period 1956- 
1987) in a sample of 1016 city-industry, in terms of various combination of the three 
above mentioned main dimensions: geographical specialisation vs. geographical 
diffusion, industrial differentiation vs. industrial concentration, and competition vs. 
monopoly. We found this article very interesting and, following Baptista - Swann (1996) 
which perform a similar analysis on US computer firms' clusters, we decided to test a 
modified version of the model which better suited the data and the specific issue of 
study in the thesis: the development of high-tech clusters. For this reason some of the 
original variables have been modified in order to take into account specific definitions 
of specialisation, and competition within the high-tech sectors. 
6.6.1. A model 
The three above mentioned theories can be formalised in a simple economic model that 
will be then empirically tested in order to discriminate between the conflicting 
explanations. Following Glaeser et al. (1992), suppose that a firm belonging to a given 
industry in a certain location has a production function given by pY =Af 
(1, ) where p 
is a price index, Y is real output, A represents the overall level of technology at time t 
(which reflects changes in both technology and price) and lt is the labour input at time 
t27. Each firm in the industry takes technology, prices and wages wt as given, and 
maximises: 
(6.13) 
the first order conditions are therefore 
A, f '(I, ) = w, (6.14) 
26 Jacobs thus highlights the role played by urbanisationlregionalisation extemalities. 
27 By choosing such functional form for the production function, which abstracts from capital inputs, "we 
may not capture labour-saving technological innovations and we shall not capture innovations that result 
only in further accumulation of physical capital" (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1132). 
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which can be rewritten in terms of growth rates as 
lo ýL) = lo -ýWll-vt-,, 
)- 
lo (6.15) 
The level of technology in the region-industry is assumed to have both local and 
national components as follows: 
A= AlocaiAnational (6.16) 
The growth rate will then be the sum of the growth of national technology in the 
industry and the growth of local technology 
lo lo +10 ýaona 
a.. al, 
+t) (6.17) 
The growth in national technology is assumed to capture changes in the price of the 
product and shifts in the national technology for that industry, while the local 
technology is assumed to grow at a rate which is exogenous to the single firm but 
depends on the different technological externalities which are present in the region- 
industry. 
lo g(specializ., local monopoly, diversif., initial conditions) + e, +, (6.18) 
If we set f (1) = I", where 0< cc <1, and we combine (6.15), (6.17), and (6.18) we 
obtain: 
lo 
ýt-+I )=- 
lo ýwIt -+ 
) 
+log +g (s, Im, d, ic) + (6.19) it 
where s stands for specialisation; Im for local monopoly; d for diversification, and ic for 
initial conditions and E is a white noise error term, assumed well behaved. 
Growth in nationwide industry employment is assumed to capture changes in 
nationwide technology and prices; workers are assumed to participate in a nationwide 
labour market28 so that wage growth will be a constant across state-industries. Equation 
28 This assumption is crucially dependent on the US institutional framework. The empirical estimates will 
thus be produced on US data. 
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(6.19) then allows one to associate the growth of employment in a state industry (or 
cluster q) with measures of the technological externalities proposed by the different 
theories as follows: 
LGMSIq -, ": aLGMUI + bLWIN75q+ cLMIN 75q+ dSPEINq + (6.20) 
+e COMINHT, + JDIVINHTq +Eq 
where SPEIN = SPEINHT in model I and SPEIN = SPEINTOT in model 2,5 and 6 
(see table 6.9). 
The variables of the estimated version of model has been based on the following 
variables. 
Dependent variable: 
LGMSIq = Log (Employment in 1995/ employment in 1975) in the state-industry. 
Independent variables: 
LGMUI = Log (US employment in 1995/US employment in 1975) in the industry. 
LWIN75q = Log of wage in the state-industry in 1975 in thousand dollars per years 
(calculated as the ratio between the annual payroll and the employment in the state - 
industry). 
MIN75q = Log of employment in the state-industry in 1975. 
SPEINHTq = index of state-industry relative geographical specialisation within the HT 
macroscctor in 1975 (calculated as a modified employment location quotient were the 
industrial total is calculated only on the high-tech part)29. 
SPEINTOTq = alternative index of state-industry geographical specialisation. in 1975 
(calculated as a generic location quotient based on employment). 
COMINHTq = index of relative local intrasectoral competition in 1975 (calculated as the 
ratio of the number of firms per workers in industry i in state s and the number of 
workers in the same industry in the US)30. 
29 SPEINHT = (employment in industry i in state s/ total high-tech employment in state s) / (US 
employment in industry i/ total high-tech employment). 
30 COMINT = (firms in industry i in state s/employment in industry i in state s) / (firms in industry i in the 
US / employment in industry i in the US). 
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DIVINHTq = index of relative diversification of the state within the high-tech 
macrosector in 1975 (calculated as a modified Herfindhal index where the shares are 
calculated on the remaining high-tech sectors). Because of its formulation DIVINHTq is 
an inverse index of diversification. The lower is the value of the index, the higher is the 
level of diversification of the state within the group we classified as high-tech industries. 
6.6.2. The data 
The data used in this exercise is the original time series dataset we built from County 
Business Patterns data in order to test the macro-ecologic approach. Since we were able 
to collect historical data (at this fine level of spatial and sectoral level of disaggregation) 
only for the US, we did not have to worry about international comparisons but only 
about the changes in the US industrial classification definition, SIC (the most recent 
occurring in 1988). 
The final dataset is composed of 112 observations on the growth rate of different 
variables between 1975 and 1995 for 7 sectors within 16 US States3l. The sectors 
involved in the analysis are (in the original US SIC codes and definitions): 283, Drugs; 
356, Office and computing machines; 367, Electronic components and accessories; 372, 
Aircraft and parts32,737 Computer and data processing services, 7391 Research and 
development laboratories33. 
31 These 16 states have been selected as the most technologically advanced in the US (i. e. the one with 
the largest number of employees or establishment in the high-tech sectors) either in 1956 or in 1994. The 
complete list is as follows: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington. From a 
geographical perspective they offer a non-biased sample of both the 9 Census divisions and of the 4 
Census regions. For withheld employment data we used the class size average, for each payroll missing 
data we constructed an "artificial" payroll data by using the employment figures obtained as above and a 
wage proxy calculated on "similar" sectors. (i. e. when employment and payroll data for Colorado in 1975 
were missing for industry 372 Aircrafts and parts, we used the average of the employment size class and 
an artificial payroll figure calculated as the product of the "average" employment and the wage of sector 
3724 Aircrafts engine and engine parts). 
32 Sector 376, Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts, had to be dropped because most of the figures 
on employment were withheld for privacy reasons. 
33 This sectors became 8371 Commercial physics research, after the changes in SIC occurred in 1988. 
We are grateful to Y. D. Funderburk (US Census Bureau) for helping us in matching precisely the sectors 
through the different SIC codes and for supplying some additional 1975 data that we did not collect in our 
original data-set. 
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Table 6.8. shows the four fastest and slowest growing state-high-tech industries in the 
period 1975-95. 
Table 6.8. Fastest and slowest growing state-industries (employment) in the period 
1975-1995 
States Industries lgwsi speinht speintot cominht divinht 
COLORADO Computer 2.714 1.022 1.282 1.399 0.360 
services 
UTAH Instruments 2.702 0.399 0.307 4.496 0.277 
Computer UTAH 2.598 1.710 1.316 1.167 0.292 
services 
MASSACHUSETTS Computer 2.585 0.575 0.881 1.878 I 0.294 
services 
average fastest 2.650 0.927 0.946 2.235 0.306 
growing Industries 
Computer KANSAS 
and o. m. -1.285 
0.352 0.790 0.692 0.725 
Computer 
NEW JERSEY 
and o. m. -1.290 
0.633 0.822 1.873 0.262 
NEW YORK Aircrafts -1.560 0.550 0.779 0.910 0.290 
Computer OHIO 
and o. m. -1.595 
0.891 0.693 0.701 0.305 
average slowest 
-1.433 0.607 0.771 1.044 0.395 growing Industries 
Idifterences 11 4.0821 0.3201 0.1761 1.191 -0.090 
Table 6.8. gives three impressions. First, rapidly growing state-industries were more 
geographically concentrated (both in relative34 and in absolute terms) than rapidly 
declining ones. Second fast growing state-industries were more competitive than 
shirking state-industries. Third, the effects of diversification on the growth performance 
of state-industries is positive (i. e. more diversified clusters grow more than the others) 
but weak35. 
The table seems therefore to support the interpretation on the genesis of externalities, 
proposed by Porter, which states that the engines of growth are geographical 
34 With respect to the high-tech industry as a whole. 
35 The table also shows the westward shift of high-tech industries (fastest growing state-industries are in 
the Mountains Census Division) and the different stages of development of industrial high-tech industries 
(with computer services rapidly growing and computer manufacturing declining). This last result can be 
seen also as a prove of the tcrtiarisation of advanced economies. 
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specialisation and local competition. However, a detailed econometric analysis is 
needed in order to test, in greater detail, the above mentioned hypotheses. 
6.6.3. The results 
Table 6.9 shows the results for different empirical specifications of the model. R2 
coefficients of every model are quite high for a cross-section analysis (they vary 
between 0.65 and 0.69) and stable. The best fit of the regression is achieved by model 6 
(which, as will be discussed below, test as the same time both the AR's and the Porter's 
theories). 
All regression equations have been tested for serial correlation (Lagrange multiplier 
test), functional form mispecification (Ramsey RESET test), non normality of residuals 
(skewness and kurtosis of residuals), heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan test), and 
multicollinearity (correlation ratios between dependent variables and auxiliary 
regressions) and no significant deviation from the classical model could be detected, 
apart from heteroskedasticity which has been corrected by using White's procedure. 
Table 6.9. The engines of high-tech clusters' growth 
models 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 
constant 4.34 4.69 2.82 4.71 3.34 2.9 3.19 
katio 4.86 5.25 2.48 5.54 3.18 2.61 2.99 
LGMUI 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.98 1.08 1.08 1.05 
t-ratio 13.16 13.51 1294 13.3 13.75 13.55, 13.08 
LWIN75 -0.84 -0.89 -0.67 -0.85 -0.71 -0.691 -0.68 
katio -2.35 -2.5 -1.86 -2.5 -2.12 -1.95 -1.98 
LMIN75 -0.25 -0.29 0.16 0.27 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 
kabb -5.56 -6.45 .3 -6.33 -4.07 -3.62 -3.44 
SPEINHT 0.01 
t-ratio -0.07 
SPEINTOT 0.09 0.15 0.14 
kabo 2.78 3.79 3.63 
COMINHT 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.17 
katio 2.07 2.53 2.55 2.02 
DIVINFIT -0.53 -0.58 -0.48 
t-ratio 1.12 -1.28 -1.07 
Adj. R sq. 0.651 0.661 0.671 0.651 0.69 0.68 0.671 
n. of obs. 112 1 1121 1121 1121 112 112 112 
* indicates that the regression parameters have been estimated using White's corrected version of the 
variance-covariance matrix of parameters. At regression coefficients are signigifacant at 5% Lo. s. (a part 
from LGWIN75 in model 6 and DIVINHT in all models which are both significant only at 20% Lo. s. ) 
The different specifications allow one to identify both the single and the combined 
effects of the different kinds of externalities on the growth of high-tech clusters. All 
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specifications include a set of control variables such as: national employment growth 
(LGMUI) which corrects for demand shifts, log of wage in the state-industry in 1975 
(LGWIN75) which corrects for generic movement of firms towards low-wage areas, and 
log of employment in the state-industry in 1975 (LGMIN75) which corrects for generic 
movement of workers toward high-employment state-industry. Alternatively and 
somehow more sensibly, one can interpret the negative coefficients on the initial values 
of employment and wages as an indirect way to measure the geographical westbound 
shifts of high-tech industries in the US from the old industrial East coast towards the 
Mountains and the Pacific (where these sectors were still in the first development phases 
and where wages were lower). All control variables have the expected signs. High initial 
employment and high wages in a cluster lead to slower growth (negative coefficients for 
both LWIN75 and LMIN75); while employment growth in the cluster is positively 
correlated with US wide industry growth. 
Table 6.9 presents six different empirical specifications of the same basic model. The 
first three specifications look at each externality effect in isolation while the remaining 
ones test the empirical relevance of the three theories through a couple of coefficients. 
The first specification uses SPEINHT as the index of geographic specialisation, and the 
parameter is not significantly different from zero. In the second specification we use the 
alternative index for geographic specialisation SPEINTOT (where the state-industry is 
compared with the total of manufacturing and service activities) and we find the 
coefficient to be positive and significant. Thus, sectoral specialisation in specific high- 
tech industries fosters growth. This result is consistent with both AR and Porter and in 
contrast with Jacobs. 
The third specification analyses COMINHT, which is an index of competition (or, 
alternatively, an inverse index of monopoly power). The parameter is positive and 
significant suggesting a positive correlation between the extent of local competition and 
the growth of the cluster36. This result is thus consistent with Porter and Jacobs but in 
contrast with AR. 
36 This is consistent with lots of anecdotal literature on the business climate of successful high-tech 
clusters such as Silicon Valley, Research Triangle etc. 
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The fourth specification, by introducing DIVINHT, studies the effect of industrial 
diversification. Although the parameter had the correct negative sign (meaning that a 
lower value of the Herfindhal index, which means a higher diversification in the other h- 
t sectors, is positively correlated with the cluster growth rate), it shows a lower 
significance37. Thus we have no strong empirical support for an important part of the 
Jacob's theory which, for high-tech industries, will take count of the inter-industry (i. e. 
within the whole high-tech sector), technological externalities and knowlege 
spillovers38. 
The fifth specification tests the significance of all parameters together (SPEINTOT, 
COMINHT, and DIVINH7). The empirical evidence thus supports the theory put 
forward by Porter, and here adapted to the case of high-tech industries, which considers 
intra-industry technological spillovers, and intra-industry local competition and rivalry as 
the spurs to innovation, growth and success of clusters39. 
The last two specifications test the three theories in a more formal way (each time with 
only two relevant parameters). The estimated coefficients of model 5 give stronger 
support to Porter's theory since both values of SPEINTOT and COMINHT are positive 
and significant; and are definitely against AR. Model 6 is partially supporting Jacobs in 
the sense that while the coefficient of COMINHT is positive and significant, the 
coefficient of DIVINHT has the expected (negative) sign but its statistical significance is 
low. 
6.7. Why do high-tech firms cluster? Some empirical 
considerations 
If one jointly considers the empirical results of section 6.3 and 6.6, then a descriptive 
conclusion would merely state that, while the actual degree of innovative industrial 
specialisation of an area (see section 6.3) is heavily dependent on the presence of large 
establishments (which enjoy higher economies of scale), the growth rate of its high-tech 
37 It is always significant only at the 20% Lo. s. 
38 The existence and the relevance of these spillovers has been shown by Scherer (1982) presenting 
systematic evidence that around 70% of innovation in a given industry are used outside that industry. 
39 This result is therefore in contrast to Glaeser et al. (1992) and consistent with Baptista - Swann (1996). 
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employment (see section 6.6) is fostered by the presence of a competitive environment 
where small firms are predominant. 
A tentative explanation of the different relations existing between the average finn's 
size (in a given industry and region), the degree of specialisation of a region, and the 
growth rate of its industry employment reads as follows. The relative specialisation of a 
given area (as measured by the industry location quotient) is explained in terms of a 
larger average size of firms. Large high-tech firms are more efficient (because of the 
existence of economies of scale in some part of the production process, say in R&D 
activities) and they acquire growing market shares. The region becomes nation-wide 
acknowledged as the centre of the industry, and the regional level of industry 
employment increases at the expenses of other industries (causing sectoral changes in 
the regional industrial structure of production) and/or of other regions (causing regional 
changes in the national geographic structure of production, and the inflow of skilled 
high-tech industry workers). The negative effects of scale economies on employment are 
in fact more than compensated for by the increasing market share. The process continues 
up to the point where regional firms as a whole have reached a dominant position in the 
market and the growth of any single firm is obtained at the expenses of the remaining 
firms in the region. From this point onward any increase in the average firm size 
necessarily implies a process of regional concentration and therefore, because of 
economies of scale, the reduction of the employment growth rate40. 
An alternative explanation, which directly relates to the organisation ecology literature 
(Hannan-Frecman, 1989) and that we have adapted to the development of industrial 
clusters is the following. In the early stages of development of a cluster small and 
pioneers firms enter from outside the region and/or are generated by a spin-off process 
from existing firms (which may well be doing business in other industrial sectors). Thus 
the positive relation between growth and small firms size in the early "heroic" stages of 
development of an industrial cluster is explained. However, when the industry begins to 
be important in the region's economy and the first signal of input competition and 
congestion begins to appear, then these small and creative firms stop being the fittest 
organisational form. They are gradually substituted by larger and more structured firms 
40 Eventually, as the process continues, the regional industry employment growth rate decreases until it 
become negative and the industry employment level in the region is reduced. 
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which, by enjoying scale economies in a technology that is gradually becoming "stable", 
make full use of their superior organisational and market power to make profits and 
grow. The locational pattern of established high-tech industries is therefore determined 
by economies of scale much more than by agglomeration economies. 
Finally it is worth to stress that the empirical analyses performed in this chapter have 
add new contributions to the existing knowledge of the structure and dynamics of 
innovative industrial clusters in many respects. In particular: 
i) The analyses performed in section 6.2 confirmed the positive influence of the 
existence of a local pool of skilled labour force (Marshall, 1920; Krugman, 1991a), 
the strength of the technological infrastructure (Feldman 1995), the degree of trade 
openness of the cluster (Porter, 1996), and a negative influence of corporate income 
tax rate and unemployment rate (Storper-Walker, 1989; Hirshleifer, 1993). 
ii) The analyses of section 6.3, to my knowledge, are the first empirical studies 
devoted to measure the relative importance of scale versus agglomeration 
economies for high-tech sectors and they are based on an extremely wide database. 
Furthermore in the same section an analysis of inter-industry and inter-cluster 
spillovers has been performed together with an empirical test of the relevance of 
locational shadowing (Arthur, 1990). 
iii) In the analyses of section 6.5, which bear some similarities to those performed by 
Swann (1998) and Swann - Prevezer (1996), we attempted to give empirical 
consistency to the ecological approach (Dendrinos - Mullally 1985; Hannan - 
Freeman, 1989; Nijkamp - Reggiani, 1998) to spatial economics and location 
theory. 
iv) In the analyses of section 6.6 we applied the original empirical framework proposed 
by Glaser et al. (1992) to the growth of US high-tech cluster, obtaining some 
interesting results which support Porter's (1990 and 1996) explanation. 
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Chapter 7 
Policy implications 
The evolving patterns of uneven regional development are not 
simply reflections or outcomes of the long waves in the national 
economy. They are the process of national economic change 
and development. 
M. Marshall (1987), Long Waves of Regional Development. 
z 1. High-tech firms and local development policies 
In recent times, almost all industrialised countries are experiencing, in varying degrees, 
two contemporary phenomena: the crisis of traditional industries and the development 
of new innovative sectors. These phenomena, which are caused by national and 
international determinants and spurred by the dynamics of globalisation and economic 
interdependence, have important consequences at the local level, the most relevant being 
the emergence and deepening of regional differentiation (Doz, 1987). 
The process of innovation and industrial change is following regional paths as are crisis 
and decline. The same process of geographic concentration of science based industries, 
which yields welfare in certain areas, is causing crises of the productive structure and 
increases in unemployment in others. This remark has a crucial importance for most 
European countries while they experience a process of economic and monetaryl 
integration. Whether the formation of EMU will cause more or less agglomeration in the 
high-tech industries is a question highly debated in the literature. Whether national and 
European authorities should view the agglomeration and specialisation process as a 
menace or as a source of advantages for the economic development and welfare of 
Europe is another matter. 
The economic scenario at the regional level can be summarised by a threefold 
taxonomy: the old industrialised regions, characterised by a decline in their industrial 
base and the obsolescence of the skills of their labour force; the new industrialised 
regions, focused on innovative and fast-growing industries supported by an existing 
pool of human and financial resources; and the peripheral regions with no industrial 
1 With the notable exception of the UK. 
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tradition which - having experienced a brief period of growth and increased welfare in 
the golden age of the fordist production system (1960s and 1970s) through the process 
of re-location and decentralisation of manufacturing - are now being pushed further 
away from the streams of technological and industrial innovation and development 
(11ilpert, 1991). 
After the crisis of the mass production model, the emergence of successful innovative 
industrial clusters, in the late 1970s, seemed to show that the opportunity still existed for 
technological development and lasting economic growth. Small and dynamic high-tech 
firms were regarded as the main, if not the sole, engine of economic development and 
regional innovation policy became the target of every public authority all over the world 
dreaming about the creation of a Silicon Valley clone. At that time the dream of a set of 
powerful regional innovation policies able to generate the development of any region 
seemed justified since the development of an innovative industrial cluster was promised 
simply by linking the existing pools of local resources to the dynamics of international 
supply and demand of innovative technologies, products and services (Blakely, 1989). 
Nowadays, it seems widely established that it is rather difficult, if not almost 
impossible, for regional policies alone to radically change the local patterns of 
innovative production. The amenity of the place (for the peripheral regions) or the 
existence of an industrial tradition, for the old industrialised regions (Swann et al. 1998) 
could not constitute the basis of successful implementation of a modified "science- 
based" version of the Perroux's (1955) "growth pole" theory. 
This chapter aims to reconsider the results coming from previous chapters of the thesis 
and to compare them with the main findings of the policy oriented literature in order to 
show the policy implications of the analysis and to develop a set of guidelines, if not an 
agenda, for policy makers interested in the location of high-tech firms and its relation to 
the process of regional development. 
Before dealing with these matters, it may be useful to briefly list some caveats: 
i) High-tech firm locations do not cause necessarily the growth and development of a 
region in terms of, income, employment, welfare etc. 
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ii) There is no clear cut evidence on the superiority of a regional development strategy 
focused on the growth of existing high-tech firms versus an alternative strategy 
based on the entry of new high-tech firms. 
iii) Finns are not the only economic actors in the process of cluster development. 
Industrial clusters, or local systems of production, are collective actors (composed 
of firms and other institutions such as local authorities and professional 
associations) that can be targeted by specific economic policy interventions. 
iv) Firm location and cluster development are lengthy and cumulative processes where 
historical accidents, expectations, increasing returns and congestion play equally 
important roles. 
v) National and regional peculiarities matter. What successfully worked in California, 
may not work as well as in Wales, Alsace, or Puglia. 
This chapter is arranged into eight sections, which highlight the policy implications of 
the theoretical models and empirical evidence presented in the previous chapters of the 
thesis. The first section has an introductory function, the second explains the difference 
existing between geographic and agglomeration benefits in determining the location of 
firms and the development of a cluster, the third explicitly refers to geographical 
benefits as location factors, while the fourth section focuses on agglomeration benefits. 
The fifth section deals with the dichotomy between firms' entry and growth as 
determinants of cluster development, the sixth section is devoted to the analysis of the 
changing nature of a high-tech cluster during its stages of development and to the 
different policy instruments which are best suited to accompany and support each stage. 
The seventh section looks at science parks as an example of a policy instrument for 
supporting the birth and development of high-tech firms, while the final section 
summarises the results of the chapter through a series of guidelines for policy makers. 
Z2. Geographical versus agglomeration benefits 
All theoretical approaches to the location of economic activities have assumed 
(explicitly or not) that location benefits (i. e. the benefits which arise to an agent, firm or 
individual, from its particular location) are composed of two parts. The first part 
(geographic benefits) is dependent on the location and it is independent from other 
agents' behaviour; the second part (agglomeration benefits) is independent from the 
223 
location and is solely dependent on the location choice of other agents. The relative 
importance attributed to geographic versus agglomeration benefits vary from one theory 
to another; consequently different theories involve different policy prescriptions (Rees - 
Stafford, 1983). 
Classical location theory and in particular the "least costs" approach (from Weber, 1929 
to Isard, 1956) describes the firm's location decision as the minimisation of the sum of 
all transport costs associated with the distance existing between the input sources and 
the market2. An economic policy intervention aimed at developing a certain industry in 
a given location involves a two-stage intervention. The first stage is devoted to the 
identification (through direct interviews, sample surveys, econometric exercises) of a 
list of the "relevant location factors" for a given type of firms (i. e. high-tech ones). The 
second stage requires the implementation of specific policy interventions aimed at 
providing, in the chosen location, the previously identified factors (OTA, 1984; Premus, 
1984). 
Alternative theorieS3 - from non price interaction models (Henderson, 1977; Fujita, 
1986) to new economic geography (Krugman, 1991a, 1995), from lock-in models 
(Arthur 1988) to industrial geography (Storper - Walker, 1989), from biological models 
(Dendrinos - Mullally, 1985) to the technological infrastructure approach (Feldman, 
1994) - focus on the influences that the number and type of already located firms have 
on the location decisions of potential new entrants. The consequences in terms of 
economic policy are connected to the design and implementation of a series of 
interventions aimed at regulating the dynamics of agglomeration economies and 
diseconornies. 
In reality it is very difficult to distinguish between pure geographic and pure 
agglomeration factors since, apart from a very restricted list of physical characteristics 
which are connected to a particular location (such as climate, altitude, closeness to 
natural elements and amenities), several other elements - which are usually classified 
under the heading of geographic factors - may well be influenced by the location of 
other firms (i. e. transport infrastructures, whose efficiency and utility is crucially 
2 Agglomeration economics are treated as a third level effect arising from the intersection of isodipanes. 
3 Which directly or indirectly refers back to Marshall (192 1). 
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dependent on the number of users). On the other hand, the early or late emergence of 
congestive phenomena is heavily dependent on the local endowment of resources and 
inputs (which is an intrinsic geographic notion). 
For these reasons in chapter 6 we have developed two distinct approaches which were 
able to highlight two different and complementary perspectives on the location process. 
The first perspective considers, in a panel-data framework, the number of located finns 
as function of a series of widely defined geographical factors. The second perspective 
considers geographical benefits as embodied in finns' location decisions and therefore 
looks at previous location as the sole determinants of new locations through time-series 
estimations. 
The following two sections of this chapter will be devoted to the discussion of 
geographical versus agglomeration benefits as policy instruments to support firm's entry 
and clusters development. The view taken in this thesis is that interventions centred on 
locational benefits may obtain the greatest results in the early stages of development of a 
cluster, while the management of inter-firm interactions (agglomeration benefits) 
becomes the major task to be accomplished after the maturity phase of the cluster life 
cycle has been reached. 
Z3. Geographical benefits and firms location 
As stated above, the location decision of an individual firm, in this perspective, is 
conceived as solely dependent on "geographic" factors (i. e. independent of the previous 
location of other factors) and the task of a local authority, willing to encourage the 
innovative industrial development of an area, implies the provision of the location 
factors preferred by high-tech companies (Coleman - Jacek, 1989). 
These "preferred location factors" have therefore to be identified in some way. One of 
these methods, described in section 5.3.1, is via a direct survey questionnaire performed 
on a sample of firms, another (see section 5.3.3) involves the use of cross-sectional 
econometric analysis. The most famous example of a survey in order to detect the 
deten-ninants of high technology plant location decisions is the analysis performed in the 
early 1980s for the US Office of Technology Assessment (Premus, 1982). In this work a 
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sample of 6914 (out of the initial selected sample of 1750) finns, members of the 
American Electronic Association, were asked to rank a series of geographical5 attributes 
on a four grades scale. The results showed that worker availability and skills, favourable 
tax structures, good educational institutions, low cost of living and efficient 
transportation infrastructure were, in order of importance, the most influential location 
factors. 
An alternative but indirect way to identify the most relevant geographic factors which 
can explain the location decision of US high-tech firms has been performed in the 
original panel data exercise, presented in section 6.2. of the thesis. The advantages of 
such an analysis lie in the sample coverage, which is extended to the universe of high- 
tech firms operating in the US in 1986 and 1993. The drawbacks relate to the fact that 
such an analysis measures the degree of correlation between certain State's 
characteristics and the relative concentration of high-tech firms with severe limits 
concerning the direction of causality and the possible existence of spurious correlation. 
According to the empirical results, States with a highly educated labour force (as shown 
by the high number of college enrolments), a strong technological infrastructure (as 
shown by high number of patents) and the presence of important metropolitan areas (as 
shown by the metropolitan population rate) are the most preferred locations for high- 
tech firms. Furthermore, State population and per-capita income are negatively (and 
significantly) correlated with the relative importance of high-tech firms, perhaps 
suggesting that innovative firms find an easier seedbed far from established productive 
centres (which usually are in rich and densely populated areas). State corporate income 
tax rate is also negatively related to the presence of high-tech firms. 
4 The sample was geographically very biased (even if the bias somehow reflected the spatial polarisation 
of high-tech firms in the period) since more than 300 firms were from California and around 200 were 
located in Massachussets. The sectoral structure of the sample was more representative of the spectrum of 
high-tech industries than one may suppose from the source of the sample (but with a remarkable bent for 
semiconductor and telecommunications which accounted for over 40% of the sample). A geographical 
breakdown of the responses allows the author to conclude that "if any aggregation bias exist, it is not 
serious" (Premus, 1982, pag. 26). 
5 The exercise was conducted as a two stages choice. In the first stage firms were asked to rank the 
important factor to locate within a region (which in the US is composed by a number of states); in the 
second one firms were asked to rank the location factors relevant for the choice of a state location within 
a given region. 
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When the same analysis is performed on the relative proportion of high-tech jobs, the 
list of significant regressors slightly change indicating that a dynamic (high number of 
business failures) and competitive (high export rate) economic environment with an 
innovative vocation (high number of patents) identifies a good location for high-tech 
jobs; while an old industrial region in crisis (as signalled by an high unemployment rate 
negatively correlated with the phenomenon at study) is a place to avoid. Other 
traditional location factors, often quoted in the empirical literature, such as the 
efficiency of transport infrastructures, the degree of unionisation of the labour force, and 
the level of local R&D seems to be not significantly correlated with the presence of a 
high level of high-tech employment. 
These results seem therefore to imply that the policy interventions aimed at raising the 
presence of innovative firms in an area must raise the level of human capital in the local 
labour force (through an appropriate incentive structure for education), support the 
international competitiveness of the local economy, enforce the system of protection for 
intellectual property rights, and maintain low entry and exit costs. When implementing 
these policies, the local authority must be aware that the location process of high-tech 
firms is a very inertial process where "past success fosters future success" and where the 
economic effects of old innovative efforts affect more significantly the decision of 
entrepreneurs than current innovative efforts. The industrial structure of an area cannot 
be completely and sharply changed by policy interventions explicitly fostering the 
location of high-tech fin-ns. On the contrary, the public authority, with its interventions, 
should focus on "already developed" areas encouraging the exploitation of locally 
available resources. For these reasons, the location of high-tech activities seems almost 
unsuitable as an instrument for narrowing geographical gaps in income, employment or 
other macro-economic variables. 
Z4. Agglomeration benefits and firms location 
The logistic models proposed in section 4.2.3, despite some empirical limitations, offer 
a useful criterion for classifying the large number of different policy interventions 
which, directly or indirectly, target the location of high-tech firms and the development 
of a local high-tech cluster. In brief all policies can be grouped into a threefold 
taxonomy which is based on the specific targeted parameter of the model. 
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For this purpose one can reformulate equation (4.5a) as follows: 
dn q=r,, (n. 
+ Yq 
dt 
dn 
Where the growth of the high-tech cluster dt 
is modelled as a logistic function of the 
number of incumbent firms nq ; rq is the incipient rate of growth (i. e. the maximum rate 
of growth which can be achieved by the cluster throughout its development); y. is a 
parameter which shifts the function along the nq axis and represents the extent of critical 
mass phenomena; K. is the maximum dimension of the cluster (i. e. the maximum 
number of profitable inncumbent firms). 
The only difference between equation (7.1) and equation (4.5a) lies in the introduction 
of the parameter y, which is intended to represent the relevance of a critical mass in the 
development process of an innovative industrial cluster and the possibility of 
implementing specific policy interventions aimed at overcoming this problem. 
By referring to equation (7.1) we can therefore distinguish between three main types of 
policy interventions alternatively aimed at: 
i) overcoming the regional critical mass (by promoting the exogenous location of y. 
initial firms), 
ii) increasing the maximum rate of regional growth (by increasing r. ), 
iii) raising the long run equilibrium size of the cluster (by increasing K. ). 
Let us now considering in details these three types of policy interventions6. 
A y-type policy is designed to overcome the problem of the initial critical mass. Such a 
policy consists of a series of temporary financial and/or fiscal interventions which 
exogenously lower the location (or entry) costs in the region for a limited number of 
6 It is interesting to note that this threefold taxonomy of policies (y, r, K) bears elements of similarity 
with the three "possible areas for policy interventions: (1) in the attainment of critical mass, (2) in the 
promotion of cooperative activities across firms and other institutions, and (3) in the coordination of 
investment decisions" identified by Temple (1998, p. 279). 
228 
firms (n. -,,: y. 
) in order to reach a level where the positive feedback dynamics of 
agglomeration economies can start to develop. A y-type policy is therefore a kind of 
geographical benefits intervention to be used in order to foster the initial phase of 
development of a cluster in an "hostile" environment. It must be implemented when the 
targeted area is lacking any previous economic development, either in a particular 
industry (i. e. there have never been high-tech firms in this site) or in an absolute way 
(there have never been industrial firms in this site). 
An r-type policy is designed to increase the positive externalities which are 
endogenously generated by the location of a new firm in the region. The intrinsic rate of 
growth, r., expresses the largest possible "attraction and generation" power7 of a given 
number of located firms and influences the speed of growth of the cluster. An r-type 
policy explicitly supports the role played by agglomeration economies and knowledge 
spillovcrs in the development process of an high-tech cluster. The parameter rq 
expresses also the difference between firms' birth and mortality rates in the region 
(r. 
= Pq - 6. 
). In this perspective, the concept of "attraction and generation" power of a 
cluster must be enlarged in order to take into account the early phases of firms' 
development within the region (the so-called incubation period, empirically estimated to 
last around 2-3 years (Regional Studies, 1994), when the bankruptcy of a firm is most 
likely). An r-type policy can therefore aim at increasing the birth rate, and/or at 
decreasing the firms' "infant mortality" rate, within the region through appropriate 
interventions (such as innovation diffusion supporting policies, start-up incentives, 
provision of business planning services, diffusion of venture capital activities, etc. ). 
A K-type policy is designed to increase the regional "carrying capacity" which is the 
region's ability to sustain a given number of profitable "representative, 8 firms. Since 
the carrying capacity is a function of the local endowment of resources (inputs and 
7 Which encompasses the entry of firms that were located outside the cluster and the "birth" of new firms 
inside the cluster. 
8 The concept of representative or average firms is introduced in the model to take into account the fact 
that, in reality, firms differ in size and that the growth of an high-tech cluster may imply either the 
increase in the number of established firms (i. e. the entry of new firms in the region) or the growth in 
size of a number of located firms. For a formal framework which explicitly models in different ways the 
entry and the growth of firms see Swann et al. (1998). 
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infrastructures) and of the average level of use of these resources made by resident 
firms, then any public policy aimed at increasing the quantity and/or quality of local 
inputs and infrastructures, and at raising the efficiency of local firms can be defined as a 
K-type policy. 
The desiderability of these different development policies is crucially dependent on the 
preferred object of intervention, the chosen time framework for the implementation of 
the policy, the level of development of the targeted region, and the state and variability 
of the relevant external macro-economic environment. 
As far as the target of the policy is concerned, r-type and y-type policies are mainly 
addressed to firms, while K-type policies usually target the economic environment and 
the productive and urban infrastructures of the local economic system. According to this 
taxonomy r-type policies imply interventions such as start-up incentives, fiscal 
allowances, information diffusion programs. The establishment of a science park and 
the strengthening of the regional network of transport and communication 
infrastructures can be defined as K-type policies9. 
An alternative criterion, relates to the time horizon which is needed for the 
implementation of the economic policy interventions. Usually r-type and y-type policies 
generate results in the short run, while K-type policy needs a longer time period to be 
effective. On the other hand, while the first two types merely influence the speed of 
development, K-type policies are the only ones capable of moving the cluster size from 
a lower equilibrium level to an higher one, thus ensuring higher sustainable long-run 
growth. 
A third criterion refers to the stage of development of the targeted region. A y-type 
policy can be implemented in an underdeveloped region without any industrial tradition. 
A r-type intervention is perfectly suited to be implemented in a "developing" region 
where the main problem is the establishment and survival of an initial core of high-tech 
firms. Finally a K-type intervention is designed to be implemented in an industrially 
9 An example of rtype policy is the re-location of governmental research institutions or public-owned 
firms. 
230 
developed region where competition on inputs and congestion of infrastructures are the 
main obstacles to the further development of the high-tech clusterIO 
A final criterion involves the state and variability (i. e. depth and frequency of shocks) of 
the relevantIl external macro economic environment. According to macro-economic 
conditions the best development strategy (as developed in section 4.4) may involve pure 
r-type, or pure K-type policies when the environment is stable; an intennediate policy 
when shocks are limited; and a mixed policy (i. e. a weighted combination of pure types) 
when shocks are deep and infrequent. 
Z5. Entry versus growth policies 
The empirical exercise of section 6.3 suggests that - although agglomeration economies 
are significantly and positively related with the high-tech specialisation of an area - scale 
economies play a dominant role in explaining the geographical distributions of high-tech 
activities (with the exception of sector 330, Instruments, where agglomeration 
economies are dominant) in four major industrial countries (US, UK, France, Italy) at 
the FLA12 level. The results also confirm that local inter-industry spillovers at the FLA 
level are more important than intra-industry externalities at the SLA level. This is to say 
that the geographical specialisation of a FLA can be better explained in terms of a 
general high-tech vocation of that area than in terms of a specific industry specialisation 
of the larger area (SLA). There are many explanations for such a phenomenon: the first 
indirectly refers to locational shadowing (Arthur, 1990) caused by the existence of a 
"best" location (FLA) which diminishes the relative attractiveness of alternative 
locations in the same SLA. The second explanation explicitly concerns the fact that 
firms belonging to the same group of industries (such as the high-tech sector as a whole) 
10 It is interesting to note that a famous US empirical study recognised that, in the early 1980s, K-type 
policies where already needed for supporting "high technology centres in the Silicon Valley and along 
Highway 128 ( ... ) which, (despite their) formidable comparative advantage in the new high technology 
industries will shortly approach the holding capacity of their respective regions" (Premus, 1982, p. 
18. ) 
11 For an open and internationally integrated region the relevant extemal environment is the world, for a 
closed and underdeveloped region the relevant environment is limited to the nation, for an intermediate 
type of region, the external macro-environment is a group of countries. 
12 FLA, First Level Areas are defined in the thesis as the lowest considered level of analysis (US States, 
UK Counties, French Dipartments, Italian Province), while SLA, where S stands for second, are 
aggregation of FLAs (US Census divisions, UK, French and Italian regions). 
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can generate a higher amount of location net benefits through a higher amount of inter- 
industry technological externalities and a lower degree of local competition on specific 
inputs. This result suggests that, since multi-technology clusters13 are long-lived, they 
provide, in the long run, an higher degree of geographical specialisation of a particular 
industry. Taken together, these results seem to indicate that high degrees of industrial 
specialisation, measured by high value of the FLA employment location quotient, can be 
achieved by local policy intervention aimed at fostering a relative specialisation within 
the high-tech industry and at supporting the growth of size of incumbent firms. 
However it should be considered that if geographical specialisation on its own makes 
the region more vulnerable to industry-specific shocks, geographical specialisation with 
a large average firm size raises the potential risk of bankruptcy of the entire local 
economic structure which depends entirely on few independent firms". Furthermore it 
should be considered that a region with a given carrying capacity (or with a limited 
growth rate) can be saturated either by an increasing number of fin-ns or by the growing 
size of the incumbents and that the two processes require very different economic and 
institutional conditions. This last observation highlights that the policy maker faces an 
intrinsic trade off between growth policies and entry policies in order to foster the 
process of local industrial development (Markusen, 1987). 
The relevance of this industrial policy dilemma (entry versus growth) is further stressed 
by the empirical exercise of section 6.615 which has tested the empirical validity of three 
different explanations of the growth of high-tech clusters, which may be respectively 
attributed to Arrow-Romer, Porter and Jacobs. The analysis shows that the growth of 
industry employment in a given state is positively correlated with the local degree of 
sectoral specialisation (thus confirming the correlation between specialisation and 
growth) and negatively correlated with the degree of local monopoly (as measured by 
the average firm size). The empirical results seem therefore to support the story put 
forward by Porter in which both industrial specialisation and local competition foster the 
growth of an high-tech cluster. 
13 In accordance with the empirical evidence shown by Swann (1998). 
14 As witnessed by the historical case of the "rust belt" in the US. 
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Chapter 6 offers some alternative explanations of the fact that the actual degree of 
innovative industrial specialisation of an area is heavily dependent on the presence of 
large establishments (which enjoy higher economies of scale), while the growth rate of 
its sectoral employment is fostered by the presence of a competitive environment where 
small firms are predominant and economies of agglomeration play a major role. These 
interpretations - together with the ecological model of section 4.4 and the empirical 
evidence presented in section 6.3 - seem to suggest that policy makers must choose an 
industrial policy aimed at sustaining either firm entry or firm growth, according to the 
stage of development of the cluster and according to the prevailing macro-economic 
condition in the relevant external (national or international) economic environment. 
However it seems generally acknowledged that, since small firms have lower entry and 
exit costs, they are best suited for the early stages (when the cluster is still competing for 
the lead in the industry) and the very late phases of development of a cluster (when the 
main core of the cluster/industry is suffering from its first crisis, and profit opportunity 
are reserved for niche productions only), while large firms perform better in an 
intermediate and mature phase (a rationalisation period which follows the emergence of 
the cluster as the national, or even international, leader in the sector and precedes the 
crisis in the cluster). 
The issue of "optimal firm size" within an innovative cluster is, although indirectly, 
related to the role played by inter-industry technological complementarities (i. e. positive 
externalities arising from the location in the same site of firms in other high-tech 
sectors). It seems easier, for a policy maker, to introduce some degree of industrial 
diversification in a quasi single-technology cluster by fostering the entry of a number of 
small firms - belonging to other industries - than to obtain the same result by influencing 
the growth path of different firms in the cluster. 
Finally, the positive and significant coefficients of the sectoral specialisation of a SLA 
in the regression equation explaining the sectoral specialisation of a R. A (in section 6.3) 
imply that the probability of establishing a successful high-tech cluster in a given 
location is heavily dependent on the industrial vocation of the larger surrounding area. 
This last result seems therefore to add further strength to the conclusion that the creation 
15 Which - for reason related to the availability of a long time series of data - has been conducted on US 
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of an high-tech cluster cannot be easily used as a policy instrument for developing 
laggard and underdeveloped regions. 
7.6. The nature of the cluster (and its policy implications) 
If one agrees that the prime aim of economic policy in an advanced industrial country is 
to sustain its international competitiveness, and that the competitive advantages of 
countries are mainly based on their stock of knowledge - embodied in the skills and 
educational attainments of the labour force and incorporated in their technological 
infrastructures - then one must also agree that the leading objective of economic policy 
is to foster the development of the country's knowledge-based resources and to sustain 
its translation into competitive performance (Storey - Tether, 1998a and 1998b). 
In such a framework the traditional twofold structure, composed by science policy - 
which refers to the creation of new knowledge - and technology policy - which refers to 
the transformation of knowledge into products and processes and to the diffusion of 
innovations -, must be enlarged in order to accommodate a third type of policy, which 
refers to the trade in innovative goods and services, the adoption and adaptation of 
information and knowledge (both tacit and explicit), and internalisation within the 
existing local technological and economic system. This third type of policy - where 
science, technology and industry interact within a given institutional and territorial 
framework - calls for a series of economic policy interventions explicitly designed for 
supporting the generation and the development of innovative clusters (Temple, 1998). 
In the empirical literature explicitly devoted or even related to the analysis of such 
interventions (Preer, 1992; Hilpert, 1991; Luger and Goldstein, 1991; Scott, 1993; 
Castells - Hall, 1994; Storper, 1997) there is little if no reference to any theoretical 
reason justifying the need for a specific policy for innovative clusters. 
A notable exception is represented by Temple (1998), who describes what he calls 
"industrial clusters" as a geographical concentration of specialised firms where quasi- 
coordination is achieved through mechanisms such as "information pooling and the 
consequential formation of shared perception regarding technological opportunities and 
their associated risks" (ibid., p. 272). On the same page it is stressed the role played by 
data at the State level for the period 1975 - 1995. 
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"shared perception" which is tentatively defined as an "impure public good (or 'club 
good') because use can only be made of it if at least some economic resources are 
committed to interpreting and refining it for the particular circumstance in hand" (ibid. ). 
According to Temple, on the basis of "at least one element of a 'public good', namely 
its non-rivalry" (ibid., p. 279), it is necessary to design and implement appropriate 
policy interventions to solve the inefficiencies caused by market failures when dealing 
with different aspects of the process of creation and development of innovative clusters. 
Temple identifies "three possible areas for policy interventions: in the attainment of the 
critical mass, in the promotion of co-operative activities across firms and other 
institutions, and in the co-ordination of investment decisions" (ibid. ). 
This stimulating work needs further extensions and refinements. Several characteristics 
- such as the existence of a critical mass, mutual trust, joint use of a common pool of 
highly mobile human and technological resources, technological and productive 
interdependence which is implied by inter-firm specialisation and division of labour, 
and the definition and setting of technical standards - of an innovative industrial cluster, 
besides the "shared vision", call for a definition of the cluster per se as a peculiar type of 
public good. The first peculiarity lies in the coincidence of producers and users. The 
public good "innovative industrial cluster" is a by-product of the autonomous firm's 
decision to produce a private good in a given site16. The second peculiarity refers to the 
fact that the "innovative industrial cluster" seems to change its nature according to the 
number of users 17. 
If such are the features of an innovative industrial cluster, then it necessarily follows that 
the development of innovative industrial clusters is a case not only for public provision 
but also for interventions aimed at regulating its use. In order to discuss this issue it may 
be helpful to make use (with some changes) of a theoretical framework proposed, 
16 This is a case of joint production which can be described as a pure production externality. 
17 For the existence of a cluster, a minimum number (the critical mass) of users (producers) is needed. 
After that number is reached, the good is not only non-rival but the more users (producers), the higher the 
level of per-user benefits. However, once a second and higher level is reached, the good becomes 
congestible (i. e. rivalry begins to appear) and, if exclusion is not feasible, the good - or better the benefits 
generated by its use - disappears. 
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among others, by Adams - Mc Cormick (1987) and presented in table 7.1, together with 
figure 7.118. 
Figure 7.1. Agglomeration costs and benefits and critical sizes of a cluster 
Agglomeration A. 
benefits and 
costs 
0ABC 
B' xD 
Number of incumbents 
Table 7.1. A taxonomy of goods 
Exclusion 
Feasible 
Rival 
Consumption Congestible 
Non- rival 
Unprofitable 
or inexistent 
Average net benefits 
Marginal net benefits 
-*- Average costs 
0--- Marginal costs 
-A- Average gross benefits 
a... Marginal gross benefits 
Nonfeasihle 
1 private goods 4 commons 
Innovative cluster phase III 
2 club goods 5 non marketable impure public goods 
Science park phase Il Innovative cluster phase II 
3 marketable public goods 6 non marketable public goods 
Science park phase I Innovative cluster phase I 
K Potential location 21 
as science park and as innovative cluster 
0 
Lets start from figure 7.1, which shows marginal and average19 agglomeration benefits 
(costs) which are enjoyed (incurred) by a firm which locates in an area (which will be 
later defined as either "science park" or "innovative cluster" according to the feasibility 
of exclusion). It is now possible to follow the evolution of the area as more and more 
18 Already shown in chapter 4, as figure 4.2. 
19 Le. the benefits available to each incumbent firm. 
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firms decide to locate there (and the dimension of the area grows from 0 to D); the area 
will change its nature by going through the different cells of table 7.1 following 
alternatively the right or the left path (column). 
The two columns of table 7.1 refer to the feasibility of exclusion. It seems reasonable to 
assume that, in general, it is not possible to exclude a specific entrant firm willing to 
join an innovative industrial cluster without violating the most basic rules of economic 
democracy2O. The situation is completely reversed when the cluster under study is a 
property-based initiative (such as a science park) and, as such, it is explicitly defined as 
a "club" in which any new membership must be approved by the incumbents (or by an 
ad hoc committee). 
The two typologies of innovative area have in common an early development stage 
(0 < n: 5 A), characterised by strong indivisibility, when the number of located firms is 
smaller than the critical mass. In such a situation, the area - despite the fact that both 
marginal and average net benefits are increasing - is a mere potential site for the 
establishment of an innovative cluster or a science park since the average agglomeration 
benefits are zero or negative (i. e. these benefits are equal or lower than those enjoyable 
outside the area2l). After this initial stage the two development paths diverge. 
The development path of an innovative cluster, in which exclusion is unfeasible, is 
divided in three distinct phases. In the first phase (A<n: 5C), which follows 
immediately after reaching the critical mass, the cluster behaves as a pure non 
marketable public good. Each firm produces its output (private good) and indirectly 
produces a positive externality which is directly enjoyable by every firm located into the 
cluster. At this stage the level of externality is an increasing (concave) function of the 
number of local firms. In the second phase (C < n: 5 X) the innovative cluster acts as a 
non marketable impure public good. The incumbents (i. e. the firms already located in 
the cluster) would like to restrict any entry, since at C the average agglomeration net 
benefits are maximised and any further entry reduces them. A simple welfare analysis 
show that entry should continue (from a cluster social planner's point of view) until the 
20 And once the firm is located in the area is even more difficult to exclude it from enjoying most of the 
benefits. 
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regional industrial mass reaches X, where marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 
However the entry process continues, driven by the existence of positive average 
benefits and, once X is exceeded, the cluster initiates its third phase (X<n: 5D) 
becoming a common resource which is inevitably bound towards over-exploitation. 
Finally the net entry process ends in D when the excessive entry of firms drives the 
agglomeration benefits to zer022. In table 7.1 the evolution of the cluster is graphically 
represented by a path which, starting in cell 0, gradually reaches cells 6 and 5 and finally 
settles in cell 4. 
A different development process is followed by a managed (property based) form of 
industrial cluster such as a science park. In the first phase (from A to Q, the science 
park behaves as a marketable public good which, thanks to the feasibility of exclusion, 
is provided by private operators. After that, the science park can be managed as a club in 
order to control the effects of congestion in a way which allows it to reach the optimal 
social dimension X. Once this dimension has been reached, the park's management acts 
to keep it stable and further entries are allowed only to compensate in the event of exits 
or bankruptcies. In table 7.1 the evolution of a successful science park is graphically 
represented by a path which, starting in cell 0, gradually reaches cells 3 and finally 
settles in cell 2. 
From the above description, it necessarily follows that policy instruments for innovative 
areas must be chosen according to the nature of the area and to its development stage. It 
is in fact very different - apart from an initial phase, where the common problem is to 
reach the critical mass - managing agglomeration dynamics with and without the 
possibility of exclusion. 
In the case of an innovative cluster, where it is impossible to limit entry, local policy 
interventions can only indirectly regulate the entry speed23 and, above all, provide 
factors which exogenously determine the carrying capacity of the cluster. In particular 
local authorities can reduce the congestion pressure on a given cluster by improving the 
21 This benchmark level of benefits is assumed exogenously fixed and for convenience is set equal to 
zero. 
22 Even though new entries are still possible, at the expense of incumbents. 
23 A reduction in the entry speed can facilitate the adjustment of supply to changes in the local demand 
of goods and services. 
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amount of locally available resources and infrastructure (i. e. enlarging the existing road 
system, changing the destination of state-owned land, increasing the local level of 
human capital, raising the local level of supply of specialised services, etc. ) or by 
virtually enlarging the geographical dimension of the cluster by lowering the 
transportation costs from outside the area. A successful example of such a policy (and of 
co-operation between local public and private institutions) is represented by the 
California NUCRO program which throughout the Eighties provided funding for 
graduate fellowships and faculty research projects, by matching grants from private 
industry (OTA, 1984). Another example of local policy24 has been implemented during 
the Nineties in Silicon Valley and has indirectly targeted the extremely high cost of 
housing, which started to emerge as a serious barrier to the further development of the 
cluster. In this the transportation network has been improved through the enlargement of 
existing highways and the construction of new ones and through strong local support for 
the government-led deregulation of the airlines industry, which triggered the 
development of cheap airline "commuter" services to nearby states (Padmore - Gibson, 
1998). 
National policies can positively influence the creation of new innovative clusters by 
reducing local congestion in already established ones. In this way a sort of equilibrium ý 
la Tiebout (1956) can be achieved by offering a spatially differentiated and wider supply 
of locations to the population of high-tech firms. The most famous case of national 
policies is represented by the Japanese Technopolis Programme which, officially started 
in 1983 by national law, planned the establishment of a network of 26 high-technology 
production centres in order to develop local innovative R&D capacity and to trigger the 
development of such industries locally (Smilor et al. 1988; Gibson et al., 1992). This 
program intends to spur high-tech industries over the country through an initial pump- 
priming subsidy to stimulate the development of local R&D capacity in two ways. 
Firstly through the relocation, from the congested metropolitan areas, of existing high- 
tech firms, and second through assisted self-development of existing local industries 
(i. e. diffusion of innovative technologies into traditional sectors) (Castells - Hall, 1994). 
24 Although mainly local in its effects this can be better defined as an example of interactions between 
local and national policies. 
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A third, hybrid, but very common, type of intervention, composed of local policies 
performed by national authorities, is exemplified by procurement policies. This policy 
instrument, in which government plays a major role in local markets as purchasers of 
goods and services, has been a major element of success in the development of high- 
tech industries in Sweden and in the US. In Sweden, carefully structured State purchases 
led to the development of industrial strength in power transmission and rail transport 
(Edquist, 1995). In Silicon Valley and in the Route 128 area, the research contracts and 
purchases by the Department of Defence and NASA acted as powerful subsidies of local 
R&D allowing the development of innovative technologies which were the riskiest in 
terms of investment. Furthermore, the practice of "second sourcing" and technology 
sharing - together with the public diffusion requirement of the discoveries25 realised 
through the Department of Defence funding - led to a rapid technology diffusion among 
firms and a high rate of formation of spin-off firms (Preer, 1992; Scott, 1993; Saxenian, 
1994). 
In the case of science parks, the presence of an explicitly designed management function 
should allow, in principle, a decisive influence and control on the evolution of the area 
through a policy of selective admission and entry fees. Since this issue has generated an 
impressive amount of literaturc26, it seems sensible to devote the following section to 
the analysis of the phenomenon in order to summarise the empirical findings and to 
organise them in a tentative taxonomy. 
7.7. Policy instruments in actions: science parks and technopolis 
When surveying the literature on policy instruments devoted to supporting the 
establishment and development of innovative industrial clusters it is impossible to avoid 
a discussion about strengths and weaknesses, pros and cons, cost and benefits of science 
parks and technopolis. 
Let us start with a definition. A science park, or technopolis, is officially defined as: "A 
property-based initiative which: has operational links with Universities, Research 
Centres and/or other Institutions of Higher Education; is designed to encourage the 
25 With the exception of those classified as "military secrets". 
26 Mainly empirical and based on case-histories. 
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formation and growth of knowledge-based industries or high value-added tertiary firms, 
normally resident on site; has a steady management team actively engaged in fostering 
the transfer of technology and business skills to tenant organisations" (Rowe, 1988)27. 
Science parks are generated by formal organisations which sell or lease land and/or 
building to firms and other organisations whose principal activity is basic or applied 
R&D and/or the development of new products or processes. This definition therefore 
excludes other forms of high-tech clusters, centres or corridors (such as Route 128 and 
Silicon Valley in the US, the M4 corridor in the UK, the Rggion Parisienne in France, 
the metropolitan area of Milan in Italy) where high-tech firms have clustered without 
and outside formal property-based organisations. It is however interesting to note that 
some of these "spontaneous" clusters have originated from a science park (the most 
famous example being Silicon Valley which emanated from the Stanford Research Park 
in Palo Alto). 
A tentative taxonomy of science parks is based on their relationships with the local 
economic environment. According to this criterion, the main types of science parks refer 
to three different regional and urban management functions: development, re-conversion 
and de-localisation (Maggioni, 1990 and 1995). The first type refers to science parks 
(such as Research Triangle Park and Utah Research Park in the US, Cambridge Science 
Park in the UK, CSATA in Italy) which are located in areas of little, or no, established 
tradition in manufacturing, willing to build their economic development on the new 
technology-based industries. The second refers to science parks (such as Nancy Brabois 
and Metz 2000 in France, Aston in the UK, Tecriocity in Italy) located in areas 
characterised by the strong presence of one or a few traditional sectors28 which are now 
in crisis; the third refers to science parks (such as Sophia-Antipolis in France, Tsukuba 
in Japan) whose main objective was to relocate part of the scientific and technological 
resources which were gravitating around a metropolis in order to reduce the existing 
urban and infrastructural congestion. 
27 This definition is can also be found in the official YAW site of IASP, the International Association of 
Science Parks (http: //www. iaspworld. org). 
28 Such as : Ferrous metals, Fabricated metal products, Motor Vehicles. 
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Each type of science park uses different tools and incentives in order to promote the 
development of the area according to the prevailing conditions of the local economic 
system. Development science parks aim to build an entrepreneurial attitude and culture 
within the academia and provide strong incentives to the creation of spin-off firms from 
university laboratories. Re-conversion science parks underline the value of continuous 
education and training of the labour force and promote the diffusion of new technologies 
into mature sectors. De-localisation science parks attract scientists and highly qualified 
workers by offering better living conditions and try to substitute the geographical 
marginality of the area by the availability of high level technological infrastructures and 
a proximity to international airports. 
All these typologies share a common feature: they are based on the coexistence (and 
possibly, co-operation) of three different actors: fjnns29' public authorities, and research 
institutions. To be effective in a science park, these three actors, despite their different 
aims, must agree on the targets to be set, the tasks to be accomplished and the 
instrument to be used. To be efficient in a science park, each of the three actors must 
specialise in the provision of specific resources according to its own comparative 
advantages (Gibb, 1985). 
In particular, firms - which should develop strong producer-user interactions - are the 
main resources of a science parks, since they provide the co-ordination between capital 
and labour in new and advanced sectors. The main objective for a firm based in a 
science park is to enjoy the agglomeration economies - in terms of knowledge 
spillovers, reduced search costs, availability of skilled labour costs and specialised 
intermediate inputs - and to establish fruitful relationships with basic and applied 
research institutions. Luger and Goldstein (199 1) suggest a twofold taxonomy of science 
park development strategies (exogenous versus indigenous) related to the prevalent type 
of firms. Exogenous development means that the science park is "initiated, propelled 
and controlled by organisations located outside the region" ( ... ) (while) indigenous 
development refers to development that is regionally initiated and planned" (ibid., p. 
18). In the first case, the science park promotes the location of R&D departments and 
29 Which are mainly private-owned, but - in the French and Italian experience - may also be public- 
owned ones. 
242 
branch plants of large national and foreign multinational corporations; in the second a 
central role is played by locally owned small and medium enterprises. 
Public authorities (both local and national) see the science park as a flexible and 
systemic tool to implement innovation supporting policies. They may act according to 
two different "styles" of policy. In the "early American style" public authorities play 
only an indirect role on the development of science parks, acting mainly as promoters of 
research contracts and purchasers of high-tech goods and services. In the "European30 
style" - in which the science park is also used as an instrument to narrow existing 
geographical gaps by developing peripheral areas - the government plays a direct role in 
the establishment, and sometimes also in the management, of the park. The main 
objectives of public authorities, involved in a science park, span therefore from 
increasing the international competitiveness of the national economy in knowledge 
based sectors, to the reduction of existing intra-national economic and social 
unbalances, from the diversification and re-vitalisation of the local economic structure, 
to the reduction of public expenditure for universities. 
Universities and research institutions provide the scientific engine of science parks. 
They are responsible for the education of the local labour force, the monitoring of the 
international scientific and technological dynamics, the expansion of scientific and 
technical knowledge, and the diffusion of innovations within the local industrial 
structure. Their main objective when joining a science park is to achieve and maintain 
international scientific reputation, to develop basic research with potential industrial 
application, and to encourage funding support from private firms. 
A science park can therefore be seen as a managed form of innovative industrial cluster 
where the achievement of the critical mass, the promotion of co-operative activities and 
the co-ordination of investment decisions are granted and regulated by specific policy 
actions. The achievement of the critical mass, in the early phases of development of a 
science park, is accomplished through the location (or re-location) of public research 
laboratories and/or public owned firms, the promotion of academic spin-off and the 
attraction of subsidiaries of multinational firms. The encouragement of co-operative 
activities is the main task of the science park's management which is actively engaged 
30 Or "late American style,. 
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in fostering the interaction between firms and other institutions located in the park and 
is also fostered by specific national and super-national research projects3l. The co- 
ordination of investment decisions is often attained within the science park through the 
setting of technical standards and the existence on site of an active financial sector 
especially devoted to the funding of innovative activities (e. g. venture capitals etc. ). 
As for any policy measure, for science parks it is also important to establish not only 
some guidelines for their design and implementation but also to list a series of 
performance indicators which should be used in order to evaluate success or failure. 
Such indicators have been explicitly and specifically designed for science parks; 
however, some of them can be easily adapted and used in order to evaluate the 
performance of any innovative industrial cluster. General indicators are: the number of 
new jobs created since the establishment of the science parks, the number of new firms 
generated and the number of already existing firms which re-located in the park, the 
number of patent registered by firms and other institutions resident in the park. Specific 
indicators are: the number of firms which have used services provided by the science 
park's management, the amount and source (public, venture capital, banking credits) of 
funds which have been raised and invested in the park. 
At present, science parks are established policy instruments only in the US (where they 
originated in the 1950s) and in France (late 1960s). In other European countries, science 
parks and technopolis were only developed in the last ten - fifteen years and therefore it 
is more difficult to value their efficacy. A number of empirical studies for the UK and 
the Netherlands (Westhead - Storey, 1994; Dollar - Wolff, 1993; Sternberg, 1997) show 
that science parks have a very limited positive influence on the rate of growth (measured 
both on employment and establishment) and on the survival rate of tenant firms. The 
situation is thus rather different from the American and the French experience where 
studies shows either a marked general positive effects for the US case (Luger - 
Goldstein, 1991) or, at least, an industry-specific positive effect in France (Longhi - 
Quer6,199 1). 
31 This is the explicit scope of several UE programs such as Eureka. 
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7. & Guidelines for policy makers 
The theoretical models presented in chapter 4 and the empirical evidence presented in 
chapter 6 of the thesis have underlined the path dependence and non ergodic features of 
the development process of high-tech clusters. The previous sections have discussed in 
depth some of the issues relating to the choice of the best policy intervention for 
promoting the generation and sustaining the development of high-tech clusters. 
It is rather difficult to summarise all these findings down to a sketchy list of policy 
prescriptions. For this reason, before trying that, it seems sensible to highlight some of 
the major issues involved. 
The first issue refers to the difficulty in identifying dynamic new sectors of production 
before they have started to grow and "yet once growth has begun and agglornerative 
forces have set in, the chances of creating a new agglomeration elsewhere are much 
diminished, for the first-mover advantages and localised externalities that accrue to the 
original case help to crowd out late imitators" (Scott, 1993, p. 256). 
Another issue relates to the degree of spatial competition. Sometimes the strategies 
implemented by competing local public agencies to develop an high-tech cluster in their 
own jurisdiction (by offering similar locational benefits) may generate an "arms race" 
type of game in which costs are far in excess of the benefits. The crucial assumption for 
the Tiebout (1956) principle to hold is, together with perfect mobility of firms, the 
existence of a sufficient degree of differentiation between localities, so that firms can 
locate according to their valuation of different mixes of locational factors. Furthermore, 
it must be considered that regional competition mechanisms are likely to widen rather 
than narrow existing regional disparities (Kaldor, 1970), since less developed regions 
are often unable to offer conditions and incentives for attracting high-tech firms 
comparable to those provided by more advanced regions. 
A further issue deals with the optimal level of implementation and funding of policy 
interventions supporting the establishment and development of an innovative industrial 
cluster (whether in a spontaneous or managed form). In particular the main option is 
between the local or the national level32. The answer, which from an institutional 
32 For the European countries the level become threefold because, especially after the White Paper 
(Delors, 1993), one must consider the European Union as a major player in any innovation related policy. 
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perspective is influenced by the degree of centralisation of the different countries, from 
an economic point of view, is related to the spatial distribution of assigned tasks and 
expected benefits. 
A final issue concerns the statement that regional policies in general (and innovative 
cluster interventions in particular) cannot be focused - as they were conceived in the 
'60s and early '70s - on the geographical redistribution and equalisation of income and 
employment. The difficulties of implementing radical local economic transfon-nation 
and of establishing new agglomeration ex-nihilo are widely known and it is also well 
recognised that the only viable alternative is to build incrementally on what already 
exists. This is not to say that underdeveloped regions should be left over; on the contrary 
anywhere there are (even limited) local endowments of human and capital resources, 
there are real possibilities of building a development process. It is however clear that 
industrial innovative clusters cannot be started everywhere and that, in the case of an 
absolute lack of initial advantages, only massive, concerted and extremely expensive 
actions by central government authorities have the possibility of producing results 
whose net effects are, however, ambiguous. 
At this stage one may summarise the main lessons which can be extracted by distilling 
the complex of theoretical models, empirical evidence, and case histories contained in 
the thesis in a series of sketchy policy suggestionS33. 
A policy maker willing to design and implement a series of policy interventions aimed 
at fostering the creation and promoting the development of an innovative industrial 
cluster must always: 
i) Identify the main type of locational instrument which will be used. In particular, 
choose between innovative cluster and science park models because- they are 
different and require different policies. 
ii) Choose the best development strategy according to the different development stage 
of the area, and the level and variability of the relevant macro-economic 
environment outside the area. 
33 Which is partially modelled on Castells - Hall, 1994. 
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iii) Take into account the path dependent and inertial nature of the location process, 
trying therefore to marginally modify rather then completely change the industrial 
location pattern of an area34. 
iv) Consider carefully the demand and supply of innovative inputs, not only in the 
targeted area but also in the neighbouring ones (with special reference to those 
regions which have long established relationship with the targeted area) in order to 
avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and potentially inefficient competition35. 
V) Choose between an exogenous and an indigenous development strategy according 
to the actual potentiality of the area (Luger - Goldstein, 1991), remembering that 
"branch plants are better than no plants" (Castells - Hall, 1994, p. 248). 
vi) Choose between a multi-technology versus a single-technology type of cluster by 
taking into account the expected degree of convergence of intra and inter industry 
technologies and the different development time-paths of the two types of cluster, 
since the former grows more rapidly while the latter is more long-lived being less 
prone to congestion (Swann, 1998). 
vii) Consider that the time horizon in which an innovative industrial cluster reaches 
maturity from its birth is on average longer than the usual period in which a firm 
expects to reach the break-even point of an investment and also longer than the 
usual political election cycle. For this reason it is essential to provide a series of 
protective mechanisms against premature accusation of failure. Conversely one 
should also avoid the temptation to expand the scope and the scale of the 
experiment in order to escape from evaluation processes. 
34 In situation where there is a "considerable concentration of 'institution and networks' in a central core 
region it may be best to attempt at local decentralisation to the periphery of this region rather than 
developing distant region. ( ... ) If (however) it is desired to build up synergistic capacities in other, more 
peripheral region, it will almost certainly be necessary to concentrate in one or two target areas that offer 
the best prospects ( ... ). A scatter-shot strategy, though more acceptable in political terms may fail to build 
up momentum anywhere (Castells - Hall, 1994, p. 248). 
35 A super-regional coordination mechanism would have avoided the bidding war which developed in 
the early 1980s between a number of states and communities (including Research Triangle in North- 
Carolina, San Diego in California, Phoenix in Texas) for the location of the research headquarters of the 
semiconductor industry's Microelectronic and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and research agenda 
This need for the emergence of "growing points" or "growth 
poles" in the course of the development process means that 
international and inter-regional inequality of growth is an 
inevitable concomitant and condition of growth itself. Thus in 
the geographic sense, growth is necessarily unbalanced. 
A. 0. Hirschmann (1958) The Strategy of Economic 
Development. 
The thesis has looked at the location process of high-tech firms and at the emergence of 
spatial industrial clusters. The main contributions achieved by the work are the 
following. 
Clustering (i. e. the spatial concentration of high-tech industries in a given 
location) is a relevant phenomenon in four major industrialised countries. 
Clustering is not limited to innovative industries but, in general, these sectors 
show an above average bias towards spatial concentration. This has been checked 
with reference to two "benchmark" sectors (Motor vehicles and Textiles) which 
have been signalled by Krugman (1991a) as two clustered traditional industries. 
The extent of industrial clustering is heavily dependent on the spatial and 
industrial definitions of the measurement unit. For this reason the statistical 
analysis has been conducted at two different geographical levels and a careful 
harmonisation of different national industrial classifications has been performed. 
Clustering is also heavily influenced by the variable chosen for the analysis. In the 
thesis both employment and establishments data have been used. Finally, different 
concentration and inequality indexes may give different results. 
The US appear to have the highest concentration ratio when clustering is measured 
in term of establishments. If (bearing in mind the usual caveats) one thinks of the 
US as a similar country to the future monetary and economic European Union, 
then high-tech clustering seems bound to increase in the next future in Europe. 
iv) Different streams of literature have been surveyed and used in the thesis to look at 
the relation between clustering and location processes. A useful twofold taxonomy 
of these contributions is based on the main source of locational benefits, these 
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being either geographical (i. e. site-dependent) or agglomeration (firm-dependent) 
benefits. 
V) Location models should explain why firms entry processes into the cluster takes 
time. The most interesting rationale refers to so called "ranle' effects (i. e. the 
existence of either subjective or objective differences in the set of potential 
entrants) and to epidemic effects (which may either refer to the diffusion of 
information or to an endogenous decrease in uncertainty). 
vi) Cluster development models should take into account the internal dynamics of a 
clusters development as well as the external ones. By "external" we mean three 
different sort of processes: the inter-industry relations within the same region, the 
inter-regional relations within the same industry, the influence of the surrounding 
national and international macro-economic conditions. When expectations are 
introduced into ecologically derived models of cluster development, these become 
very similar to the (subjective) rank effects modelled described in (v). 
vii) A highly educated labour force, strong innovative vocation, and low corporate 
income tax seem to favour the location of high-tech firms in dynamic areas. 
Established industrial centres and declining areas are, on the contrary, deserted by 
high-tech industry. 
viii) Scale economies, in general, outweigh agglomeration economies as the major 
determinant of industrial specialisation. Inter-industry technological externalities 
seem stronger than geographical knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, for the 
Instruments industry, there is empirical evidence of locational shadowing. 
ix) In general, competitive interactions between high-tech clusters are not 
symmetrical. The development of one cluster may well be negatively influenced 
by the industrial specialisation of a neighbouring area even if the development of 
the latter is uninfluenced by the industrial activity of the former. 
X) Industrial specialisation and local competition are, according to Porter (1990) and 
to our empirical evidence (based on the evolution of 112 US high-tech clusters 
from 1975 to 1995), the "engines" of cluster growth. 
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xi) The desirability of different types of policy is heavily dependent on the 
development stages of the cluster (within its life cycle) and the macro-economic 
conditions of the relevant external economic environment. 
xii) 11igh-tech industrial clusters may be developed by policy makers either as 
innovative clusters or as science parks. The choice is crucial, since on it depends the 
future evolution of the areas and the different policy instruments which must be 
implemented in order to ensure their success. 
Future research plans involve the extension of the database to other advanced countries 
(such as Germany, Canada and Japan) and the use of "spatial indexes" as explanatory 
variables of the international competitiveness of different sectoral and national systems 
of innovation; the re-estimation of the industrial and spatial interaction effects of section 
6.5 at a lower geographical level, (i. e. different counties within high-tech clusters such 
as Silicon Valley, Route 128, Research Triangle); the collection of firm level data in 
order to test the diffusion derived model of section 4.5; and the construction of a 
simulation framework for exploring the spatial diffusion patterns of high-tech clusters 
when agglomeration economies and diseconomies, and spatial and industrial spillovers 
are present. 
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